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This thesis explores how the topic of laboratory animal research is related to in everyday life 
in the UK, providing a sociological analysis of practices of knowing, caring, and constructing 
necessary biomedical uses of animals. In doing so, it develops the few qualitative studies of 
societal understandings of animal research, aiming to expand analyses in this area beyond 
measurement of polarised and static notions of acceptance or opposition. Instead, this thesis 
approaches understandings of animal research as relational and positional, emerging within 
particular yet shared social worlds which give the issue meaning in the everyday. Such a 
stance goes beyond efforts to observe what people think or know about animal research 
which dominate previous studies in this area and, instead, opens these categories up further 
to explore what animal research means to individuals and why. In this way, the thesis 
challenges assumptions of passive absorption of information on the issue and accusations of 
public ignorance or misunderstanding.  
Diverging from the dominant emphasis in this area on examining the views of the ‘general 
public’, this thesis explores the contributions of a specifically situated sample, namely 
correspondents to the Mass Observation Project, a national life-writing project in the UK. The 
Project’s embrace of plurality, reflexivity, and embodied knowledges provides an opportunity 
for a qualitative analysis of understandings of animal research which resists the pull to resolve 
concerns or debate in this area. In thematically analysing the 159 written responses to a 2016 
Mass Observation Project Directive on the topic of ‘Using animals in research’, this study 
focuses on processes through which correspondents to the Project, or ‘Mass Observers’ as 
they are known, relate to animal research.  
Going beyond assessments of attitudinal positions on the issue, this thesis attends to the 
messy affective and material dimensions of relations with animal research, embracing the 
ubiquity of ambivalence and discomfort that surround the topic. In doing so, the analysis 
presented here reveals tensions that animal research can generate amongst care obligations, 
moral values, and identities. Dwelling on the socio-ethical concerns associated with animal 
research, this thesis argues that science-society relations around the issue should move away 
from seeking consensus and instead contend with the complexity of concern it evokes, 
engaging with such concerns not as problems, but as valid and important contributions to a 
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This thesis explores how the controversial and highly debated topic of animal research is 
related to in everyday life in the UK, looking at practices of knowing, caring, and constructing 
necessary biomedical uses of animals. To achieve this, it draws on an analysis of writing from 
the Mass Observation Project, a national writing project in the UK, and literature across the 
fields of Public Understanding of Science, Science and Technology Studies, Care Ethics, and 
the Sociology of Ignorance. In doing so, the thesis aims to move beyond the traditional 
polarisation of understandings of animal research into absolute positions of support or 
opposition, instead seeking complexity over consensus. In critiquing elements which currently 
limit science-society dialogue around animal research, this introductory chapter first provides 
an overview of the UK regulatory framework around animal research, gives context on the 
openness agenda and the societal debate around the issue, and introduces the method at the 
centre of this thesis. The chapter concludes with an outline of the research questions which 
have guided this project and the overall thesis structure.  
1.1 The regulation of animal research 
The use of non-human animals in scientific research is argued to be necessary to the 
advancement of science (Barré-Sinoussi and Montagutelli, 2015: 8) and in 2019, 3.40 million 
procedures involving the use of non-human animals were conducted in Great Britain. Animals 
can be used in ‘basic’ research which aims to gain a better understanding of a particular 
system or phenomenon, ‘applied’ research which investigates specific pre-defined 
hypotheses, ‘regulatory testing’ which involves testing the safety and efficacy of drugs and 
chemicals, environmental research, and in education and training. The majority (57%) of UK 
scientific procedures using animals undertaken in 2019 were for the purpose of basic 
research, with the three main areas focused on being the immune system, the nervous system 
and oncology (Home Office, 2020: 2). However, as well as experimental procedures which 
constituted 1.73 million of all procedures in 2019, 1.67 million procedures using animals 
concerned the creation and breeding of genetically altered (GA) animals (ibid).   
The use of animals in the UK is regulated at the national level via the Home Office’s Animals 
in Science Regulation Unit (ASRU) and the Animals in Scientific Procedures Act 1986, 
commonly referred to as ‘A(SP)A’, and at the European level through the EU Directive 
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(2010/63/EU). Embedded within both levels of regulation are the principles of Replacement, 
Reduction, and Refinement, referred to as the 3Rs. These principles were put forward in 
Russell and Burch’s (1959) publication of The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique 
and emphasise the importance of experimental animal welfare. Replacement concerns the 
aim of replacing non-human animals in scientific procedures with NHA alternatives wherever 
possible. This could mean either full replacement (no animals are used) or partial 
replacement, which may include the ‘use of some animals that, based on current scientific 
thinking, are not considered capable of experiencing suffering’ (NC3Rs 2021). The principle of 
reduction aims to minimise the number of animals used in scientific procedures, aiming to 
obtain as much data as possible from each animal in order to decrease the overall number of 
animals used. This may include the ‘microsampling of blood, where small volumes enable 
repeat sampling in the same animal’ and data-sharing to avoid duplication (ibid). Finally, 
refinement concerns research design which ensures that the impact on any animals used is 
as minor as possible. Examples of refinement may cover the housing, pain relief, and training 
of animals used in scientific procedures.  
In the UK, The National Centre for the 3Rs (NC3Rs) works to improve 3Rs implementation 
across bioscience institutions, providing information and training resources and funding 
research projects which further the 3Rs principles. The 3Rs framework also guides the ethical 
review process performed by localised ethics committees called Animal Welfare and Ethics 
Review Bodies (AWERBS) who decide whether to licence project proposals involving animal 
use or not. As well as the 3 Rs, another key ethical framework which informs the regulation 
of animal research is the Harm-Benefit Analysis (HBA), which weighs up the potential harms 
that a procedure is likely to inflict against the expected benefits of the research. This 
utilitarian model is intended to ensure that only projects able to demonstrate that the 
potential benefits outweigh the potential harms will be licenced.  
In considering the potential harms that a given project using animals may inflict, assessments 
are not limited only to the expected impact on the non-human animals involved but also 
consider how the research might negatively affect the local and wider society. For instance, 
the use of particular species deemed as occupying special social status is seen as more 
societally contentious and harmful than using other species, and it is for this reason that dogs, 
cats, horses, and non-human primates are classified as ‘specially protected’ species and 
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afforded higher levels of protection under A(SP)A (Home Office, 2017). Hobson-West and 
Davies (2017) argue that such consideration of how animal research might perpetrate societal 
harm signifies a recognition of what they term ‘societal sentience’, with the regulation here 
intending to ‘reduce societal pain, suffering, distress and lasting harm potentially caused by 
laboratory animal science’ (Hobson-West and Davies, 2017: 15-16). Such work draws 
attention to the role that societal understandings of animal research play in shaping its 
regulation.    
However, in order for the practice of animal research to function within acceptable societal 
parameters, areas of particular societal concern or priority must be continually monitored, 
identified, and addressed in regulatory processes. Raising this point, a 2017 report on the HBA 
by the Animals in Science Committee (ASC), a non-departmental public body created by the 
Home Office to provide independent advice to the Government on animal research, called for 
better identification of societal concerns and more consideration of such concerns if they are 
found. As the report states –  
‘At present, societal concerns relevant to harms and benefits (along with important 
ethical concerns and novel or contentious issues) are not well defined. In addition, 
there is no clear mechanism for ensuring that the diversity of relevant issues is 
identified and given due scrutiny within the project evaluation and HBA processes. If 
and when societal concerns are identified, they should clearly be placed in the ‘harm’ 
side of the HBA and given due weighting’ (ASC 2017: 62).  
As this excerpt emphasises, to maintain good practice in the scientific use of animals, the 
bioscience community must be considerate of societal understandings of the issue. 
Methodologically, this task would seem to demand the fostering of open and mutually 
meaningful dialogical processes which enable publics to articulate their views towards animal 
research practice and engage in ongoing discussions about how animals are used in science. 
Yet, most prevalent in shaping science-society dialogue on the topic, as we will now explore, 
is the bioscience community’s turn to institutional openness on animal research.  
1.2 The openness agenda 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, the UK saw several high-profile undercover investigations, 
activist campaigns, and instances of extremism around animal research. For instance, in 1999, 
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Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) was founded in response to footage aired in a 
Channel 4 documentary showing staff at Huntingdon Life Sciences assaulting beagles whilst 
taking samples of their blood (Bright, 2001). In 2004, brothers running a guinea pig breeding 
facility for use in research suffered the desecration of their mother-in-law’s grave by animal 
liberation activists (BBC, 2006). Also in 2004, SPEAK (originally Stop Primate Experimentation 
at Cambridge) was founded to campaign against the build of new animal research facilities at 
universities in Cambridge and Oxford. Though successful in their first endeavour, in their 
second campaign against the construction of a new biomedical research facility at the 
University of Oxford, SPEAK encountered the response of a pro-animal research campaign. In 
response to SPEAK’s Oxford protests, in 2006 16-year-old Laurie Pycroft formed Pro-Test, a 
research advocacy group with the intention to ‘dispel the irrational myths promoted by anti-
vivisectionists and to encourage people to stand up for science and human progress’ (Pro-
Test, accessed 2018). Despite years of lobbying from animal rights groups, the animal 
research facility at Oxford was built.  
Recognising the achievements gained in responding to anti-animal research groups and the 
negative impact of withdrawing from public discussions, the bioscientific community recently 
embraced an agenda of openness. This was formalised by the 2014 launch of the Concordat 
on Openness on Animal Research by the non-profit research advocacy organisation 
Understanding Animal Research (UAR). The Concordat has received 126 signatures to date 
from life science organisations who commit to improving transparency, openness, and data-
sharing (UAR 2021). Demonstrating a shift from mitigating the risks of openness to the risks 
of secrecy, included in the Concordat’s Objectives for 2017 to 2020 is to ‘[a]lert the research 
community to the risks of secrecy, and provide support for greater transparency, highlighting 
its benefits for science, animal welfare and communications’ (Williams and Hobson, 2019: 8). 
Underlying this turn, however, is an assumption that an increase in providing scientific and 
regulatory information on animal research will resolve societal concerns towards the practice. 
Such an approach frames those with concerns as inherently hostile and as a problem to be 
solved rather than engaged with, as shown in the excerpt from UAR below –   
‘Within the life-science sector the Concordat has inspired collaborations between 
institutions, and challenged the fears associated with speaking about animal research, 
to reflect a society where the voices against using animals in science are becoming 
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more reasoned and less aggressive. For wider-society, the Concordat has provided 
better access to information about animals in research. This has led to a greater 
understanding of the role of animal care staff, enabling interested public to see inside 
facilities, and more considered news stories on the use of animals in research’ (UAR 
2017).  
This reflection on the work of the Concordat illustrates an important way in which publics are 
constructed through the openness agenda on animal research, being seen as a threat to 
scientific practice caused by mass ignorance, misinformation, and irrationality. Therefore, in 
constructing this public imaginary (Rommetveit and Wynne, 2017; Paper on the construction 
of public imaginaries in the UK animal research debate by McGlacken and Hobson-West is 
under review, see Appendix G), the task of the bioscientific community is set to neutralise and 
manage this threatening public entity (Welsh and Wynne, 2013), either through educating 
and informing the public on the scientific basis and necessity of animal models and the 
stringency of the regulatory framework or by displaying institutional transparency and 
challenging assertions of secrecy through release of data such as annual statistics. These 
approaches treat publics as students to be taught and as silent witnesses of data, substituting 
reciprocal engagement with the views and concerns of publics for one-way management and 
dismissal.  
Indeed, the enactment of such openness on animal research has itself come under scrutiny, 
being characterised as ‘selective’ and chiefly ‘a matter of controlling information’ (Holmberg 
and Ideland, 2010: 365; see also Pound and Blaug, 2016). As will be explored in Chapter 5, the 
practice of openness on animal research largely treats this as an end in itself, with information 
sharing through release of annual statistics of national animal use, institutional webpages 
dedicated to explaining their animal use to lay audiences, non-technical summaries of project 
licences, virtual tours of certain laboratory facilities1 and so on being presented as fulfilment 
of the bioscience community’s contribution to public discourse around animal research. 
However, as a bioethical controversy and enduring moral dilemma, animal research is an issue 
which requires collective discussion which is inclusive of diverse perspectives and open to 





nor are they ‘students’ to be taught: ‘the learning is open ended, and there is no “teacher” to 
set standards and design a learning process’ (Limoges, 1993: 422). Rather, all actors involved 
create the controversy through what Limoges terms their ‘worlds of relevance’, in doing so 
redefining what is at stake and what matters through their interactions with one another. 
Nevertheless, as will be explored next, current efforts towards fostering science-society 
dialogue and public involvement in decision-making processes around animal research fall 
short of the reciprocity at the core of such an approach.  
1.3 The role of publics in dialogues around animal research  
Although I have argued that the enactment of openness around animal research fails to 
contribute to two-way dialogical processes involving publics, ‘public opinion’ represents a 
valuable resource to various stakeholders in the practice (Hobson-West, 2010). As Chapter 2 
will discuss in detail, the manufacture of public opinion through national opinion polling and 
surveying plays a leading role in science-society discourse on the issue and is frequently 
gestured to by stakeholders with differing positions. Poll results are often referred to as 
evidencing what ‘the public’ think or know about animal research, with stakeholder 
organisations then able to use elements of this public mood to underscore their particular 
positions or aims with democratic legitimacy. In such cases, national polling can provide 
credibility to public education initiatives by interpreting such data as reflecting public 
ignorance or misinformation on the issue (UAR 2019: 2) or can be pointed at as evidencing 
public opposition to animal research and a desire for the replacement of animal models with 
alternatives (PeTA, 2019). Indeed, as insights from the field of Public Understanding of Science 
have shown, such mechanisms can work as technologies of ‘elicitation’ (Lezaun and Soneryd, 
2007), acting as ways of strategically managing publics and their participation.  
As well as this, such methods often overlook the affective ways in which individuals 
understand animal research. On this point, Michael (2001) argues that the survey as a method 
cannot capture the ‘changeability’ of opinion, claiming that ‘[c]ontradiction, ambivalence and 
so on are, rather, obscured in the production of reasonableness and balance, that is, in the 
performance of rationality and the self-presentation of self-possession’ (Michael, 2001: 216). 
Indeed, in discourse on animal research emotion towards the topic is often construed as 
evidence of irrationality, as this excerpt from Yogeshwar, a science TV presenter in Germany, 
on the risks of public advocacy for animal research demonstrates –  
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'An audience presented with multiple opinions and viewpoints tends not to weigh the 
credentials and expertise of the speakers, but to decide on instinct who is more 
emotionally credible. Even if a television programme is convinced to not air graphic 
images of animals, an actress weeping about the fate of a puppy will carry more weight 
than a dry scientist with a logical defence' (Aziz et al., 2011: 459). 
Therefore, in restricting how publics can relate to animal research, favouring clear-cut binary 
positions and the closure of tick-box responses, the dominance of opinion polls and surveys 
in this area ignores the complexity that emotional understandings of the issue can introduce. 
Attending to the role of affect in animal research, there is a growing body of social scientific 
research exploring the practices of multispecies care between actors in the laboratory 
(Holmberg, 2011; Greenhough and Roe, 2011; 2018b; a; Friese and Latimer, 2019).  However, 
how wider publics might understand animal research through the lens of care has been 
overlooked in pursuance of their attitudes towards and knowledge on the issue.  
Overall, instead of viewing poll results as a guide for further discursive investigations of views 
towards animal research, enabling them to be explored in more detail and breadth, such 
mechanisms can be seen as creating public opinion which can then be used to reinforce the 
pre-held positions and agendas of stakeholder organisations. Indeed, going further, such 
approaches of eliciting views towards animal research help to construct a homogenous public 
entity, allowing for the plurality, positionality, and relationality of views and feelings towards 
animal research to be ignored.  
Again, this construction of ‘the public’ by stakeholders in the societal discourse around animal 
research is unpacked in the literature review in Chapter 2, however, it is pertinent to note 
here how this imagination of publics feeds into the restriction of science-society dialogues on 
the issue. As touched on in the earlier discussion of openness around animal research in 
subsection 1.2, the construction of publics as a homogenous collective makes possible claims 
of ‘public’ support or opposition to animal research, minimising the nuance that exists 
between these absolute positions and the contexts which shape such relations to the issue. 
Similarly, in utilising particular constructions of ‘the public’ to further their own position on 
animal research, stakeholder organisations are able to characterise this public as collectively 
threatening, irrational, emotional, supportive, ignorant, misled, outraged and so on when it 
is useful to do so.  
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As signified in the ways that openness around animal research has been implemented, 
current bioscientific interactions with publics on animal research often treat concerns 
towards the practice as problems to be solved. As MacArthur Clark et al. (2019) put it, ‘[i]t is 
likely there will always be a sector of society that actively opposes animal research. Therefore, 
responding to the concerns of that sector, and preventing activists from becoming radicalized, 
involves engaging today’s public and educating them about the contributions that science has 
made to human and animal lives’ (MacArthur Clark et al., 2019). Given this, science-society 
interactions are often conducted in ways which seek to close down concerns i.e. through 
educating or informing publics and dismissing their views as illegitimate. Such disengagement 
with societal concerns towards animal research undermines the social contract upon which 
science can be ethically and most valuably practiced. Indeed, rather than treating 
disagreement as a hindrance to productive public engagement, Irwin (2017) claims that 
‘concepts like dissensus, disclosure, conflictual consensus and agonism are valuable—but 
they should be seen as part of the consensual ideal rather than a contrast to it’ (Irwin, 2017: 
12).  
To embrace societal concerns around the scientific use of animals is to recognise that such 
concerns should also be present throughout the bioscientific community, being part of a 
commitment to ethical reflexivity and motivating the implementation of the 3Rs. In valuing 
concern around animal research not as inherently antagonistic but as an important part of 
citizenly engagement with one aspect of how ‘we’ as a society treat animals, science-society 
dialogues on the issue may begin to move away from a paradigm based in conflict. Such a 
shift would encourage societal discourse to better address the nature of animal research as 
an issue of enduring bioscientific controversy and moral concern (Beauchamp et al., 2015a; 
Beauchamp et al., 2015b; Degrazia and Beauchamp, 2015) that is bound up with lived 
understandings of human-animal relations and expectations of the role of science and 
medicine. It is the contention of this thesis, then, that animal research remains problematic 
in the UK and rather than seeking to resolve concerns towards the practice, many of which I 
will suggest in the conclusion to this thesis are unresolvable without the full replacement of 




Furthermore, involving publics in discussions on animal research means more than engaging 
with ‘concerns’, it means exploring the range of societal sensitivities and sentiment around 
how animal research is practiced and being guided by priorities that publics identify for its 
future. Therefore, to explore these areas in a way which embraces their plurality and nuance, 
this thesis uses the Mass Observation Project (MOP), a national life-writing project based in 
the UK which I will now introduce.  
1.4 The Mass Observation Project 
To explore understandings of animal research, this thesis is based on a qualitative analysis of 
writing from The Mass Observation Project (MOP), a national life-writing project which aims 
to document ‘everyday life in Britain’ (Mass Observation, 2015b). As accounted for in more 
detail in Chapter 3, the MOP maintains a panel of voluntary correspondents from across the 
UK, referred to as ‘Mass Observers’, who are engaged with through ‘Directives’, a set of 
questions or prompts on a particular topic. Directives span a varied range of topics but areas 
of interest can be brought together under the heading of ‘everyday life’. In analysing the 159 
responses to the 2016 ‘Using animals in research’ MOP Directive, this thesis aims to offer an 
alternative mode of studying societal understandings of animal research which attends to the 
particular contexts that shape such understandings, seeking nuance instead of generality and 
being careful not to treat analyses as representative of ‘the public’. 
In situating the data upon which this study is based in the ‘everyday’, I am explicitly 
attempting to move away from concepts such as ‘public’ views or opinions. Instead, I use the 
notion of the ‘everyday’ to mark the location of this data within the MOP and its longstanding 
focus on everyday life in Britain. As an object of study, the everyday can be hard to define, 
being seemingly embedded in mundane and ordinary experiences yet equally all-
encompassing and intangible (for a 'peripatetic' discussion of different conceptualisations of 
the 'everyday', see Chapter 2 in Michael, 2006). Understanding the everyday as signifying 
totality, Burkitt (2004) describes it as including the official and formalised as well as the 
interpersonal and intimate elements of social life. As they summarise, ‘[e]veryday life is 
profoundly related to all activities, and encompasses them with all their differences and their 
conflicts; it is their meeting place, their bond and their common ground. It is in everyday life 
that the sum total of relations that make the human – and every human being – a whole takes 
its shape and form’ (Burkitt, 2004: 211).  
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As well as signalling the totality of social life, the concept of the everyday can attune us to its 
fluidity and relationality. As Back (2015) explains, ‘the value of thinking about the everyday is 
that it signals the routine and unfolding aspects of social life. It makes sociologists think about 
society not as a set of structural arrangements but as a moving and dynamic entity that has a 
rhythm and a temporality’ (Back, 2015: 820). Particularly important to this thesis is how the 
everyday ‘makes us take the mundane seriously and ask what is at stake in our daily 
encounters’ and ‘also means we have to think about the wider spectrum of life experiences’ 
(ibid, 821). Such an approach is important to provide legitimacy to the range of 
understandings of and relations to animal research, enabling a move beyond polarised 
positions of support and opposition and the hierarchisation of expert knowledges that is 
reflected in deficit-model (Millar and Wynne, 1988) approaches to exploring views towards 
animal research (more detail on which is provided in Chapter 2).  
Discussing the Mass Observation  Project’s own conceptualisation of the everyday, Highmore 
(2002) describes how, from its beginning in 1937 as the social research organisation Mass 
Observation (MO), the Project did not delineate what counts as everyday life. Rather, in 
practicing an open interpretation of the category, MO constructed the everyday as an object 
of study with political potential, enabling recognition of marginalised voices (with a ‘vast 
number’ of early recruits to the national panel being women) and undervalued elements of 
social life (i.e. the ‘domestic sphere’) (Highmore, 2002: 109). In doing so, Mass Observation is 
seen to pursue a ‘politics of everyday life’ which embraces ‘the non-rational, the affective and 
the oppositionally ritualistic’ and ‘has as its potential the purposeful destruction of the hard 
and fast distinction between specialist and amateur, between objectivity and subjectivity, 
between science and art’ (ibid, 110-111).  
In these ways, the MOP presents an alternative to the problems identified earlier in this 
chapter that limit dominant approaches to researching ‘public’ views. For instance, as will be 
explored in depth in Chapter 3, with its own strong commitment to the importance of 
embodied knowledges, documenting observations, feelings, and experiences which are lived 
and located in the everyday, the MOP complicates assumptions of public ignorance or 
misinformation. Rather, given the reflexivity typical of MOP writing, Mass Observers often 
critically consider the epistemic value of their own knowledge. As Kramer (2014) explains in 
describing how Mass Observers are encouraged to record both their own perspectives and 
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experiences and those of others, acting as both ‘Observer’ and the ‘Observed’, ‘the strength 
and richness of Mass Observation here is not just that it is able to reflect the perspectives and 
experiences of a wide range of people, but also that Mass Observers carefully identify the 
limits of their knowledge’ (Kramer, 2014: 5). In considering not only what they know and do 
not know about a topic and how their knowledge might compare to that of others, but also 
assessing what such knowledge means to them, Mass Observers are able to locate their views 
within their particular yet shared social worlds. In this way, MOP writing has the potential to 
challenge the authority of scientific knowledge by situating it amongst other ways of knowing 
that may have equal or more relevance. As such, use of the Mass Observation Project as a 
research method presents one possibility for moving beyond the restrictive ways in which 
understandings of animal research have tended to be explored.  
1.5 Research questions 
Grounding my initial inquiry in Public Understanding of Science literature and its focus on the 
ways that publics make sense of technoscientific issues beyond the deficit-model, this study 
is shaped by three predominant research questions. These consisted of looking into what 
kinds of understandings of institutional openness on animal research are represented in MOP 
writing on animal research, whose interests are considered and cared about in MOP writing 
on animal research, and how are judgments about the necessity of animal research made in 
MOP writing on animal research. These questions, their corresponding meta-themes, and the 
sub-questions they encompassed are detailed below: 
1) What kinds of understandings of institutional openness on animal research are 
represented in MOP writing on animal research? [Meta-theme: Knowledge] 
- How is the topic of animal research engaged with in the everyday? How is knowledge 
or ignorance of animal research obtained/maintained? 
- What kinds of information do Mass Observers want to know about animal research? 
- What kinds of emotional understandings are represented in writing about animal 
research?  
- How do Mass Observers construct the role of ‘the public’ and in turn themselves in 
relating to animal research? 
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As knowledge capacity is a central aspect of the openness agenda around animal research, 
with deficit-model approaches informing assumptions about ‘public knowledge’ on the issue, 
I was motivated to consider what knowledges Mass Observers have of animal research means 
to them in everyday life and how the topic of animal research is actively engaged (or 
disengaged) with.   
2) Whose interests are considered and cared about in MOP writing on animal research? 
[Meta-theme: Care] 
- How do Mass Observers relate to animals involved in scientific research?  
- How do species distinctions shape how Mass Observers understand animal research?  
- What role do discourses of health and illness play in relating to animal research? 
- Who is involved in harm-benefit frameworks of animal research? 
- How is personal responsibility constructed in relating to the issue of animal research?  
The first research question’s exploration of knowledge sparked my interest into the relation 
between knowing and caring and led me to consider the care dimensions within areas such 
as human-animal relations, sentience and suffering, and health and illness. Rather than 
exploring the mobilisation of absolute ethical principles, I aimed to explore everyday care 
practices in which animal research is implicated.  
3) How are judgments about the necessity of animal research made in MOP writing on 
animal research? [Meta-theme: Medicine]  
- Which categories of animal research are deemed most important?  
- How is necessity in animal research understood by Mass Observers in the everyday?  
- How is the category of medical research understood? 
Given the role that claims of necessity play in justifying and accepting scientific use of animals 
in the present (more detail on which is provided in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8), the construction 
and negotiation of this necessity was a key interest from early on in the project. This involved 
consideration of the frameworks that ‘necessary’ research endeavours are understood 
through, how the concept of necessity relates to ethical justification, as captured in the 
common phrase associated with animal research – ‘necessary evil’, and boundaries between 
‘necessary’ and ‘unnecessary’ research. As will be illustrated in Chapter 7, my inquiry into the 
theme of necessity came to focus on medical research, due to an interest in critically 
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examining claims that acceptance of scientific animal use is greater for medical research 
(Ipsos MORI, 2018).  
1.6 Thesis structure 
In exploring everyday understandings of animal research and answering the three research 
areas I have identified, this thesis is structured as follows: 
Table 1: Thesis chapter structure 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
P. 10 
CHAPTER 2 EXPLORING UNDERSTANDINGS OF ANIMAL RESEARCH: PROBLEMS 
AND POSSIBILITIES 
This chapter is organised in two halves. The first will provide a 
review of previous empirical studies of views towards animal 
research across the UK and Europe. The second will discuss four 
key analytical lenses from Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
and Public Understanding of Science (PUS) literature, exploring the 
role of knowing, trust, hope and fear, and care in understandings 
of technoscientific issues and considering their application to 
animal research.  
P. 24 
CHAPTER 3  INTRODUCING THE MASS OBSERVATION PROJECT 
This chapter offers an overview to the method at the centre of this 
thesis – the Mass Observation Project, giving a brief insight into its 
history, explaining how the Project functions, detailing the kinds of 
research based on MOP materials, then discussing the particular 
positionality of Mass Observers and how their writing should be 
treated in research. 
P. 53 
CHAPTER 4  MY USE OF RESPONSES TO THE 2016 MASS OBSERVATION 
PROJECT DIRECTIVE ON ‘USING ANIMALS IN RESEARCH’ 
This chapter accounts for the specific ways that I have used the 








CHAPTER 5 DATA CHAPTER 1: KNOWING AND NOT-KNOWING ABOUT ANIMAL 
RESEARCH 
Focusing on RQ 1, the first data chapter explores how Mass 
Observers relate to and manage information on the topic of animal 
research.  
P. 84 
CHAPTER 6 DATA CHAPTER 2: CARING AND NOT-CARING ABOUT ANIMAL 
RESEARCH 
Focusing on RQ 2, the second data chapter offers an analysis of 
how Mass Observers relate to animal research through the lens of 
care.  
P. 120 
CHAPTER 7  DATA CHAPTER 3: CONSTRUCTING AND CONSTRICTING THE 
‘NECESSARY’ USE OF ANIMALS FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 
Focusing on RQ 3, the third data chapter examines how Mass 
Observers construct medical research in relation to the concept of 
necessity, looking at how the boundary between necessary and 
unnecessary research is both made and contested. 
P. 155 
CHAPTER 8 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This final chapter of thesis draws wider implications from the data 
chapters. These consist of the implications for those interested in 
using the MOP as a research method and identifying the limitations 
of this study, the implications for stakeholders invested in the 
public dialogue around animal research, and the implications for 




2. Exploring understandings of animal research: Problems and 
possibilities 
2.1 Introduction 
Animal research has been studied by scholars across the social sciences, being explored as a 
practice which transforms non-human animal bodies into scientific data (Lynch, 1985; Latour 
et al., 1986; Lynch, 1988), a scientific controversy (Nelkin, 1995), a space in which human and 
non-human actors intersect through the ‘doing’ of science (Arluke, 1988; Birke et al., 2007), 
and as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, a socio-political issue in which public 
opinion is enrolled as a form of currency (Hobson-West, 2010). Indeed, as Davies et al (2020) 
have commented, the plurality of reasons drawing those to the study of animal research 
reflect its ‘material importance and imaginative pull […] as a space for studying the remaking 
of human-animal relations and ethical practices in an era of modern biomedical science’ 
(Davies et al., 2020: 3).  
Given the enduring controversy of scientific animal use, societal or ‘public’ views and 
attitudes towards animal research have also been studied widely across the social sciences. 
However, as this literature review will demonstrate, much of this research has been 
quantitative and focused on investigating views in ‘representative’ ways which allow for 
monitoring and measurement across social demographics and populations. Given that animal 
research remains a controversial area of scientific practice, the methodological approaches 
and methods used to explore views and feelings towards the issue are of both methodological 
and ethical importance. Because of this, this literature review is organised into two main 
sections. The first half explores previous studies of public or societal ‘opinion’, ‘attitudes’, or 
‘views’ towards animal research and is structured into three subsections which discuss the 
methodological aspects of the research. With the method and approach intimately shaping 
the response and what is made of it, here, I navigate previous studies by the way in which 
they treat the views and feelings of publics towards animal research. In relation to the largely 
quantitative nature of work in this area, the first and second subsections respond to the focus 
on internal and external variables seen as influencing views towards animal research. Finally, 
the third subsection looks specifically at the use of opinion polls, a method which has been 
given privileged attention here due to the significance it holds across UK animal research 
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dialogues. In providing an overview to empirical work in this area, I draw on theoretical 
insights from Science and Technology Studies and Public Understandings of Science to provide 
a critique of methodological problems and gaps. Because animal research practice in the UK 
is currently regulated at the European level and studies in this area often look at views across 
Europe or purport to analyse the views of Europeans, this review concentrates on UK and 
European data and includes only those written in English.  
In the second half of this literature review, I consider how the four analytical lenses of 
knowing, trust, hope and fear, and care have been employed in different degrees across 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Public Understandings of Science (PUS) to interpret 
how individuals make sense of technoscientific issues. Indeed, as will be discussed, such 
lenses have been employed in some of the qualitative studies on views towards animal 
research. However, given the dominance of quantitative approaches to studying views 
towards animal research which have focused on correlation with particular variables, 
attention to such relational processes has been marginal in this area. The focus on these 
particular lenses (that I refer to as lived lenses) is informed by my relational approach to 
understanding views towards animal research, looking at how individuals make sense of the 
issue as situated within social relations. Rather than interpreting views towards animal 
research by categorising and correlating internal and external variables which are treated as 
constant and stable, the lenses outlined here emphasise the ways in which animal research is 
made sense of within the affectual relations which give it meaning in the everyday and the 
structural constraints which shape these. 
It is pertinent to acknowledge that this literature review could have been structured 
differently, concentrating instead on the internal and external variables that previous studies 
on views towards animal research have identified as having a significant role in shaping 
responses. However, in recognising the serious methodological pitfalls in an area dominated 
by macro-scale quantitative studies and the polarisation of answers into ‘support’ and 
‘opposition’ that such work often lends itself to, a consequence of particular significance in a 
domain marked by controversy, I have taken a methodological focus in my review of the 
literature.   
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2.2 Previous studies of views towards animal research: the methodological problems 
There have been many studies that indirectly touch on what publics think about animal 
research, for instance studies looking at how scientists frame the debate and construct ‘the 
public’ within it (Michael and Birke, 1994b) or media coverage of the debate (Birke and 
Michael, 1998). However, this review is focused upon studies that have sought to capture and 
interpret what publics themselves think about the issue of animal research. There exists a 
range of empirical studies exploring the views, attitudes, or opinion of publics, or, as they are 
often framed as belonging to, ‘the public’, on animal research. As a research topic, views 
towards animal research have been investigated within both Psychology and Sociology. Such 
studies largely employ quantitative approaches which tend towards the macro level, using 
surveys or opinion polls with nationally and internationally ‘representative’ samples through 
which overarching themes can be interpreted, demographic influences can be deduced, and, 
from which, longitudinal analyses can be conducted to monitor trends over time or across 
locations. In this way, previous studies in this area have aimed to determine the influence of 
demographic categories such as gender, age, socioeconomic group, education level, etc. on 
views towards the scientific use of animals, with a tendency to frame views in terms of 
acceptance or opposition. The few qualitative exceptions to these, however, are marked as 
such.  
2.2.1 Looking inside: The ‘public’ and the internal influences 
The imaginary of the UK ‘general public’ plays an important role in discourse around animal 
research, but claims about what this mass entity knows or feels about a topic are troubled by 
many well-documented problems. As will be explored in the second half of this chapter, 
decades of research from the fields of STS and PUS have shown that the notion of the ‘public’ 
is a construction which has particular consequence when invoked as a natural category. 
However, in the animal research domain, the construction of ‘the public’ as a singular and 
unified entity that can be said to collectively think, feel, know, or want things is prevalent in 
stakeholder dialogues as well as research investigating societal views towards the topic.  
In previous studies of views towards animal research, participant samples are often intended 
to represent a nation-bound ‘general public’, an entity which can be collapsed into 
demographic groups. Indeed, much has been made of the links drawn between being female 
(Pifer et al., 1994; Crettaz von Roten, 2008; Ormandy and Schuppli, 2014; Pulcino and Henry, 
27 
 
2009; Bradley et al., 2020; Furnham and Heyes, 1993; Furnham and Pinder, 1990), being 
younger (Ormandy et al., 2013; Ormandy and Schuppli, 2014), or having a lower educational 
status (Gaskell et al., 2000) and opposition to the practice. Even when such variables do not 
paint a clear or rich picture of what publics think and feel about animal research, as in Pifer 
et al.’s (1994) cross-cultural analysis, the problem is associated with a lack of variables rather 
than an overreliance on them. For instance, Pifer et al.’s study found that ‘[o]nly gender shows 
a clear trend across all cultures studied, with women generally opposing animal research 
more than men’ (Pifer et al., 1994: 108). However, rather than signalling a need for a more 
in-depth approach to better understand why this might be the case, they suggest that such a 
finding could indicate that ‘there are variables that have not been identified or fully 
addressed’ (ibid, 111), thus implying that future research should attend to other possible 
attitudinal variables.  
This treatment of publics as constituted by demographic categories undermines the way that 
they emerge through their interrelation with social actors, fields, and issues. Indeed, Jasanoff 
(2014) argues that ‘PUS research should promote a more robust conception of publics—not 
treating them as natural collectives (e.g., housewives or teenage women) but as dynamically 
constituted by changes in social contexts' (Jasanoff, 2014: 23). Instead, Jasanoff suggests that 
publics ‘organise around 'matters of concern' and 'are not all alike but are guided by culturally 
conditioned “civic epistemologies”’ (ibid). This argument for the relationality of publics 
reveals how constructions of publics as the sum of demographic categories, which act as 
variables influencing opinions or attitudes, ignores their performative constitution through 
interaction with issues.  
Furthermore, complicating the strength of correlations drawn between demographics and 
support or opposition to animal research are findings from other studies which stress limited 
or no correlation between personal variables and opposition or support towards animal 
research (Schuppli and Weary, 2010) or demonstrate the considerable or greater significance 
of other variables, such as belief in ‘animal mind’ (Knight et al., 2004), vegetarianism or 
veganism (Bradley et al., 2020; Schuppli and Weary, 2010; Schuppli et al., 2015; Furnham and 
Heyes, 1993; Furnham and Pinder, 1990), or pet-keeping (Hagelin et al., 2002). Collectively 
such studies suggest that some variables can be said to matter sometimes, giving little overall 
explanation to contextualise why this is. Indeed, summarising their analysis, Hepper and Wells 
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(1997) contend that ‘[d]emographic factors alone will never provide full information on 
human-animal relations’, with other factors such as ‘previous experience and quality of 
relationships with animals’ perhaps having more sway’ (Hepper and Wells, 1997: 60). 
Similarly, in concluding their study of attitudes towards ‘animal use’ broadly, Knight et al. 
(2003) advise that ‘[f]urther investigation is needed that focuses on people’s motivation to 
maintain an attitude or behavior and examines the underlying processing of factors relating 
to the animal and type of use, rather than trying to explain attitude variance in terms of 
personal variables such as gender and age’ (Knight et al., 2003: 324).   
There are a few notable exceptions to the prevalence of analyses based on variables and 
‘predictors’. Of the few qualitative studies in this area, Knight and Barnett (2008) used 
interviews to explore attitudes towards ‘animal use’ broadly, using a small, non-
representative sample and aiming to increase ‘the richness of data, rather than seeking data 
that are representative of a population’ (ibid, 33).  In their analysis, the authors identify three 
key themes, namely ‘type of animal used’, ‘purpose of animal use’, and ‘knowledge of animal 
use’ and, in discussing how these factors relate to each other, emphasise a break with 
previous studies which have ‘analyzed and reported attitudes as uni-dimensional’ (Knight and 
Barnett, 2008: 32). Instead, Knight and Barnett note that ‘the relationship between these 
factors and attitudes is fluid; behavior is not always based on the rational consideration of 
relevant factors’ (ibid, 41).   
Another important qualitative study in this respect is Michael and Brown’s (2004) analysis of 
laypeople’s views on xenotransplantation. Again, rather than aiming for a sample that is 
‘representative’ of the general public and which could thus be broken down into demographic 
groups, participants were ‘selected for the range of views that they might bring to the 
discussion’ and the sample included members of patient support organisations and local 
community organisations (ibid). In their analysis, Michael and Brown found that ‘lay 
discussion of such arguments quickly goes beyond and beneath cost–benefit to encompass a 
series of concerns and views that eventually render those cost–benefit arguments highly 
spurious’ (ibid, 394). Moving beyond the cost-benefit framework, the authors characterise lay 
discussion on xenotransplantation as mobilising three ‘meta-arguments’: ‘trust (whose costs 
and benefits to believe), telos (futility in the face of technological inevitability) and trump 
(redundancy in the context of desperation)’ (ibid, 388). Michael and Brown contend that the 
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use of these meta-arguments ‘show how contingent this form of reasoning is’ (ibid, 393). As 
well as this, their study emphasises the use of analogy in defining what is being discussed, 
which in this case centred on meat, and which reveals construction of the issue as ‘a rather 
fluid and amorphous phenomenon’ (ibid). The contingency of understandings of animal 
research practices revealed here thus pose a challenge to the use of methods which prevent 
participants from explaining how they are defining the issue, what it means to them, and how 
this is dependent on particular contexts.   
In recognising the situation of understandings of animal research within particular social 
worlds and their relational nature, the idea that we can measure ‘the public’s’ views or 
attitudes towards the issue becomes even more suspect. Moving away from references to 
the individualised mass entity of ‘the public’, Converse’s (1964 [2006]) concept of ‘issue 
publics’ alludes to the ways that publics come into being through their interest in and 
engagement with specific issues. In describing the public identity as performative in this way, 
Converse’s work can be seen as laying the groundwork for later categorisations of publics and 
their relationships with socio-political and technoscientific issues. For instance, the 
identification of ‘attentive publics’ coined by Almond (1950) and since expanded upon by 
Devine (1970) and Adler (1984) enables a similar specification of publics, distinguishing those 
who follow a topic the closest, are more aware of the details involved, and more likely to have 
a strong and informed opinion from the ‘general public’.   
More recently Michael’s (2009) distinction between ‘publics-in-general’ (PiG), an 
‘undifferentiated whole’ (Michael, 2009: 620), and ‘publics-in-particular’ (PiP) those with ‘an 
unidentifiable stake’ (ibid, 623) in an issue, can be seen as extending this work, emphasising 
how publics are constituted in relation to technoscientific issues as well as other public 
imaginaries. Such conceptualisations of publics emphasise the interaction between publics 
and technoscience, attending to the ways in which people are already actively engaged in 
processes of understanding and intervening in issues and controversies. Recognising the 
notion of publics as performative, arising through public performances in which one 
differentiates themselves from something, be it the state, science, or other public groups, 
thus reveals the limits of framing and analysing their views and contributions through 
personal variables. Hence, the focus on personal variables which privilege certain 
characteristics, such as gender and age, over experiences which may have more relevance 
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and meaning in relating to animal research, such as living with health conditions, reveals a 
lack of engagement with how animal research is made meaningful through everyday 
experience.  
2.2.2 Looking outside: The method and its external influences 
Other studies of how publics understand animal research have accounted for attitudinal 
‘variables’ or ‘predictors’ related to study-specific characteristics and the instrument used as 
well as individual and societal factors (Hagelin et al., 2003; Crettaz von Roten, 2009; Ormandy 
and Schuppli, 2014; Pulcino and Henry, 2009). Such studies have looked at the effect of the 
type of research specified or whether the word ‘pain’ is mentioned (Hagelin et al., 2003) as 
well as characteristics related to the animals involved in research (Ormandy and Schuppli, 
2014). Although such work recognises that the responses of participants are explicitly shaped 
by the method used to elicit them, instead of this acknowledgment leading to calls for 
qualitative work which is invested in the relationality of views, opinions, and feelings about 
animal research – the ways in which they emerge through cultural contexts and practices – 
the contingency of responses is often taken as an indication that more standardisation across 
survey design is needed.  
For instance, in a secondary analysis of the Eurostat database and the Science and Technology 
Eurobarometer surveys, Crettaz von Roten (2012) concluded that given the data reviewed 
‘didn’t include a wide collection of items to measure fully attitudes towards animal research’, 
‘this important issue should be studied with a specific survey that would involve a well-
established series of items on attitudes towards animal research’ (Crettaz von Roten, 2012: 
700). The implication here is that if enough variables are accounted for then attitudes can be 
‘fully’ measured to produce a comprehensive insight into what certain groups think about 
animal research. Indeed, such a view is explicitly summarised in Furnham and Heyes’ (1993) 
contention that despite the psychology students they surveyed demonstrating ‘mixed’ views 
towards  animal research, ‘beliefs about animal experimentation are not particularly complex 
and multi-dimensional’ (Furnham and Heyes, 1993: 10).  
Another instance in which the reproducibility of findings is privileged above the particularity 
of where and how such responses emerge is found in a study by Lund et al. (2012b). Following 
on from their qualitative study of Danish people’s attitudes towards animal research in 
specific connection with the cost-benefit framework (Lund et al., 2012a), Lund et al. (2012b) 
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undertook a ‘quantitative investigation’ to evaluate its key findings (Lund et al., 2012b: 430). 
Commissioning an online questionnaire with a ‘representative sample of the Danish public’, 
the authors aimed to map the prevalence of the attitudinal categories found in the previous 
qualitative research, those of ‘Approvers’, ‘Disapprovers’, and ‘Reserved’, amongst the 
‘general public’. They found that the ‘reproducibility of these stances appeared to be 
excellent’ (ibid, 440) and that the majority (50%) of Danes sampled fell under the ‘Reserved’ 
category, not choosing ‘a core value to subscribe to’, instead deciding ‘to approve or reject 
animal research on a case-by-case basis by weighing the animal costs and human interests’ 
(ibid, 441).  Although the three categories outlined above are used to indicate that 
judgements about animal research are made on a case-by-case basis, with participants 
weighing up the acceptability of experimental procedures individually, the authors suggest 
that they also pertain to underlying values which can be measured within populations. Hence, 
in categorising the views and feelings of participants into these overarching stances, the study 
compromises the richness and contextuality of discussion in favour of broad attitudinal 
positions which can then be measured across the ‘general public’. In addition, although 
animal harms and human benefits are important considerations in discussions on animal 
research, the authors’ contention that this is likely ‘the decisive factor in people’s decision to 
approve of such research’ (ibid, 429) ultimately detracts from the plurality of factors at play 
in shaping views towards animal research.   
An uncommon example of studies which account for the relationality inherent to socio-ethical 
thinking is offered in Macnaghten’s (2004) qualitative study of public attitudes towards the 
genetic modification of animals. Using structured focus groups and a discussion guide 
‘designed to explore how people ‘felt’ about current and future applications of biotechnology 
to animals in the context of existing everyday social practices’ (Macnaghten, 2004: 537), 
Macnaghten reported that people ‘seem willing to make trade-offs in judging the boundaries 
between acceptable and unacceptable use’ (ibid, 547). Hence, alike with Lund et al. (2012a; 
2012b), Macnaghten’s work supports the importance of cost-benefit frameworks in how 
publics judge scientific experiments using animals. However, unlike Lund et al., Macnaghten’s 
study ‘emphasizes that it is specific embodied social practices, rather than abstract ethical 
principles, that are most likely to shape and transform our relationships to animals' (ibid, 537). 
In embracing this, Macnaghten’s research situates the acceptability of this use of animals and 
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the concerns that it may generate within ‘wider cultural and political debates' (ibid, 540), thus 
reflecting how concerns can be reflective of anxieties that are not intrinsic to the GM issue, 
but are nevertheless key in its social practice, such as mistrust of government.  
However, quantitative studies and their proclivity for anatomising views and feelings towards 
animal research into internal and external variables that can be analysed in isolation remain 
prevalent. In their restrictive response formats and focus on the macro, they provide little 
room for respondents to describe what animal research means to them and to situate the 
issue in practices and relationships with relevance to their everyday worlds. Indeed, although 
various studies purport to explore ‘attitudes’, what people feel about animal research is often 
left unattended to. 
Indeed, in their review of relevant literature on attitudes towards animal research, Ormandy 
and Schuppli (2014) found methodological issues and identified three primary shortcomings 
of literature reviewed. These are the ‘use of college students as participant samples, use of 
general questions about ‘animal use’ rather than specific questions about different types of 
animal use (or even different types of animal research), and use of Likert scales or rating scales 
that do not allow for more qualitative reasoning’ (Ormandy and Schuppli, 2014: 400). On this 
last issue, the authors argue that ‘[w]hen restricted response options do not allow for 
consideration of what people’s concerns are (e.g., why they might be opposed to certain types 
of research), it is difficult for policy makers to understand the nuance in attitudes in order to 
make progress in addressing societal concerns’ (ibid, 401). Despite this, as the next subsection 
will demonstrate, fixed response formats continue to dominate studies of views towards 
animal research. 
2.2.3 The special status of opinion polls and surveys 
Despite calls (Ormandy and Schuppli, 2014) for more open-ended studies on views towards 
animal research, those which provide more room for participants to articulate why they think 
or feel a certain way about the issue, opinion polls have become an authoritative method in 
exploring ‘public’ views on the matter. For instance, at the EU level, the Eurobarometer is 
recognised as an important tool for measuring ‘public’ opinion and monitoring long-term 
trends and, featuring specific sections on animal biotechnology, data from the Special 
Eurobarometer 341 (2010) is included in several meta-reviews of studies of views towards 
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animal research (Pifer et al., 1994; Crettaz von Roten, 2009; 2012; Ormandy and Schuppli, 
2014).  
In the UK, market research company Ipsos MORI has been conducting studies of ‘public 
opinion’ on animal research since 1999. Over the years, studies have been carried out on 
behalf of varying stakeholders, such as ‘the Medical Research Council (in 1999), New Scientist 
magazine (in 1999), the Coalition for Medical Progress (in 2002 and 2005), the Department of 
Trade and Industry (in 2006), BERR [Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform] (in 2007) 
and BIS [Business, Innovation and Skills] (in 2008)’ (Ipsos MORI, 2009). In 2014, the original 
survey was updated to ‘reflect how the context of life sciences in the UK had changed’ (Ipsos 
MORI, 2018) and this new version of the ‘tracker survey’ has since been conducted biennially. 
This new survey is conducted on behalf of the governmental Office for Life Sciences, a joint 
office between the Department for Health and Social Care and the Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy and aims to measure the views of a ‘representative’ sample of 
Great Britain, enabling ‘cross-wave’ comparisons in order to track changing trends and 
patterns in the public acceptance of animal research (Ipsos MORI, 2018).  
The Ipsos MORI surveys have wide-ranging significance in UK dialogues on animal research, 
being referenced by stakeholders invested in the continuation of scientific animal use 
(Understanding Animal Research, 2019) and its abolition (PeTA, 2019; Cruelty Free 
International, 2019), and by animal welfare organisations such as the RSPCA (Butler, 2019). 
The polls are often referred to as a measurement of what ‘the public’ think, feel, know, or 
want at a given time and used as a way to bolster stakeholder positions with democratic 
weight. For instance, discussing the 2018 wave of the survey, the head of the RSPCA Research 
Animals Department is quoted as stating ‘[t]hese results yet again show the public’s ongoing 
and serious concerns for lab animals – concerns which are shared by the RSPCA’ (Butler, 
2019). However, as suggested in the previous studies discussed above, the restrictive nature 
of polls which constrain contributions to set responses misses the complexity and 
‘changeability’ (Michael, 2001) of views towards animal research. Indeed, in their assessment 
of the methodological weaknesses of previous studies of views towards animal research, 
Ormandy and Schuppli (2014) contend that although ‘polls can be valuable in tracking 
attitudes over time, and they invite broader perspectives from a wider and more 
representative sample population’, they ‘remain subject to the prior criticism of using fixed 
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response options for participants to choose from’ (ibid, 401). In this case, surveys often limit 
responses to issues of animal welfare, regulation, and knowledge capacity, preventing the 
expression of concerns around the scientific validity of certain types of animal research, and, 
as Lund et al. (2012a) have pointed out, rarely include consideration of balancing risks and 
benefits of particular forms of research.  
The restrictive nature of such methods thus means that they are particularly effective for 
evidencing pre-determined institutional agendas, with stakeholders able to guide and then 
gesture to what ‘the public’ thinks or wants in ways which serve their intentions. Indeed, in 
this way, Lezaun and Soneryd (2007) contend that opinion polls function as a ‘technology of 
elicitation’, which, along with ‘the cohorts of experts that control their application and 
interpret their results’ compose ‘a veritable extractive industry’ in which ‘public opinion’ is 
something to be produced and won in order to serve pre-defined institutional aims (Lezaun 
and Soneryd, 2007: 280). Hence, public opinion may be used to evidence a lack of awareness 
or to signal the level of trust that publics have in certain actors, both often lending to 
responses based around educating ‘the public’. 
The Ipsos MORI surveys are also enrolled in informing animal research policy. Indeed, UAR’s 
launching of the Concordat on Openness in Animal Research in 2014 was, in part, a response 
to Ipsos MORI’s repeated finding that a majority of those sampled characterised the 
bioscience sector as secretive (Ipsos MORI, 2009; 2013). Commissioned by UAR to run 
workshops on openness intended to feed into the Concordat, Ipsos MORI note that, given the 
nature of qualitative research, ‘we cannot assume that the views of this small group will be 
reflected in the same proportions within the population at large’, however they repeatedly 
fall back onto discussing their participants’ views as ‘the public’s’. For instance, introducing 
its purpose, the report states that ‘the public dialogue aimed to better understand what the 
public consider to be openness and transparency with regard to animal research’ (Ipsos MORI, 
2013: 11). Hence, the wants of those sampled become the wants of ‘the public’, i.e. ‘[t]he 
public want the sector to demonstrate its commitment to openness by creating greater 
scrutiny of itself’ (ibid, 56).  
As well as referencing the Ipsos MORI polls as a signifier of public opinion, campaigning groups 
have also conducted their own studies of what publics think about animal research. For 
instance, in 2013, market research agency Savanta ComRes were commissioned by UAR to 
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survey a ‘representative sample’ of the British public, asking ‘To the best of your knowledge, 
do you think it is legal to test finished cosmetic products on animals in the UK?’ (Understanding 
Animal Research, 2013). Discussing the poll’s findings, UAR’s Chief Executive is quoted as 
stating that ‘[i]t is clear that we must do more to explain how and why animal research is 
conducted in the UK […] There is a risk that well-intentioned members of the public oppose 
animal research because they mistakenly think this means cosmetics testing […] I hope this 
survey will encourage scientists to talk more about their work to alleviate human and animal 
diseases. It is an opportunity to explain to the public that animal research is about medicine, 
not make-up’ (ibid).  
More recently, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, UAR commissioned market research 
company Ipsos MORI to investigate public opinion during the crisis. Discussing the findings of 
this study, UAR determine that ‘[g]enerally, the public thinks of animals in scientific research 
related to products that they consume such as testing for cosmetics or for drugs. Many people 
do not think of the enormous amount of research carried out in universities, research 
institutes or in research arms of private companies, but it seemed that over a few short weeks 
this had changed’ (Understanding Animal Research, 2020b: 2), suggesting that the usual 
portrayal of a comprehensive deficit of public awareness has narrowed towards specific 
pockets of ignorance.  
In 2020, Cruelty Free International (CFI), an animal advocacy group which campaigns for the 
abolition of animal use in science, commissioned Savanta ComRes to conduct a survey of 
Europeans’ views towards animal research (ComRes, 2020). Similar to previous polls in this 
area, responses were structured by scales of knowledge (from knowing ‘A great deal’ to 
‘Little/ Nothing at all’) and agreement (from ‘Strongly agree’ to ‘Strongly disagree’). Discussing 
the findings of this poll, CFI’s Director of Science is quoted as contending that ‘[t]he results of 
our poll show the EU public is ready for animal tests to become a thing of the past. Now it’s 
up to leaders to listen and put in place a plan that will end cruel and unnecessary suffering of 
animals in European laboratories once and for all’ (Cruelty Free International, 2020).  
Similarly, advocacy organisation The Fund for the Replacement of Animals in Medical 
Experiments (FRAME) conducted their own study of public views towards animal research in 
2020, aiming to ‘drill down into the detail of public understanding and perceptions – as well 
as misconceptions – around animal testing and animal use in research’ (FRAME, 2020a: 6). 
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Key aims of the survey included measuring ‘knowledge of the regulations’ and ‘awareness of 
alternatives’ (ibid). Correspondingly, discussing the survey’s finding, FRAME’s Chief Executive 
gestured to the poll as evidence of public knowledge deficits, stating that ‘[e]ven though there 
have been scientific advances in recent years and some improvements in regulation, there 
are still many misconceptions about the use of animals in testing and research’ (FRAME, 
2020b). 
As these examples of stakeholder use of opinion polls and surveys show, claims about what 
publics know and think about the practice are a resource of great importance in animal 
research dialogues. However, the way in which such methods frame respondents’ 
contributions continues in the heavily critiqued tradition of the ‘knowledge deficit-model’ 
(Millar and Wynne, 1988), an approach based on the assumption that publics are lacking in 
relevant knowledge and once educated they will agree with the perspective of the speaker 
(for analysis of the persistence of this approach, see  Meyer, 2016; Raps, 2016; Simis et al., 
2016; Suldovsky, 2016).   
Such an approach ignores decades of learning from the fields of STS and PUS, which have 
complicated the lay/expert divide, challenging the pressure to inform and educate the public 
by emphasising instead the value of lay expertise and local and embodied knowledges 
(Wynne, 1992; Epstein, 1995). Indeed, as Epstein’s (1995) influential case study of AIDS 
activism in the US demonstrated, when required, laypeople can amass scientific knowledge 
in order to participate in expert technoscientific fields, becoming ‘genuine participants in the 
construction of scientific knowledge’, able to affect ‘changes both in the epistemic practices 
of biomedical research and in the therapeutic techniques of medical care’ (Epstein, 1995: 
408). Therefore highlighting, as Jasanoff (2014) does, that rather than acquiring scientific 
knowledge in one comprehensive transference, ‘understanding science for most adults is a 
process, not a steady state’ (Jasanoff, 2014: 23).  
Of course, this critique is not just aimed at polls and surveys but also implicates the 
dominance of studies which break down understandings of animal research into the internal 
and external influences documented earlier. In constructing samples to represent ‘the public’ 
and correlating their views with particular influences such as ‘education’, these studies 
overlook how knowledges other than the scientific are relevant in shaping understandings of 
animal research. Animal research is more than a technoscientific issue, it draws on ethical, 
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political, relational, and affectual dimensions of social life. In considering these aspects of how 
animal research is made meaningful in everyday life, the next section will explore the areas 
of knowing and not-knowing, trust, hope and fear, and care.  
2.3 Lived lenses for analysing understandings of animal research 
Unlike many of the previous studies which have analysed how views towards animal research 
are influenced by different variables such as demographic categories, implying fixed and 
homogenous assumptions of what these mean across lived realities, this section will attend 
to how certain processual analytical lenses may shape understandings of animal research. In 
reviewing literature on how publics relate to technoscientific issues, it is clear that certain 
analytical lenses have been prominent across the fields of Science and Technology Studies 
and Public Understanding of Science. The choice of analytical lenses included below are 
informed by these, whilst also drawing from work from the emerging field of the Sociology of 
Ignorance (McGoey, 2016) and the field of Care Ethics (Tronto, 1993). Additionally, this 
literature review and my positioning within it has also been influenced by my interactions 
with the Mass Observation Project and the theoretical work which dwells upon its 
methodological approach and value. In considering the lenses of knowing, trusting, hoping 
and fearing, and caring, I aim to illustrate the important insights these offer for studying how 
animal research is related to in the everyday. I have referred to these as ‘lived lenses’ in the 
subheading of this section in an attempt to capture their nature as practices through which 
social life is lived and experienced.  Although such analytical optics have been used to examine 
the animal research domain itself, they remain underused in critical studies of understandings 
of animal research. Therefore, this second half of the literature review will discuss the 
important empirical and conceptual lessons offered by scholarly work which contends with 
such practices and each subsection will end by considering their application to studying 
understandings of animal research.  
2.3.1 Knowing and not-knowing 
The question of what individuals or publics know about animal research dominates analytical 
framings of the issue. However, when engaging in the process of knowing about 
technoscientific and socio-ethical issues, multiple considerations navigate what individuals 
come to know and that which remains unknown. In exploring these, studies from the 
Sociology of Ignorance (McGoey, 2016) emphasise that a shift should be acknowledged which 
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moves the framing of knowing as a passive act through which people absorb information, as 
implied in the previous studies of views towards animal research discussed earlier, to knowing 
as an active and often strategic process.  
As well as recognising knowing as an active and deliberate practice, not-knowing or ignorance 
should also be understood as a part of this process, not as the antithesis of knowledge, but as 
existing alongside it on a shared continuum. This is because knowing is continual and despite 
enlightenment framings of knowing and learning as a process of illuminating dark spots of 
ignorance (Bogner, 2015), leading to the ‘domination of ignorance by knowledge’ (Woolsey, 
1988), there will always remain areas unknown. Discussing why ignorance has traditionally 
been ignored in Sociology, Smithson (1985) claims that the ‘foremost conceptual problem 
stems from the (usually implicit) assumption that ignorance simply consists of the absence or 
distortion of “true” knowledge’, an assumption he characterises as informing functionalist 
and Marxist sociology and their treatment of ideology as ‘erroneous thought, with “science” 
usually providing the template for correct thought’ (Smithson, 1985: 151).  But, in contrast, 
learning new information only brings us into contact with more areas where our knowledge 
is lacking. As Gross (2012) describes, ‘[w]henever knowledge grows, so too does ignorance’ 
(Gross, 2012: 425).   
Indeed, science itself produces ignorance as well as knowledge (Kourany, 2015). In this way, 
knowing is always partial, as Haraway (1988) illustrates with the powerful metaphor of the 
‘god trick’, a concept she uses to critique the dangers of scientific objectivity and its promise 
of ‘infinite vision’ (Haraway, 1988: 582). Rather, Haraway argues for a ‘feminist objectivity’ 
which is grounded in ‘the view from a body […] versus the view from above, from nowhere, 
from simplicity’ (ibid, 589). Such recognition of our positionality and partiality as knowers and 
seers enables ‘us to become answerable for what we learn how to see’ (ibid, 583) and, 
importantly, also what we do not. As feminist philosopher Tuana (2004) puts it, ‘[i]gnorance, 
far from being a simple lack of knowledge that good science aims to banish, is better 
understood as a practice with supporting social causes as complex as those involved in 
knowledge practices’ (Tuana, 2004: 195). Being alert to the construction and preservation of 
what is known and unknown and by whom can thus ‘provide a lens for the political values at 
work in our knowledge practices’ (ibid).  
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Examining the ways in which not-knowing can be an active and functional practice, legal 
scholar Somin (2015) describes a ‘rational ignorance’, referring to when someone ‘has 
decided not to learn some body of knowledge because the costs of doing so exceed the 
benefits, based on the decision-maker’s own objectives’ (Somin, 2015: 274). Similarly, 
McGoey (2012) discusses a ‘strategic ignorance’, which is ‘distinguishable from deception or 
the suppression of data by virtue of the fact that unsettling knowledge is thwarted from 
emerging in the first place’ (McGoey, 2012: 559). In such terms, the legal advantages of 
strategic ignorance are evident. For instance, an organisation designed to keep certain illegal 
practices from the knowledge of its executives can be seen as preserving their innocence; it 
was not possible for them to know. Yet, strategic ignorance may also be used to preserve 
one’s internal harmony through ‘practices of obfuscation and deliberate insulation from 
unsettling information’ (McGoey, 2012: 555). Using the language of denial rather than 
ignorance, Cohen (2001) also discusses how we manage unsettling information. For Cohen, 
there are three types of denial: literal, interpretive, and implicatory. Whereas literal denial is 
a refusal to accept the knowledge itself and interpretive denial is a refusal to accept a 
particular interpretation of the knowledge, implicatory denial is useful to consider here in that 
it refers to instances where one denies the implications of said knowledge. As Cohen states, 
‘[u]nlike literal or interpretive denial, knowledge itself is not at issue, but doing the ‘right’ 
thing with this knowledge’ (Cohen, 2001: 9). In this case, Cohen writes that ‘[w]e turn away 
from our insights and hide their implications. We half-know, but don’t want to discover the 
other half’ (Cohen, 2001: 34).  
Such theorising reframes ignorance and denial as ordinary, everyday practices, which, rather 
than being inherently negative, can be personally and culturally beneficial. Challenging the 
notion that ignorance is something to be eradicated through the gaining of knowledge, such 
understandings of ignorance highlight both its social and psychological utility. When 
confronted with an opportunity in which one may come to know something about an issue 
that is already associated with uncomfortable knowledge, the refusal to know more or engage 
with the implications of any knowledge acquired can thus be seen as a coping mechanism. 
As well as being usefully enacted at an individual level, practices of not-knowing are often 
collective, with ignorance being a relational phenomenon (Smithson, 1990), and, in many 
cases, one can only turn away from certain information if others also work to maintain a 
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cultural veil of ignorance. The risks of rupturing such collective ignorance are discussed by 
Wicks (2011), who argues that when ‘distancing from unpleasant information is a collective 
enterprise, it can be seen as the social organization of denial […] The costs then also become 
social’ (Wicks, 2011: 189). Although Wicks claims that engaging in collective denial may 
generate social losses through the exhaustion such ‘serious collaborative effort’ (ibid) 
requires and the amount of tension it produces, the interruption of collective denial by 
acknowledging the ‘elephant in the room’ also poses a social threat. As they go on to suggest, 
‘[c]haracterized by a strong emphasis on avoidance, taboos frequently manifest themselves 
in the form of strict prohibitions against looking, listening or saying. Those who defy or ignore 
these prohibitions are universally regarded as social deviants’ (Wicks, 2011: 192).  
Ignorance is not only enacted as a defensive strategy but can also be used to challenge 
dominant framings of an issue and consequently reclaim a level of autonomy over it. In 
relation to scientific knowledge, Michael (1996) suggests that acknowledging and defending 
one’s ignorance can represent attempts to stake independence from science and challenge 
its epistemological authority (Michael, 1996: 120). Relatedly, in examining ‘don’t know’ 
responses to questionnaires on scientific issues, Turner and Michael (1996) contend that such 
articulations do not necessarily reflect a lack of knowledge but instead may be a way of 
expressing political contention towards the topic at hand. McGoey (2012) also discusses the 
production of ignorance as valuable in resisting the pressures to fit into constraining power 
structures. Drawing on Sedgwick’s challenge of the homo/hetero distinction in Epistemology 
of the closet (1990), McGoey describes an ‘emancipative ignorance, where deliberate 
ambiguity becomes a weapon against the dogmatic certainties and schematic impositions of 
others’ (McGoey, 2012: 7). In these ways, the production of ignorance and promotion of not-
knowing does not simply reflect an absence of knowledge, as naivety or unawareness, but 
rather a potential resource with political value that can be deliberately cultivated.  
In summary, then, this section has outlined key ideas across the Sociology of Ignorance which 
suggest that knowing and not-knowing are active processes, placing emphasis on how they 
are continually enacted rather than treating them as achieved states. Such an understanding 
of knowledge and ignorance demonstrates that knowledge, and as is often assumed, scientific 
knowledge, cannot eradicate areas of non-knowledge or ignorance, but rather the two exist 
together on a shared continuum. In this way, ignorance is not an inherently negative 
41 
 
phenomenon, and given the partiality of knowing with its necessary limitations, being 
ignorant is a normal and regular occurrence. Indeed, as the studies mentioned above 
illustrate, producing and maintaining ignorance can be functional, performed deliberately and 
strategically to protect individuals and collectives from potentially disturbing knowledge.  
In the context of dialogues around animal research, such framings of knowing and not-
knowing are significant for challenging the dominance of deficit-model approaches to publics 
and their contributions to societal discussions on the topic, which reinforce the idea that the 
‘general public’ require more scientific or regulatory knowledge to be able to fully participate. 
In their study of the meaning of openness on animal research in Sweden, Holmberg and 
Ideland (2010) claimed that ‘public debate on animal experimentation is restricted by 
selective openness and by the enlightenment/deficit model of public communication’  with 
assumptions of ‘the idea of the public as uninformed and misled (in different ways), 
effectively hindering other perspectives on and knowledge of animal-experimentation-based 
research’ (Holmberg and Ideland, 2010: 366). Similarly, picking up on the prevalence of 
deficit-model approaches to science-society dialogue on animal research, Crettaz von Roten 
(2020) suggests that given the evidenced ineffectiveness of such an approach, ‘scientists who 
care about public attitudes should rethink their representation of the science-society 
relationship and move toward two-way and interactive activities that foster dialogue’ (Crettaz 
von Roten, 2020: 16). Nonetheless, analysis of how individuals actively engage in knowing or 
not-knowing about animal research has been overlooked and with it a critical appraisal of 
what such knowledge may mean and how ignorance may function as a protective practice in 
relating to the ethically and emotionally contentious topic of animal research.  
2.3.2 Trust 
Emerging from and overlapping with diagnoses of a public deficit of scientific knowledge, 
science governance has turned its attention to a public deficit of trust (Hagendijk, 2004; Irwin, 
2006; Wynne, 2006b). Discussing the markers of this shift in scientific governance, Irwin 
(2006)  claims that ‘the old language of cognitive deficit increasingly is in competition with 
talk of a new form of deficit: this time a deficit not of scientific understanding but of public 
trust. Just as top-down communication was seen as the cure for the old deficit, greater 
openness and consultation can remedy the new one’ (Irwin, 2006: 303). Commenting on the 
influential 2000 report on ‘Science and Society by the House of Lords Select Committee on 
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Science and Technology’, Wynne (2006a) describes the document as ‘an emphatic official 
acknowledgement of a sense of widespread crisis of public mistrust of science used (as it is, 
increasingly) as supposed public policy authority’ (Wynne, 2006a: 211). In responding to this 
apparent breakdown in public trust of science, Wynne (2006b) observes the mobilisation of a 
‘second-order’ deficit model, which interprets problems around trust as a result of 
misunderstanding regulatory processes. In such framings of mistrust, the dualism of experts 
and laypeople is preserved and public engagement processes become ways of managing and 
pacifying a threatening public body using the familiar agenda of educating and informing.  
The measurement of public trust in the regulation of animal research and in different sources 
of information on the issue is a key element of the Ipsos MORI polls discussed earlier in this 
chapter. Similar to their treatment of knowledge, these polls conceptualise ‘public trust’ as 
something which can be measured en masse as a capacity which can increase and decrease 
(Ipsos MORI, 2018), rather than a practice which is enacted. Here too, mistrust has been 
linked with a lack of knowledge or awareness, with a decline in public trust in the bioscience 
sector picked up by earlier Ipsos MORI polls being a catalyst for the launch of the Concordat 
on Openness on animal research (Ipsos MORI, 2013: 10; MacArthur Clark et al., 2019: 36). 
Indeed, in their reporting of a ‘public dialogue’ intended to feed into the Concordat, Ipsos 
MORI state that the ‘ultimate aim of the sector being more open and transparent is to boost 
public awareness of, and create more informed debate about, animal research. Concordat 
group members hope that in a climate of openness and transparency, better discussions can 
happen, and indeed that the public might then be more supportive of animal research as an 
integral part of scientific discovery’ (Ipsos MORI, 2013: 10). Hence openness is constructed as 
a way of resolving mistrust of the sector through creating an informed public body (McLeod 
and Hobson-West, 2015).  
Similarly, discussing between the UK animal research community’s turn to openness and the 
research culture in the US, MacArthur Clark et al. (2019) write –  
‘science is becoming increasingly complex, making it even more difficult to “translate” 
research into terms the public can understand and appreciate. However, the Pew 
survey did show that more highly educated respondents, or those with increased 
knowledge about science, are more likely to support animal research. Anecdotal 
information reveals that programs and individuals who proactively communicate 
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about their animal research are more likely to gain public trust’ (MacArthur Clark et 
al., 2019: 37). 
Again, science-society communication is thus presented as revolving around one-way 
education, with mistrust being primarily a symptom of scientific ignorance. Public trust is thus 
treated as a resource to be won by stakeholders.  
However, rather than simply signalling a lack of awareness, mistrust can often be a rational 
response to unequal power distributions across local and global contexts. As demonstrated 
in Wynne’s (1992) influential study of how Cumbrian sheep farmers responded to scientific 
advice on the restrictions introduced after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, relationships 
between lay communities and experts can become marked by mistrust due to a lack of 
recognition of relevant lay knowledge, resulting in the use of scientific expertise as an 
authority that dominates other ways of knowing. Although, Wynne (2006a) later suggests that 
disempowerment does not always result in a withdrawal of trust. Rather, in situations where 
people may feel a lack of choice otherwise, what Wynne calls an ‘as-if’ trust can develop, 
symbolising a ‘reluctant acquiescence of the public in its knowingly inevitable, and relentlessly 
growing, dependency upon expert institutions’ (Wynne, 2006a: 212).  
Crucial here is that the credibility of science as an epistemology rests upon the credibility of 
particular scientists in a given context. Mistrust towards ‘science’ is thus often entangled 
more closely with mistrust towards actors involved in creating, disseminating, and putting 
into practice scientific knowledge. Pointing to the relational quality of trust, Scheman (2015) 
observes that ‘claims to credibility—what makes our beliefs justified—rest in large part on 
[sic] socially grounded reasons for trusting’ (Scheman, 2015: 217). Given this, Scheman argues 
that it is ‘irrational to expect people to place their trust in the results of practices about which 
they know little and that emerge from institutions— universities, corporations, government 
agencies—which they know to be inequitable’ (ibid, 230). As Whyte and Crease (2010) put it, 
‘if science is to provide [sic] public benefits, then “science” and scientists must be trustworthy 
in the eyes of ordinary citizens’ (Whyte and Crease, 2010: 413).  
This turn directs attention away from trust as a capacity that publics express in varying levels 
and which can be measured via polls and surveys, i.e. in being trusting, towards a 
performative quality enacted in being trustworthy. In commenting on which factors impact 
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on trustworthiness, Rolin (2002) contends that credibility is not always deterministic. Rather, 
they claim that there can be a ‘systematic mismatch between credibility and trustworthiness, 
so that the socially powerful is assigned credibility in spite of the lack of trustworthiness, or 
the powerless is denied credibility in spite of trustworthiness’ (Rolin, 2002: 100). To be able 
to trust, Cortassa (2016) suggests that one must be able to appraise ‘the competences and 
trustworthiness of the teller’ (Cortassa, 2016: 456-457). Such appraisals can be informed by 
indirect sources, such as ‘others’ references’ or from one’s ‘own general understanding of the 
skills and values that could be expected from someone at a certain realm or institution’ (ibid, 
457). For Cortassa, the ability to make such judgments through ‘alternative sources’ is crucial 
in science-society relationships, ‘because [laypeople’s’] links with scientists are rarely close or 
sustained enough to provide evidence about the aptitudes and qualities of a given speaker’ 
(ibid). Such approaches help to emphasise the significance of material worlds through which 
publics encounter science and scientists and which imbue scientific work with meaning.  
Others have sought to develop the notion of trust, and its withdrawal, as not simply a rational 
act but also an affectual one. Engdahl and Lidskog (2012) describe trust as an ‘emotional 
attitude, a feeling that affects our judgments and makes us perceive the world (others as well 
as ourselves) in a specific way’ (Engdahl and Lidskog, 2012: 712). Rather than being ‘the 
opposite of reflexivity or rationality’, trust is better described then as ‘an emotionally based 
strategy that bridges the gap between the present and the future by anticipating the result 
that trust, if successful, creates’ (ibid, 711). In building trusting science-society relationships, 
Engdahl and Lidskog argue that the concerns and understandings of publics must be 
accounted as part of the issue at hand and, within them, citizens ‘must, to some degree, be 
able to positively recognize their personal identities and social identities’ (ibid, 712-713). If 
correct, public trust in science therefore depends on the acknowledgment of areas of 
dissensus and a valuing of alternative framings of an issue. 
However, importantly, Camporesi et al. (2017) emphasise that trust and distrust do not 
necessarily exist as polarised positions, such as those suggested by methods which seek to 
measure and monitor the trends in public trust towards different facets of animal research 
practice. Rather, they contend that ‘we need to move away from hydraulic and binary notions 
of trust to articulate its complexities in expert knowledge systems, which are necessarily 
relational and mediated’ (Camporesi et al., 2017: 29). Indeed, a pertinent example of the co-
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existence and relationality of both trust and distrust is offered in Michael and Brown’s (2004) 
study of views on xenotransplantation. As they observed, 'on the one hand, the 
sensationalism/ individualism of animal welfare groups vs. the objectivity/broadness of 
governmental bodies, and on the other, the “willingness to expose” of the animal welfare 
groups vs. the “tendency to secrecy” of the governmental bodies’ mean that ‘both animal 
welfare organizations and governmental bodies can be both trusted and distrusted’ (Michael 
and Brown, 2004). Adding to the relationality of trust, Szerszynski (1999) calls attention to its 
performative nature, meaning that rather than conceiving of trust as a stable and measurable 
capacity, trusting ‘in un-civic situations where the dialectic of trusting and trustworthiness 
has faltered or not yet started’ can reflect attempts ‘to restart it through illocutionary acts of 
entrusting’ (Szerszynski, 1999: 250). Again, such considerations reinforce the significance of 
situating understandings of trust within lived experience and the contexts through which trust 
relationships emerge.  
In the case of animal research, attention to trust is important given the role of the regulatory 
framework in ensuring scientific practice is conducted in a way which safeguards the welfare 
of laboratory animals (Home Office, 2014). If this regulatory framework is expected to placate 
the concerns of publics around the scientific use of animals, as animal research advocacy 
organisations (UAR, 2019: 2) and their associates (Festing and Wilkinson, 2007) suggest, then 
trust in the systematic implementation of such legislation is paramount. As touched on in the 
earlier discussion of previous empirical studies of views towards animal research, relational 
approaches to trust have featured in some of the qualitative research in this area. For 
instance, enriching understandings of how the ‘cost (now referred to as ‘harm’)-benefit’ 
framework is mobilised in lay grasping and judging of xenotransplantation, Michael and 
Brown (2004) argue that ‘costs and benefits entail unarticulated cultural assumptions and 
unexamined relations of trust’ (Michael and Brown, 2004). Macnaghten’s (2004) study of 
public attitudes to the genetic modification of animals also considers the role of trust, with 
their analysis suggesting that ‘the misgivings people express towards the applications of GM 
animal technologies appear to be reflections of broader syndromes of mistrust towards those 
institutions seen as responsible for such applications’ (Macnaghten, 2004: 547). However, 
such relational understandings of the role of trust in relating to animal research are 
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overshadowed by deficit-model approaches in this area which treat mistrust of the bioscience 
sector as the result of misinformation or ignorance.  
In reframing trust as performative, as a quality which is cultivated in trustworthy acts, 
emphasis can be shifted from measuring how much trust in the bioscience sector publics 
have, to how trustworthy the bioscience sector is deemed as acting. Discussing the UK’s and 
Switzerland’s openness agendas around animal research (as signified by their respective 
formalised commitments to transparency via the Concordat (UAR 2014a) and the Basel 
Declaration (BDS 2010)), McLeod (2018) argues that such initiatives ‘are unlikely to be enough 
on their own to build greater trust between the AR community and wider society’ (McLeod, 
2018: 70). In order to cultivate science-society trust around animal research, McLeod suggests 
that there also needs to be evidence of the trustworthiness of the AR regulatory system and 
the accountability processes that govern it’ (ibid, emphasis added). Indeed, this shift in focus 
from assessing trust as capacity to exploring how trustworthiness is enacted encourages a 
recognition that mistrust may, at times, be a sensible way of relating to certain actors and 
institutions. As Wynne’s study of the Cumbrian farmers demonstrated by contextualising the 
farming community’s distrust of scientists responding to Chernobyl to pre-existing 
controversies at the local nuclear station Sellafield (Wynne, 1992: 285), mistrust towards 
government and science can have deep sociocultural roots.  
Further, as discussed earlier in this section, trust as well as mistrust can signify a response to 
unequal power distributions, with trust being ‘given’ in circumstances of disempowerment. 
In this way, ‘gaining trust’ does not necessarily indicate support, thus complicating 
assumptions that measurements of public trust in animal research can also determine levels 
of acceptance. Rather, attention to trust as a relational act can reveal how animal research is 
entangled within broader power structures, such as governance, which shape how it is related 
to in the everyday and, indeed, what kinds of relations are even possible.  
2.3.3 Hope and fear  
When considering science-society relations through the lens of trust, the related role that 
hope and fear plays in guiding such relationships also becomes evident. Indeed, hopes and 
expectations in relationships between publics, patients, and biotechnology have been 
documented as a key focus within the Sociology of Expectations and its attention to emerging 
innovations across science and technology. For instance, discussing debates around the 
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emergence of in vitro fertilisation (IVF), Mulkay (1993) observes a ‘rhetoric of hope’, which 
tends to ‘avoid consideration of the social changes that may be needed to put new 
technologies into successful operation’ (Mulkay, 1993: 728). In the context of science-society 
relations, this rhetoric of hope works to project ‘a radically simplified future where scientific 
knowledge necessarily extends our control over disease, disability and death, and 
progressively generates, despite pockets of resistance, substantial improvements in the way 
of life of society at large’ (ibid). Such analyses reveal how imaginaries of the future are invoked 
in order to secure public ‘buy-in’ for projects whose promises may not be delivered in the 
short-term, whether such imaginaries invoke hopes for a desired future or fears towards a 
future that must be prevented.  
Writing broadly about public engagement exercises, Felt and Fochler (2010) locate 
participation as occurring within a ‘technoscientific economy of promises’, emphasising that 
‘ever more strongly both in scientific and political discourse, promises of future applications 
have become a central currency in both attaining funding and in legitimising public 
expenditures for technoscience’ (Felt and Fochler, 2010: 235-236). Many of these insights into 
the role of hope in science and technology have been made from learnings in the field of the 
Sociology of Expectations, within which, as Michael (2017) writes, ‘accounts of the future are 
seen as performative – they are understood as enacting a particular future (while also 
marginalizing alternative futures) in order to enrol actors in the present, who will, ideally, help 
realize the projected future in the future’ (Michael, 2017: 513).  
Similarly, Adams et al. (2009) have written of ‘anticipatory discourses’ around technoscientific 
innovations, arguing that anticipation ‘reconfigures the ‘lay of the land’ as sites that in colonial 
logics were mapped as either primitive (past and out of time) or modern (present and in time) 
and turns them both into productive ground for anticipatory interventions, each forecasting 
its own type of darker and/or more hopeful futures’ (Adams et al., 2009: 248). They claim that 
a key state of anticipation is ‘abduction’ which, in its darker manifestation, ‘can be a form of 
kidnapping, where life in the present is held hostage to the potential violence of the future’ 
(ibid, 255). In navigating this potential future, biopolitical discourses advocate an 
‘optimization’, which entails ‘maximizing one’s chances for a best possible future but also that 
the pursuit of the ‘best possible’ is legitimately infinite in its scope and always ongoing’ (ibid, 
256). Such orientation to a threating future leads to an ‘anticipatory preparedness’ which, 
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they argue, ‘is speculative and reactive, in ‘preparation for’ the event and the trauma as if it 
were already here, rather than offering ‘prevention of’ it so that it never happens (ibid, 257).  
Such attention to the creation and investment of hope, expectation, and fear in the animal 
research domain may help to reveal how acceptance of animal research in the present often 
hinges on expectations of its bringing forth a particular future. This might involve the 
replacement of animal models with non-human animal alternatives as well as promised 
medical benefits for human patients. Correspondingly, resistance towards the use of animals 
in science in the present may also be linked to resistance towards a particular future their use 
is seen as heralding. However, the role of hope, expectations, and fear in understandings of 
animal research or science-society relations around the practice remains surprisingly 
unattended to in social scientific studies. Discussing fear narratives in openness regimes 
around animal research, McLeod (2018) has written about the animal research community’s 
perceptions of a public body which is fearful of what goes on in animal research laboratories 
and also elicits fears in scientists using animals due to the history of animal rights extremism. 
However, this work is based on a comparative analysis of UK and Swiss openness initiatives 
around scientific animal use and is thus not explicitly focused on how fear might shape 
societal understandings of animal research in general. Nevertheless, attention to the role of 
hope, expectation, and fear when exploring views on animal research encourages a shift away 
from what intrinsic qualities a respondent can be said to have and how these might shape 
their relation towards the practice, as detailed in the earlier discussion of previous studies 
emphasis on variables. Instead, promoting consideration of how discourses around animal 
research work to rhetorically enrol publics in projects of futuring and how such rhetorics of 
hope and fear are understood in the everyday. 
2.3.4 Care 
Though traditionally overlooked in analyses of public relations with technoscience, literature 
which explores ethics and practices of care demonstrates how care is entangled with practices 
of knowing and also not-knowing, in that caring often directs what we decide to engage with 
in a process of knowing or choose to ignore. Indeed, discussing the prologue of Primo Levi's 
(1947) Survival in Auschwitz which commands the reader to retain and retell that which the 
book will impart, Hatley (2000) emphasises that one is required to accept their responsibility 
to care before one can come to know. As they put it, ‘[b]efore there is knowledge, before the 
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exact shape of the world and its entities can be fixed, one must already have considered that 
one is obliged to consider’ (Hatley, 2000: 12). Similarly, van Dooren (2014) argues that ‘the 
obligation to ‘know more’ emerges as a demand for a kind of deep contextual and critical 
knowledge about the object of our care, a knowledge that simultaneously places us at stake 
in the world and demands that we be held accountable’ (van Dooren, 2014: 293). However, 
rather than getting lost in the directionality between knowledge and care, the point here is 
to emphasise how they are entwined. On this point, Puig de la Bellacasa (2012), following on 
from Haraway’s (1988) work on situated knowledges, argues, ‘[t]hat knowledge is situated 
means that knowing and thinking are inconceivable without a multitude of relations that also 
make possible the worlds we think with […] relations of thinking and knowing require care’ 
(Puig de la Bellacasa, 2012: 198).   
Care Ethics has been argued to represent an interdisciplinary field of inquiry (Leget et al., 
2019). Initially emerging from the field of nursing (Watson, 1979) and becoming a key feminist 
theoretical approach (Noddings, 1984; Gilligan, 1993), the lens of care has brought together 
a diverse range of scholars exploring social fields beyond healthcare settings (for instance, see 
Riley, 2013; Hankivsky, 2005; Popke, 2006). An example of this related to the topic at the 
centre of this thesis, Donovan (1996) has called for the application of a feminist care ethic to 
the issue of animal welfare and ‘rights’ philosophy, arguing that, rather than appeals to a 
universal logic, a ‘viable ethic for the treatment of animals can be rooted in sympathy, a 
passionate caring about their well-being’ (Donovan, 1996: 98). The call for approaches to 
ethics which are based in care rather than moral rules or principles thus promotes attention 
to how ethics are practiced relationally, with care offering, as Jennings (2018) puts it, an 
‘instructive constitutive context [sic] within which the moral identity of persons is grounded 
and articulated in recognition’ (Jennings, 2018: 554).  
Before considering the ways in which publics might ‘care’ about animal research, it is 
important to first address the dichotomy imposed between caring for and caring about. This 
is particularly important given how the current emphasis on interpersonal, professional, and 
material manifestations of care reflects a privileging of practices of caring ‘for’. Smith (1998) 
distinguishes between caring ‘for’ and ‘about’ by describing the former as ‘beneficence’, ‘as 
doing good or showing active kindness’ and the later as ‘benevolence’, ‘as merely the desire 
to do good or charitable feeling’ (Smith, 1998: 16). Similarly, Silk (1998) has described caring 
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about others as involving ‘a genuine ethical and emotional engagement, being troubled or 
concerned about their situation; we wish to do good or entertain charitable feelings’, whilst 
caring for others represents a ‘crucial step’ in going ‘beyond’ this, requiring ‘doing good or 
actively showing kindness, providing support for their emotional and physical needs and well-
being’ (Silk, 1998: 167). Although, Silk claimed that ‘the traditional reliance of activities of care 
and caring upon face-to-face interaction and associated action will continue’, they anticipated 
that ‘increasingly they will constitute only one link in complex sets of chains and circuits of 
actions and interactions’ (ibid). 
In such distinctions, the treatment of caring about as an abstract form of care or an initial step 
towards establishing or enacting care is evident. However, refuting assumptions that caring 
about is a lesser form of care, Barnett and Land (2007) make the case that caring about is 
essential for one to provide adequate care for another. As they put it, ‘[r]ather than supposing 
that caring-about is a secondary, derivative variant of a more genuine set of relationships of 
caring-for, we might instead start from the observation that any caring practice, in order for 
it to be caring, has to be attentive and responsive to the needs of the other’ (Barnett and 
Land, 2007: 4).  
Differentiating between caring for and about by understanding the former as implying ‘a 
specific subject as the focus of caring’ and the latter ‘a more general form of commitment 
that refers to less concrete objects’ (Milligan and Wiles, 2010: 740-741), Milligan and Wiles 
(2010) argue that caring about ‘refers to the emotional aspects of care [which] might also 
include the generalized relational and affective elements of being caring’ (ibid, 741). Similarly 
challenging representations of caring about as a detached and disembodied experience, they 
contend that such relations can become deeply embodied by the way in which ‘caring about 
can impact on and shape an individual’s personal politics and belief systems’ (ibid, 742).  
Taking a broader and more inclusive understanding of care that can thus encompass the 
for/about binary, Fisher and Tronto (1990) suggest that ‘caring be viewed as a species activity 
that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we 
can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our 
environment, all of which we see to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web’ (Fisher and 
Tronto, 1990: 40). Such a conceptualisation of care as implicit in the co-constitution of social 
worlds signifies the prevalence of care, existing beyond traditionally narrow constructions of 
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‘caring’ acts. With this approach, the importance of care in binding together all areas of social 
life is evident and, as such, practices like animal research may be understood as meaningful 
because of their implication in broader care networks. In this way, attention to embodied care 
practices, rather than ethical principles such as beneficence, non-maleficence and harm-
benefit analyses, enables a more situated and relational study of understandings of animal 
research.  
In the animal research domain, care has emerged as a prominent lens of analysis, with much 
recent focus concentrated on the material and affectual multispecies relations in the 
laboratory (Holmberg, 2011; Greenhough and Roe, 2011; 2018b; a; Friese and Latimer, 2019) 
and their constitution of a ‘culture of care’ (Davies et al., 2018). Such work signals a shift from 
the centrality of the politics of animal research, with examinations of how polarised ‘sides’ in 
the debate relate to each other (Michael and Birke, 1994a; Paul, 1995), to the intersubjective 
practices of care and ‘somatic sensibilities’ (Greenhough and Roe, 2011) involved in doing 
animal research.  
At an official level, the cultivation of a ‘culture of care’ is now encouraged by stakeholder 
organisations such as the National Centre for the Replacement, Refinement & Reduction 
(NC3RS) (Brown, 2014) and regulatory bodies such as the government’s Animals in Science 
Regulation Unit (ASRU). The latter defines a good culture of care as ‘an environment which is 
informed by societal expectations of respectful and humane attitudes towards animals used 
in research’, with each establishment having ‘its own way of conveying its culture of care’ 
(ASRU 2015b: 4). As notable in this definition, wider societal values around the appropriate 
treatment of animals are taken as informing care relationships in the laboratory, however, to 
date there has been little attention given to how publics and representations of publics 
feature in such care networks. With much focus concentrated inside the physical space of the 
laboratory in which care is emphasised as the performative product of a situated 
intersubjectivity, a ‘common existential corporeal experience’ (Svendsen and Koch, 2013: 
124), how publics who rarely enter the laboratory space may enact care ‘at a distance’ (Silk, 
1998; 2000; 2004) towards those involved appears currently overlooked. Given the 
dominance of focus on what publics know about animal research and deficit model 
approaches in this area, this lack of consideration of how publics may practice care towards 




To conclude, this chapter has provided an overview of how previous studies have explored 
understandings of animal research, critiquing the prevalence of quantitative macro-level 
studies which have tended to frame understandings of animal research through the influence 
of internal and external variables. As argued, in aiming for samples which are representative 
of a given ‘public’ population, such studies reify public opinion as a phenomenon which can 
be objectively measured, monitored, and correlated with levels of support or opposition. In 
its construction of a homogenous public body restricted to expressions of consent, dissent, 
confusion, or ignorance such an approach misses the affectual and relational dimensions of 
how individuals relate to the issue, overlooking what it means to them and why. Therefore, 
in looking at literature across the fields of the Sociology of Ignorance, STS, PUS, and Bioethics, 
I have considered instead the utility of the four analytic lenses of knowing (and not-knowing), 
trust, hope and fear, and care, which, although have featured in studies of certain aspects of 
animal research, remain underused in studies of societal understandings of animal research. 
These lenses have informed and helped to structure my analysis of MOP writing on animal 
research, with the first data chapter specifically concentrating on the role of knowing and not-
knowing and the second data chapter exploring the role of caring and not-caring. The role of 
trust and hope and fear are touched on within each data chapter in varying levels, not being 
central analytical foci but being included within the meta-themes. In examining these lenses 
here, I hope to have added further weight to calls for more substantial qualitative approaches 
which embrace the relationality inherent to understandings of animal research. The next 
chapter will present my own methodological approach to exploring how UK publics relate to 
and understand the use of animals in scientific research, introducing the method at the centre 






3. Introducing the Mass Observation Project 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter offers an overview to the method at the centre of this thesis – the Mass 
Observation Project (MOP). Although, as will be illustrated, the MOP has been used as a 
method for data collection across the social sciences, the use of archival methods is still 
relatively novel in Sociology. Indeed, in their paper entitled ‘A Sociologist’s Field Notes to the 
Mass Observation Archive’, Lindsey and Bulloch (2014) stress the need for an interdisciplinary 
approach when engaging with Mass Observation materials. They write that ‘the sociologist's 
expectations and habits are challenged when engaging with this socio-historical data source. 
The access routes to the data, its structure, the relationship between researcher and 
researched, as well as the agency of the researcher, require a particular type of engagement 
with the data that challenges pre-conceptions and discipline-bound methodological 
approaches’ (Lindsey and Bulloch, 2014: 10). Therefore, because of the particularity of Mass 
Observation, I feel it is important to provide a dedicated chapter to exploring how the Project 
works, the unique positionality of Mass Observers and how their writing should be treated, 
and the kinds of academic research that MOP materials have been used in. In doing so, this 
chapter is also intended to give context to Chapter 4’s outline of the specific ways I have 
utilised the MOP as a research method and analysed MOP writings on the topic of animal 
research.  
As argued implicitly and explicitly throughout this chapter, the MOP occupies a unique 
position in relation to knowledge production and social research, with its correspondents – 
the Mass Observers – acting not merely as subjects of research but as participants in its 
production, engaging with the archivists and researchers in their investigations of social life 
and sometimes with as much or more at stake in the research (Sheridan, 1993). Indeed, as 
Pollen (2014) puts it, ‘MO material is collectively produced and its meaning is collectively 
owned’ (Pollen, 2014: 10). Because this thesis uses the MOP to research an area dominated 
by quantitative assessments of what people think, with such studies frequently generalising 
their samples as representative of ‘the public’, it is necessary to present this detailed look at 
the methodological standpoint underpinning the MOP, a standpoint that is radically at odds 
with much of the previous research on views towards animal research. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 2, this issue of representing ‘public’ or ‘societal’ views has been a prominent 
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consideration in my navigation of this project and has further informed my understanding and 
use of the MOP. Therefore, in providing this overview to the MOP, I aim to illustrate its 
particular methodological approach and contextualise my use of MOP materials and also 
reflect on the Project’s value for exploring views or understandings. In order to do so, this 
chapter explains the way in which the Project functions, explores who the Mass Observers 
are, and finally, details some of the ways in which the MOP has been used in academic 
research.  
3.2 How does the Mass Observation Project work? 
Housed in an archive called The Keep at the University of Sussex, the Mass Observation 
Project is a ‘national life writing project about everyday life in Britain’ and is ‘one of the major 
repositories of longitudinal qualitative social data in the UK’ (Mass Observation, 2015b). Being 
established in 1937, the Project began its life as the social research organisation Mass 
Observation (MO) and upon winding down its activities in the years following World War Two, 
collections from this early period came to comprise the Mass Observation Archive (MOA) 
when they were deeded to the University of Sussex in 1975. In 1981, Mass Observation’s 
activities were resumed once again and MO entered its current phase as the Mass 
Observation Project (MOP).  
The MOP maintains a panel of voluntary correspondents from across the UK who are referred 
to as ‘Mass Observers’ or ‘Observers’. In early 2019, there were 310 active writers on the 
panel, a high representation of whom are located in South East England, are female, and are 
over the age of 61 (Mass Observation, 2019). The Mass Observation Project engages with its 
panel of voluntary correspondents through ‘Directives’, which ask Observers to write on a 
particular topic, guided by a set of questions or prompts. The MOP conducts three or four 
Directives per year, usually divided into seasons (i.e. February is the Spring Directive and 
May/June the Summer) and most Directives feature two or sometimes three topics which are 
split into separate parts. Directives span a diverse range of topics but can be brought together 
under the heading of ‘everyday life’. In composing Directives, Bloome et al. (1993) highlight 
that ‘[e]very attempt is made to make the Directives interesting and varied so that at least 
one part of it will appeal to all correspondents’ (Bloome et al., 1993: 5). Most Directives are 
internally designed using input from archival staff, but the MOP also accepts commissions 
from external researchers and suggestions from Observers themselves (ibid). Directives often 
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follow an open-questionnaire format but occasionally the MOP asks Observers to submit a 
one-day diary, usually for a specific national event.  
Mass Observers are issued with identification numbers to use in place of their names when 
responding to Directives and only archival staff can link an Observer’s number to their name 
(Mass Observation, 2015a). The anonymity of the panel allows Observers to reveal as much 
of themselves as they decide, an important attribute in enabling respondents to express 
themselves openly on intimate or sensitive topics. However, the anonymity of Mass 
Observers does not mean that their accounts are closer to a social ‘truth’. The writing of MOP 
correspondents is still produced within the specific conditions that instigate and shape its 
expression in particular ways. Hence, as sociologist Shaw (1998) states, ‘it would be naive to 
imagine that M-O writing is 'truer' or less mediated than other texts used in social science, or 
that the experience recorded can be taken at face value’, although, for Mass Observers, ‘the 
absence of an interviewer is crucial’ (Shaw, 1998: 4). As well as safeguarding privacy through 
anonymised identification numbers, in order to publicly reproduce excerpts of Mass 
Observers’ writings (e.g. in journal publications) permission from the archive must first be 
sought. This involves sharing the selected excerpts with Mass Observation archivists so that 
they can check the copyright status of the Mass Observers involved, with some 
correspondents having particular restrictions on their writing. Again, such a process reflects 
that Mass Observers are not simply research subjects whose writings academic researchers 
can extract but are participants with ‘shared ownership’ (Pollen, 2014) in the collective Mass 
Observation Project.  
3.2.1 Responding to Directives 
Mass Observers are able to respond to Directives in a myriad of formats. Responses can be 
hand-written, typed, word-processed, audiotaped, or video recorded. As former Mass 
Observation Director (1990-2008) Dorothy Sheridan (1993) describes, written responses 
encompass multiple genres, covering ‘letter-writing, answering questionnaires, being 
interviewed, keeping a diary, writing a life story’ (Sheridan, 1993: 34). These can be submitted 
to the archive through post or e-mail. With no single genre of writing proving to be the most 
appropriate, Sheridan claims that those involved in Mass Observation are engaged in ‘the 
process of forging a new genre: the ‘Mass-Observation directive reply’ (ibid). The flexibility 
that the MOP offers in correspondence with the archive is important in capturing the writing 
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styles of individuals, particularly given the Project’s interest in preserving the practices of 
those who stand to be forgotten by the formal institutions of history. By enabling Mass 
Observers to adopt their own writing preferences when responding, the MOP stands to 
capture non-professional writing, the writing of ‘ordinary’ people. For those interested in 
literacy, this is an important aim in itself, as Bloome (1993) describes –  
‘The phenomenon of the Mass Observation Archive itself - that "ordinary" people 
enthusiastically volunteer to write for the Archive, and that they feel it is important to do 
so - suggests that there is a breadth and depth of writing in the general public, among 
"ordinary" people, that has not yet been revealed or understood by scholarship on writing 
and literacy’ (Bloome, 1993: 7-8).  
That the material choices that Mass Observers make in responding to a Directive are 
preserved adds to the richness of their history-making. The kind of paper used and the 
condition it might end up in, the style of handwriting or word-processing font and formatting 
all offer a material suggestion of where and how the writing took place. As social scientists 
Moor and Uprichard (2014) emphasise – 
‘a focus on materiality allows a way of approaching data not only to study what people 
have said, thought or done at a particular point in history, but also to reflect on the 
'dating' and the 'timing' of social action at both individual and collective levels’ (Moor 
and Uprichard, 2014: 3).  
They remind us that the writings of Mass Observers exist in physical form in the archive and 
that when reading their words, the content is best examined within the materiality which 
bears it. Analysing how Observers write about a topic therefore requires us to consider not 
only the things they discuss and the vocabulary and the grammatical structures they use to 
discuss them, but also how an Observers’ corporeality and temporospatial location shapes 
the form their writing takes. As Lindsey and Bulloch (2014) describe of MOP writing, ‘looking 
at the type of paper on which it is written, the stains it has acquired, the handwriting, the 
spelling, the colour of the ink, the reader forms an impression of the writer's level of 
education and class, favoured beverage, the level of care given to the theme on which they 
are writing and perhaps, whether they have written the piece in one sitting’ (Lindsey and 
Bulloch, 2014: 8). Alongside this, it is important to acknowledge the influence that the archive 
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as a physical and cultural space, with its given practices, have on our interpretation of Mass 
Observation documents. As Moor and Uprichard note, the ‘fact that the men's and women's 
responses were kept physically separate is interesting in itself, and reflects the materiality of 
social ordering at work’ (Moor and Uprichard, 2014: 4).  
A more pronounced way in which the writings of Mass Observers are shaped is provided in 
Sheridan’s (1993) emphasis on the role of the Directives. As Sheridan puts it, the testimonies 
that correspondents send to the MOP ‘may not have existed at all, and certainly not in such 
a specific form, if it had not been for the initiative of the interviewer/researcher; there is 
inevitably a considerable degree of dependence on external prompts’ (Sheridan, 1993: 33). In 
being mindful of this, we can understand MOP materials as relational products. Stressing this 
point, material and visual culture scholar Pollen (2014) states that, ‘writing to MO is always 
solicited and consequently shaped by the nature of the questions asked and the contributors' 
conceptualisation of the larger project’ (Pollen, 2014: 10). Indeed, for some Mass Observers, 
the relationship they share with the archive is not simply institutional, but felt to be personal, 
as Shaw (1998) describes, ‘[e]ven without face-to-face contact there is intimacy, trust and a 
sense of being in a relationship. Many writers have contributed for years and this reliability, 
plus the Archive's responsiveness, leads them to feel, and to be known by the staff’ (Shaw, 
1998: 4).   
Generally, correspondents do not have a set deadline for responding but the suggested 
timeframe for replies are within three to four months (Mass Observation, 2015a). Although 
the general rule of thumb is for Mass Observers to respond within three to four months of 
receiving a Directive, the Mass Observation website advises those interested in joining the 
panel that ‘[o]ccasionally, however, you may not have the time or inclination to write for a 
while, and we are still pleased to accept Directive replies which arrive late or in bulk’ (ibid).  
3.2.2 Archiving of responses 
Once Directive responses have been collated, they are recorded by archival staff and filed 
according to the topic. Directive responses are publicly accessible at The Keep, an archive at 
the University of Sussex which houses Mass Observation materials and the current Mass 
Observation Project, being accessible by appointment and read ‘by a wide range of 
researchers’ (ibid). In registering with The Keep, visitors are given access to the reading rooms 
where they can request to view archival documents. In accessing MOP materials, researchers 
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receive ‘basic information about each person (age, sex, marital status, current occupation and 
town of residence) […] and background information about the whole Project’ (ibid). As 
suggested above, researchers using the archive come from a range of disciplinary 
backgrounds and bring with them different research interests when engaging with the 
materials. Those researching the archival materials include academics such as sociologists, 
psychologists, historians, and geographers, as well as students, school children and journalists 
(ibid). Hence, the MOP offers a wide range of uses, from educational to research applications 
and, as will be detailed later in this chapter, this use spans disciplinary boundaries.  
3.3 Who are the Mass Observers?  
As one might expect of an archive which claims to record ‘everyday life in Britain’, the 
question of the MOP’s representativeness features often in critiques of the method. Indeed, 
as Pollen (2014) points out, the MOP panel is skewed towards ‘older rather than younger 
contributors, with a greater attraction to women rather than men, and with a population 
more commonly located in the south east of the UK than the north west’ (Pollen, 2014: 4). In 
conducting a longitudinal study of certain Mass Observers, Lindsey and Bulloch (2014) 
similarly note that the ‘available demographics of the MOP writers […] mirror what we know 
about the demographics of volunteers, the so-called 'civic core', which in the UK consists of 
older, middle-class females from the south-east (Lindsey and Bulloch, 2014: 6). As these 
demographics suggest, Mass Observers may also share motivations for contributing, with 
archival staff, scholars, and Observers themselves identifying multiple roles that are 
performed through the process of Mass Observation. Such roles include the citizen journalist, 
documentarian, local historian, recorder for posterity, or amateur writer and such identities 
are not always distinct for Observers (Bloome et al., 1993; Pollen, 2013). Rather, their writing 
for the MOP may emerge through a blend of such performances.  
One way of understanding MOP writing is to say it is stimulated by what Sheridan (1993) has 
called an ‘auto-biographical impulse’, with the subjectivities of writers often taking centre 
stage in their descriptions of social events and issues. In their determination to document 
collective social life, Mass Observers are often reflexive of their own position, assessing the 
foundations their thoughts are based on and considering how others might perceive the topic 
at hand. In this autobiographical style of writing, Sheridan explains that some correspondents 
write to imagined future selves, addressing their writing to ‘versions of themselves, real selves 
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in the future, or imagined selves in the form of their actual descendants or their spiritual 
descendants, people ‘like them’ who enjoy reading about ordinary people’s lives in the past’ 
(Sheridan, 1993: 21). However, writing for the MOP also complicates traditional 
understandings of autobiography in its resistance of producing finalised life narratives. 
Rather, as Sheridan puts it, the MOP materials collectively reflect ‘a kaleidoscope of 
experiences, mediated by a multitude of texts’ (ibid, 33). In the view that autobiographies tell 
the story of the self, detailing a traceable identity through time, the summative 
autobiographical project of the MOP, then, is forever out of reach.  
Understandings of MOP writing as straightforwardly autobiographical are also complicated 
by the attention that Mass Observers give to other perspectives and voices in their responses. 
Mass Observers often take care to consider the knowledges and experiences of others when 
responding to a Directive, and the personal views or beliefs they articulate in their writings 
are frequently embedded in wider sociocultural and historical contexts. In this sense, we may 
argue that the MOP captures a sense of the plurality of narrative and knowledge, rather than 
privileging a singular, unified telling. Yet, along with the MOP’s emphasis on the plurality of 
experience and knowledge, a thread which runs through the motivations of many Mass 
Observers is a commitment to documenting the voices of ‘ordinary’ people, a commitment 
which, as will be discussed, shapes how they interact with the archive and how they approach 
their writing on different topics.  
3.3.1 Being ordinary 
Since its inception, capturing the thoughts, feelings, and experiences of ‘ordinary’ people, 
those whose contributions will be otherwise missed by the formal institutions of history, has 
been key to the MOP and comprises an important element of the Mass Observer identity. 
Highmore (2010) traces this foregrounding of the ‘ordinary’ in the collective identity of Mass 
Observers back to the ‘period of Mass-Observation after 1981 [when] diarists were explicitly 
asked to write for future historians who would want to understand the lives of ordinary 
people' (Highmore, 2010: 92). However, rather than viewing this motivation for writing as a 
positivist construction of Mass Observers as neutral conduits of ‘everyday life in Britain’, 
Observers may instead be driven by the chance to record an alternative history, a window 
into worlds that may be forgotten, mundanities that might one day stand to be remarkable. 
As Pollen (2013) describes –   
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'Correspondents give generously of their thoughts, feelings, experiences and opinions 
in part because they enjoy the process as self-developmental or even therapeutic, but 
also, at times, as a kind of social altruism, as an oppositional ‘ordinary’ voice against 
‘official’ culture' (Pollen, 2013: 220). 
Rather than taken as an agreed upon signifier, the idea of what constitutes an ‘ordinary’ 
person or life can more accurately be seen as a performance of particular standards of 
normality. This lens of the ‘ordinary’ that frames much of MOP writing challenges the power 
dynamics associated with traditional historical records, with Mass Observers compelled by an 
expectation that their experiences may go towards establishing a history of ‘the people’. As 
Bloome et al. (1993) claim, Mass Observers ‘often express a shared sense of creating a history 
of ordinary people - ordinary as opposed to those they describe as “kings and queens,” “the 
posh,” “the big cheeses,” and “the media”’ (Bloome et al., 1993: 15). In this sense then, 
Sheridan (1996) writes that ‘[c]alling themselves "ordinary" signifies what they are not, at 
least within their identities as Mass-Observers; they are not […] people who have certain sorts 
of power to define what history is’ (Sheridan, 1996: 9, emphasis in original). From this 
perspective, we can see how the MOP might offer its correspondents an opportunity to re-
value their life experiences and recognise the significance of the ‘mundane’ or ‘everyday’.  
3.3.2 Being out of the ordinary   
However, some Mass Observers have expressed that, through their participation in the MOP, 
they are in some ways different to the ‘ordinary’ person. This self-reflection is highlighted in 
the following responses to the 2004 Directive on ‘Being Part of Research' as referenced in 
Pollen’s (2014)  work on the ‘shared ownership’ of Mass Observation –    
'I suppose we represent a somewhat limited cross section of the community - the 
verbose, reasonably literate section who like to express our opinions on every possible 
subject' (Mass Observer quoted by Pollen, 2014: 9-10). 
~ 
‘I joined Mass Observation because I believe in its aims and objectives. I have always 
hoped it provided a kind of 'history of ordinary people'. However, I have thought that 
it is possible that Mass Observers themselves might form a category of people who are 
in fact not 'ordinary'. Perhaps they are a type of person who likes to reflect on their 
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lives by writing about themselves; thus they might be considered as being 
extraordinary’ (Mass Observer quoted by Pollen, 2014: 10). 
The troubling of Mass Observers’ claims to ‘ordinariness’ therefore raises implications for who 
the panel can be said to represent. As the above excerpts suggest, for some Mass Observers, 
their positioning as reporter of self and society may challenge their ability to represent 
ordinary lives, with the act of reflecting on and writing about everyday life complicating their 
membership within the world of ‘ordinary’ people. Indeed, as Kramer (2014) describes, ‘as 
well as recounting their personal experiences, [Mass Observers] also document or 'bear 
witness' to contemporary social life, making observations about society, as well as describing 
their own individual personal experiences. They are then both the self-observed, and the 
observer' (Kramer, 2014: 7). This liminality associated with performing Mass Observation 
means that the MOP troubles what Sheridan (1993) identifies as the dominant meaning of 
‘representativeness’, the privileging of ‘the individual, the single voice, and [..] the assumption 
that people can only be seen to represent themselves’ (Sheridan in Bloome, 1993: 18). Under 
this model of representativeness, ‘the quality of representativeness lies not in what [people] 
say, but in who they are (as defined by selected socio-economic characteristics which permit 
large scale generalisations about the whole population)’ (ibid). Overall, the ‘dual vision’ 
(Kramer, 2014) of Mass Observers as both researchers and the researched, and the slippage 
between being extra/ordinary that their role on the panel might create, thus emphasises the 
importance of embracing the particularity of the MOP and the materials it produces.  
3.3.3 Mass Observers and ‘the public’ 
As well as unsettling assumptions about representativeness, the relationality of Mass 
Observers to others in their writings is also significant in its challenge of dominant approaches 
to exploring ‘public’ thought. The Project’s encouragement for Mass Observers to consider 
how others’ views, feelings, or experiences might relate to the topic of discussion or how 
others might react to the Observer’s own writing moves the Project away from reductive 
notions of the ‘individual’ which, as highlighted in Chapter 2, are common throughout 
previous studies of views towards animal research. This means that when using the MOP to 
understand collective views towards an issue, we should be mindful of the particular 
positioning of Mass Observers and how their writing and knowledge claims are being used. 
Given the focus of previous studies on ‘public’ or ‘societal’ views towards animal research 
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amongst which this thesis is situated, this negotiation of the Mass Observer identity and their 
location amongst wider publics has been an ongoing concern throughout this PhD research.   
Typical of MOP writing is how Mass Observers contextualise their thoughts about a topic with 
the personal relevance (or irrelevance) it represents, what it means within their particular 
social world and how it has been influenced by their lived experiences. As well as locating 
their views in specific contexts, Mass Observers often consider the epistemic value of their 
knowledges and the limits to what they can claim to know. As Kramer (2014) explains –  
'Mass Observers do not then simply write of their experiences: they explain and 
account for the relevance of the information they provide, allowing researchers not 
just access to personal experience, but also insight as to how Mass Observers 
understand and present the value of their knowledge and experience' (Kramer, 2014: 
3). 
This means that in reading MOP accounts to get a sense of how an issue is viewed or 
understood, the reader must face the uncertainty that Mass Observers themselves convey in 
their writing. Reckoning with the fluidity and contingency of the thoughts expressed in such 
writing thus unsettles the notion of ‘opinion’ or ‘views’ as free-floating phenomena which can 
be extracted from their surrounding contexts, an assumption which, as discussed in 
subsection 2.2.3, frequently underpins the use of opinion polls and the interpretation of their 
findings. Rather, Mass Observers ground their writing in embodied experiences and shared 
social worlds and, in doing so, reveal the dependency of their writing upon multiple others.  
Challenging the traditionally individualistic view of opinion-formation raises implications for 
who it is we engage when we want to understand views and feelings about something. As 
discussed in the literature review, research from throughout the fields of STS and PUS has 
demonstrated how publics are dynamic and performative, coming into being through their 
mobilisation around particular issues (Converse, 1964 [2006]; Michael, 2009). In taking 
lessons from such fields and from the MOP’s embrace of the locatedness of knowledge, using 
the MOP for studies of opinion thus demands attention to the particularity of the Project and 
its panel. 
As touched on earlier in this chapter, there may be multiple overlapping motivations for 
becoming a Mass Observer, such a passion for contributing to a ‘people’s history’, 
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documenting the ‘everyday’, or non-professional writing. Although these attributes or 
identities can be used to describe Mass Observers as a collective, in their writing on different 
topics, the identities of Mass Observers may shift not only generally over time but through 
interactions with different topics and the different elements of one’s identity that they may 
solicit or foreground. The Directive itself thus plays a crucial role in directing how 
correspondents enact their identity, with the ‘form of reply shifting [sic] in relation to the 
ways in which the writers see the task they are performing’ (Sheridan, 1996: 12). In this way, 
as Pollen (2014) puts it, 'MO contributors are partly produced by their users; who they are 
and what they contribute is in part defined by what researchers ask and what they think their 
audience wants' (Pollen, 2014: 5).  
Therefore, any understanding of the identities of Mass Observers, should ultimately centre 
on their commitment to the overall project of Mass Observation. Whether or not their 
motivations for contributing to the MOP are the same, as the beginning of this section stated, 
Mass Observers should be recognised as invested in the Project, not merely as respondents 
or research subjects, but as correspondents who are engaged in the collective mission of 
recording ‘everyday life’ in the UK.  
3.4 Using the Mass Observation Project as an academic resource 
Given the MOP’s attention to the far-reaching corners of ‘everyday life’, academic 
publications that have used MOP materials encompass a broad range of themes, covering 
social practices, institutions, and relationships. For instance, the MOP has been used to study 
areas such as ethical consumption (Adams and Raisborough, 2010), gardening (Bhatti and 
Church, 2000; Bhatti, 2014; Bhatti et al., 2014), libraries (Black and Crann, 2002; McNicol, 
2004; Black, 2011), friendship (Smart et al., 2012), kinship (Kramer, 2011), and belonging 
(May, 2016b; a; 2017).  Describing why the MOP is particularly useful for those researching 
relationships, Smart identifies the ‘richness and depth of the narratives that many panellists 
provide’ and ‘the policy of the MOP to encourage people to write about actual experiences 
and real events, rather than offering opinions and attitudes’ (Smart, 2011: 541).   
As well as being valuable for research because of its emphasis on lived experience, the MOP’s 
longitudinal nature has also offered methodological opportunities. For instance, looking at 
food practices, Nettleton and Uprichard (2011) analysed responses to the 1982 MOP Winter 
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Directive on food and eating along with food diaries submitted by MOA panel members in 
1945. Likewise, Clarke et al.’s (2017) study of anti-political sentiment in the UK analysed 
diaries from 1945, 1987, and 2001, with these dates identified as key moments in political 
history. However, although Mass Observation provides a valuable resource for such 
longitudinal research, as Lindsey and Bulloch (2014) observe ‘academics have tended to use 
it thematically and cross-sectionally, focusing on responses to a given theme at given points 
in time’ (Lindsey and Bulloch, 2014: 3).  
Whilst most research based on MOP writing has been qualitative, a few have taken a 
quantitative approach (Lowe, 1995; Sloboda and O'Neill, 2001). Though Lowe (1995) found 
the MOP to be useful for quantitative research, Pollen (2013) contends that in ‘seeking 
objective data correlation, not enough attention is paid to the particular status of MOP 
writing, which is viewed as an unproblematic generator of facts to be mined for ‘evidence’ 
and statistical frequencies, rather than as complex, variable, subjective material solicited so 
as to access experience, opinion and feeling’ (Pollen, 2013: 224). Hence, Pollen argues that 
through their reduction of ‘reflective and sometimes extensive writing to numerical 
information’ quantitative use of the MOP can do ‘violence to the qualitative nature of MOP 
material’ (ibid, 224).  
Of particular interest to my own use of the MOP are instances where MOP materials have 
been used to explore understandings of, experiences with, and feelings towards science, 
technology, medicine, or animals. Located within these areas, and echoing my own 
assessment of why the MOP is a valuable methodological resource, is Cook’s description of 
his use of MOP materials to study public perceptions of AIDS amidst the crisis of the 1980s. 
He states that, ‘[u]nlike opinion polls or surveys that ask direct questions and demand direct 
answers, MO sought discursive responses guided by general themes and loose questions. 
These responses allow us to see something of the complex texture of thought, opinion, and 
feeling’ (Cook, 2017: 248).  
Similar to Cook’s desire for somewhat less tethered responses, Haran and O’Riordan’s reason 
for choosing to self-commission the 2006 MOP Directive on ‘Genes, Genetics and Cloning’ was 
based in the method’s ability to ‘contribute to something of a gap in the field by eliciting 
discussion in an open way that did not constrain the responses through a focus on particular 
media genres, issues, or patient groups, or through assuming particular criteria about what 
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constitutes appropriate knowledge in the genomics or cloning field’ (Haran and O’Riordan, 
2018: 3-4). As such research demonstrates, the MOP’s strength in providing rich, personal, 
and reflexive accounts and the flexibility that Mass Observers have to write about topics in 
ways which are relevant to them have been recognised as valuable for investigating views 
towards technoscientific issues.  
Looking at relationships beyond and between species boundaries, Charles has employed the 
MOP to investigate kinship amongst humans and other animals (2014), the case of post-
human families (2016),  and how the medium of writing enables the communication of kinship 
with non-human animals (2017). In this latter work, Charles argues that methodologies which 
allow for anonymous correspondence through writing are crucial to gaining insight into 
human-animal relationships in ways that are not constrained by the risk of normative 
judgement. As they suggest, ‘[w]riting about relationships with animals produces a 
particularly intimate account which is almost confessional, while talking to another person 
about similar relationships renders the intimacy less obvious and represents human-animal 
relations in a different way’ (Charles, 2017: 117-118). Given the controversy that surrounds 
animal research in the UK, a matter which was touched on in the introduction to this thesis, 
the MOP’s potential for offering a literary ‘safe space’ for discussing sensitive or taboo 
subjects is especially important.   
Overall, the diverse research interests of those drawing on materials from the MOP reflects 
the breadth of topics that the Project explores and the range of writing it generates. As 
discussed, the MOP elicits a plurality of voices, knowledges, experiences, backgrounds, and 
writing practices and that such works also span disciplinary boundaries highlights the 
applicability of the method and materials to multiple modes of social research. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the methodology of the Mass Observation Project, 
with a particular consideration of how the MOP relates to questions about who ‘the public’ 
are and the merit of the MOP for examining views and understandings. In doing so, I have 
covered how the MOP functions, the multiple identities of Mass Observers and their relation 
to the Project and the wider public imaginary, and what kinds of academic research MOP 
materials have been used to explore. Being informed by a critical approach to public 
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understandings of science, I have suggested that the MOP’s embrace of the situatedness and 
plurality of knowledges, the ways in which they emerge from relationality within particular 
social worlds, presents a radical alternative to the reductive methods of polls and surveys 
which are predominant in studies of views towards animal research. Having now introduced 
the MOP, the next chapter will focus on my specific employment of the MOP as a research 



















4. My use of responses to the 2016 Mass Observation Project 
Directive on ‘Using animals in research’ 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis is based on an analysis of 159 responses to the Mass Observation Project (MOP) 
Summer 2016 Directive on ‘Using animals in research’. This Directive was commissioned by 
Dr Pru Hobson-West as part of a Leverhulme-funded programme of research named ‘Making 
science public’ 2, which involved animal research as an area of study. The aim at the time was 
to understand more about the potential of the MOP as a resource for research. Subsequent 
research then led to a Wellcome Trust Collaborative Award bringing together 5 UK universities 
under the programme ‘The Animal Research Nexus: Changing Constitutions of Science, Health 
and Welfare’3. As part of this Award, the idea to conduct a detailed analysis of responses to 
this Directive was proposed. By my PhD start-date of October 2017, the majority of responses 
to the Directive had been collated by archivists at The Keep, with only a few responses being 
received by the archive after this point. 
Although my primary supervisor had commissioned the ‘Using animals in research’ Directive, 
other modes of data collection were of course possible and, indeed, in choosing to use the 
MOP responses, there was no plan determined for how to go about this. Throughout the 
earlier stages of this PhD, interviews were discussed as a possible supplementary form of data 
collection, and there was also consideration of whether I should look at responses to other 
MOP Directives, particularly those focusing on animals such as the 2009 ‘Animals and 
Humans’ Directive (see Appendix B). However, after my first reading of the 87 electronic 
responses to the 2016 ‘Using animals in research’ Directive, I felt that they offered a 
substantial amount of depth and richness for analysis. Therefore, once I had visited the 
archive to make copies of the 72 paper responses, thus completing the set of responses to 
the ‘Using animals in research’ Directive, I decided that I would not need to supplement this 







This chapter details the specific ways that I have approached, handled, and analysed 
responses to the ‘Using animals in research’ Directive, explaining my research journey with 
the method in a chronological order, from research design to analysis.  In doing so, I will first 
discuss the Directive’s design and offer some critical reflections on the ways it may have 
shaped Mass Observer writing on the topic of animal research. Following this, I will describe 
the approach I took in ‘making data’ from the MOP materials. Then I will explain how I handled 
the dataset and, finally, how I analysed it. In choosing to structure this chapter 
chronologically, I hope to aid readability by offering a clear and coherent sense of how I have 
used the MOP materials at the centre of this study, moving from what Law (2007) describes 
as the ‘mess’ of research methods to the distinct yet overlapping themes that form the data 
chapters of this thesis. However, the processes signified by the headings of the following 
subsections were not always distinct or linear, such as the way the handling of the dataset 
and the analysis of it bled into each other. The messiness of doing social research and of using 
the MOP as a method is not something to be cleaned up in an attempt to reconstitute the 
process as neat and scientific, capable of exact reproduction by another researcher who can 
simply follow the steps. Rather, the mess is an inextricable part of the method and therefore 
in presenting my particular use of the MOP I also hope to illustrate the emergent nature of 
doing qualitative data-driven research whilst still clarifying the approaches and considerations 
which guided my decisions.  
4.2 The Directive design 
Although I was not involved in designing the Directive, in analysing the responses to it I can 
offer some critical reflections on the ways it may have shaped Mass Observers’ writings. The 
‘Using animals in research’ topic was Part One of two topics that comprised the Summer 2016 
Directive, with Part Two of the Directive being on the topic of ‘Being ‘thrifty’’ (see Appendix 
A) I did not intend to methodologically consider Part Two of the Summer 2016 Directive nor 
analyse the responses to this part of the Directive. However, like others who have analysed 
the responses to only one part of a Directive (Harrison and McGhee, 2003), I do acknowledge 
that the ordering and placement of these two topics in proximity to each other within the 
Directive may have influenced how Mass Observers responded to Part One on ‘Using animals 
in research’. Having noted this, from this point onwards, my use of the term ‘Directive’ will 
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refer specifically to Part One: ‘Using animals in research’ of the Summer 2016 Directive unless 
explicitly stated otherwise. 
The Directive begins by introducing the topic with an explicit framing of the issue around 
medical research, i.e. –  
‘Experiments on animals are widely used to understand disease and to develop and 
test new medicines. However, using animals for this kind of research remains 
controversial. Is animal research necessary to understand and improve human health, 
or are there other ethical issues to consider?’ 
In focusing on biomedical uses of animals, particularly those which lead to medicine 
development, it was likely assumed that the topic would be made more accessible and 
relatable for the diverse group of correspondents that comprise the MOP panel. This angle 
can be seen as providing Mass Observers with a material ‘way in’ to the topic, in their 
consumption of medicine and experiences and ideas of health and illness. Such a framing is 
valuable in offering an alternative to abstract ethical conceptualisations, the merit of which 
is acknowledged in Macnaghten’s (2004) work on views towards genetic modification, and 
also to prevent the conflation of animal research with animal ‘use’ in general (Ormandy and 
Schuppli, 2014: 400). However, it is also important to note how this focus on medical uses of 
animals in particular steers responses away from other purposes for which animals are used 
in research, such as regulatory testing, environmental research, or military research. Of 
course, this is not to say that such uses of animals could not still be raised by Mass Observers. 
Indeed, purposes other than the biomedical were discussed in multiple responses and, as 
Chapter Seven will explore in detail, the use of animals for cosmetic purposes was mentioned 
across many accounts. Yet, it is nevertheless significant to acknowledge that in setting up the 
Directive on ‘Using animals in research’ with an emphasis on medical purposes and 
applications, Mass Observers’ views towards ‘animal research’ as a broad topic were likely 
filtered through this framing.  
In a similar regard, the Directive uses the terms ‘animal research’ and ‘laboratory animal 
research’ interchangeably, reinforcing the idea that animal research only occurs within 
laboratories. Discussing the dominant construction of the laboratory as the main space in 
which animal research takes place, Palmer et al. (2020) write, ‘the conflation of “animal 
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research” with research in laboratories may contribute to a lack of attention to research 
conducted on animals at POLEs [Places Other than Licensed Establishments]’ (Palmer et al., 
2020: 7), e.g. in field-based environmental research. In reproducing this conflation, the ‘Using 
animals in research’ Directive could be said to uncritically foreground certain scientific uses 
of animals over others and suggests particular ideas about housing conditions, species use, 
and severity which do not necessarily reflect the animal research conducted at POLEs, which, 
for instance, are ‘often only marginally invasive’ (ibid, 3).  
The main body of the Directive is organised into 3 sections: Thinking back; Everyday life; and 
Policy and Practice. The first section ‘Thinking back’ asks Mass Observers if they have any 
memories of animal research in the news or media, if such stories prompted any discussions 
between family and friends, and if their impressions of animal research has changed over 
time. The second section ‘Everyday life’ asks Mass Observers to situate their responses in 
their personal experience, asking whether they have experience of working within an 
environment in which animal research is performed, whether they conducted experiments 
using animals during their education, and whether they consider the involvement of animals 
in producing medicines when buying or taking them. The third and final section ‘Policy and 
practice’ asks Mass Observers their impressions of those working in animal research 
laboratories, whether some species are more acceptable for use in research, and their opinion 
of the claim that ‘the general public needs to know more about animal research, and that 
more ‘openness’ from scientists and the government is therefore needed’.  
Given the emphasis on knowledge and awareness in previous studies of views towards animal 
research, particularly those using polls and surveys (see subsection 2.2.3), the ‘Using animals 
in research’ Directive’s inclusion of questions which focus on the epistemological, i.e. 
memories of encountering the topic or considerations of animal research when buying or 
consuming medicine, as well as the relational, i.e. discussions had about animal research and 
personal experience of experiments involving animals, is of value in potentially encouraging 
rich and contextual contributions to the area. This is because such questions go beyond the 
aim of capturing the presence or absence of knowledge about the topic of animal research, 
working to also capture what this means to Mass Observers. 
Related to the aim of generating reflections on what a topic means to Mass Observers, given 
the MOP’s longitudinal nature, it is understandable that some prompts in the ‘Using animals 
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in research’ Directive have an explicit focus on the past. In encouraging Mass Observers to 
trace their feelings towards animal research over time, such prompts allow space for writers 
to contextualise their current thinking and, in noting how this might have shifted, record any 
uncertainty or conditionality of their feelings towards the issue. Although, the Directive may 
have benefitted from the inclusion of questions with a more explicit inquiry into visions of the 
future of animal research, as this appears to be a gap in previous studies in this area. 
Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated in the data chapters, and particularly the third data 
chapter, expectations of the future were still prominent in MOP writings on animal research 
and can be seen as informing views towards the practice in the present.  
As well as this, given the need for more relational studies of views towards animal research, 
such as those offered by Macnaghten (2004) and Michael and Brown (2004), the Directive 
might also have benefitted from including explicit probes into other ways that humans relate 
with non-human animals, (i.e. consumption practices which involve animals or pet 
ownership), and how this bears upon views towards the use of animals in research. Although, 
there are of course pragmatic limits to how much can be included in a Directive and I 
acknowledge that a careful balance must be sought between making the topic accessible 
through wider experience and maintaining a focus on the matter at hand. However, similar 
to the role that expectations of the future play in MOP writing despite not being explicitly 
featured in the Directive’s questions and prompts, as is demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, 
Mass Observers often dwelled on their relations with other animals, and discussions of pets 
and eating practices were common throughout responses. 
Similarly, it is interesting that although the Directive does not feature an explicit probe into 
which kinds of scientific uses of animals or which purposes are felt to be more or less 
important or necessary, many Mass Observers discussed animal research in this way, 
identifying the value of medical research and the connection of animal research in advancing 
healthcare (as explored in Chapter Seven). Medicines are mentioned in a question within the 
‘Everyday life’ section which asks: ‘When taking medicines or buying them for you and your 
family members, to what extent do you think about the scientific research on animals that 
went into producing them?’ and therefore we might assume that this prompted wider 
discussion of medical research. However, as we will see in Chapter Seven, many Mass 
Observers who mirrored the Directive structure in their responses wrote about necessary 
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scientific uses of animals before reaching this section. Again, although responses to Directives 
can include discussion of aspects of a topic that are not explicitly mentioned in the Directive 
itself and indeed may ignore some of the Directive’s specific prompts, it is important to note 
that the Directive’s foci still play a crucial role in shaping responses.  
Overall, these particularities of the Directive, the areas it focuses on, those it does not, and 
how these are framed, are not necessarily limitations. Rather, they mean that the Directive 
shaped the writing of Mass Observers on animal research in specific ways and it is the 
acknowledgment of this which is crucial. To recognise this is to situate the Directive responses 
in the context through which they emerged, as a product of the exchange between the 
archivists, researchers, and Mass Observers. Therefore, although the MOP offers an 
alternative to the restricted methods that dominate studies of views and understandings of 
animal research (as discussed in Chapter 2), like all methods, it remains important to ground 
MOP writings in the necessarily partial contexts in which they are produced.  
4.3 Making data: collating MOP writing 
On beginning the PhD project in 2017, I was given the 87 electronic copies of the email 
responses to the 2016 ‘Using animals in research’ Directive by USB. After spending the first 
year of my PhD immersing in relevant literatures, I read through the electronic copies to get 
a general sense of the data before travelling to the archive to make photographic copies of 
the paper responses. On November 28th 2018, I travelled to The Keep, the archive at The 
University of Sussex in Brighton from which the MOP runs and in which its materials are 
housed, to retrieve copies of the 72 paper responses and complete my dataset of 159 
responses to the 2016 ‘Using animals in research’ Directive (a process I blogged about 
(McGlacken, 2019)). To do so, I purchased a photography pass and took photographs of each 
of the paper responses, as is advised by The Keep 4. I chose to photograph the paper responses 
rather than use the scanning equipment, judging this to be a quicker method given the 
number of documents I had to copy, and this was completed over two days of visiting the 
archive.  
Although others have analysed samples of MOP responses, such as Busby’s (2000) creation 
of a 'pragmatic sample’ to study the particular issue of sickness leave in relation to paid 
 
4 https://www.thekeep.info/services/self-service-copying/  
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employment or May’s (2016b) analysis of a sub-sample of responses to a Directive on 
belonging to look specifically at the theme of non-belonging, I decided to keep the entire 
dataset of 159 responses for analysis. Though by doing this I could not expect to analyse the 
MOP accounts at a micro-level, I made this decision to aid an analysis of the data which sought 
broad themes across the dataset and, importantly, allowed for shared societal and structural 
ways of relating to animal research to emerge in my analysis. This meant I could explore the 
writings of Mass Observers at a meta level, looking at the macro processes which characterise 
UK science-society relationships around animal research, processes which are wide-reaching 
but still configured in micro and highly contextual ways through particular lived experience. 
In doing so, I hoped to address the gaps identified in the literature review, looking at the ways 
in which animal research is meaningfully lived and felt in the everyday, whilst acknowledging 
the structural constraints which shape this. This analytical approach, along with my 
exploration of the ‘lived lenses’ discussed in Chapter 2 (see subsection 2.3), led to an eventual 
concentration on the meta-themes of knowledge, care, and medicine.  
As demonstrated in subsection 2.2.1 of the literature review, given that much of the previous 
work around views towards animal research have concentrated on demographic categories 
to explain findings (e.g. Pifer et al., 1994; Crettaz von Roten, 2008; Ormandy et al., 2013), 
working to construct samples which are ‘representative’ of a wider public body, I wanted to 
use the MOP materials in a way that resists such generalisations. Because of this, such 
demographic analyses do not feature in my representation and interpretation of the data. In 
addition, although a basic demographic breakdown of Mass Observers who responded to the 
Directive could be retrieved through the archive, I felt it important to recognise that Mass 
Observers have the option to include, omit, and shape their demographic information in 
responding to each Directive. For example, some of the short biographies heading MOP 
accounts break with traditional demographic conventions, instead being playful, 
conversational, open-ended, and choosing to convey identity in flux. For instance, Mass 
Observer K798 wrote the words ‘creative daydreamer’ after their age and I filed this into the 
‘Other’ section of my ‘Occupation’ category when classifying each Mass Observer in my 
qualitative data analysis software (QDAS) (my use of which will be discussed in the following 
subsection). Similarly, Mass Observer H2418 wrote in their short biography – ‘retired perhaps 
- who knows? Took voluntary redundancy end of February 2016 volunteer at hospice, perhaps 
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that ending soon too’ (Mass Observer H2418). As this Mass Observer’s currently active role 
was that of volunteer at a hospice, I categorised this person as ‘Volunteer’. But this could have 
been characterised differently, choosing instead to foreground their status as retired. Both 
examples demonstrate how a question which appears simple on the surface, such as asking 
Mass Observers to state their occupation, can generate short yet complicated answers. 
Hence, even these mini biographies can become messy depictions of identity and resist neat 
categorisation. 
As the previous chapter emphasised, to recognise this is to appreciate how the Directive itself 
plays a crucial role in directing not only how Observers write about a topic but, in turn, how 
they enact their identity as Mass Observer and who they write as. Furthermore, given the 
relationality of Mass Observers to the social worlds they document, being both ‘Observer’ 
and ‘Observed’ (Kramer, 2014), MOP writing can be best said to reflect more than the views 
of an individual. As Sheridan (1993) claims, ‘[e]ven when the correspondent is not explicitly 
representing others, we can see that there are other voices embedded within the texts’ 
(Sheridan, 1993: 20). Thus, identity can be seen as shifting both across responses and within 
them and surpassing simplistic demographic categories.  
4.4 Handling the dataset  
In deciding how to best handle the dataset, I briefly reviewed literature on the use of QDAS. 
Although QDAS is often seen as providing ‘rigour’ in the analytical process (Richards and 
Richards, 1991), I was aware of the criticism such positivist assumptions have received. For 
instance, MacMillan and Koenig (2004) claim that, in such approaches, ‘[r]igor is treated not 
as the product of concise conceptual thought, ideas, and examination of research materials 
within a particular research framework but as something provided by a software tool able to 
produce replicable data sets’ (MacMillan and Koenig, 2004: 184). Similarly, Fielding (2004) 
states that many interpretations of the software ‘confuse [sic] a technical resource with an 
analytic approach’ (Fielding, 2004: 3). Rather than providing the benefit of rigour, some argue 
that QDAS can instead impede the analytical process, generating distance from the data or 
reducing it to coding trees. Related to this last point, QDAS is sometimes associated with a 
difficulty in knowing when to stop coding (Welsh, 2002). This has been referred to as ‘data 
fetishism’ (Cisneros Puebla, 2003) and as García‐Horta and Guerra‐Ramos (2009) explain, this 
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‘‘let’s code everything’ strategy, in turn, can lead to excessive and non-reflexive coding which 
inflates the results that are to be reported’ (García‐Horta and Guerra‐Ramos, 2009: 163).  
In relation to analysis of MOP writing in particular, the use of QDAS raises other 
methodological issues to consider. Given the materiality of MOP accounts and the importance 
this can have to the analytical process, converting such materials into digital documents has 
an important impact which is difficult to mitigate. As Hurdley (2014) claims, ‘[f]or researchers 
accustomed to interview transcripts, surveys, field notes or film/audio recordings, which can 
be fed into Qualitative Data Analysis Software packages, or at least stored digitally, translating 
MO submissions into units for analysis is challenging’ (Hurdley, 2014: 3).  
In discussing traditional qualitative approaches, Hurdley argues that the ‘rhetoric of 
sociological text production strives towards unity and closure, a standard story in which gaps 
are closed, traces erased and contours smoothed’ (ibid, 19). Yet, the messiness of MOP 
materials do not fit easily into neat narrative forms for analysis. Instead, as Hurdley puts it, ‘it 
is a messy archaeology of things, to show that any 'anthropology of ourselves' must 
encompass dust, mess and gaps if it is to materialize in a different methodological 
architecture’ (ibid).  Similarly, Law’s (2007) critique of the realist drive in qualitative Sociology, 
calls for an embracing of mess and an acknowledgment of that which is excluded in the 
formation of analytical narratives. On this point, Law states that the ‘problem is not exclusion 
as such’ but, rather, the ‘refusal to acknowledge that this is going on’, a refusal ‘to recognise 
what is sometimes (though in a different register) called ‘invisible work’’ (Law, 2007: 7).   
On the other hand, however, Le Blanc (2017) found that QDAS can help in resisting the 
pressure to form neat, realist research narratives. As they report of their usage, QDAS 
‘subverted the authority of any one privileged telling and allowed for the creation of research 
narratives that were fluid, fragmented, and resisted closure’ (Le Blanc, 2017: 789). Whilst it 
was not ultimately relevant to my analysis of responses to the ‘Using animals research in 
research’ Directive, with the Directive receiving no images, Le Blanc also argues that the 
‘hypertextual environment [of QDAS] can permit researchers the liberty to craft 
representations that display greater degrees of complexity and openness than orthodox 
ethnographic texts’ (Le Blanc, 2017: 796).  
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Most important in determining my decision to use QDAS to handle the MOP materials was 
understanding the software as an organisational, rather than analytic, tool. Given the large 
size of the dataset, I felt that the comprehensive storage, organisation, and coding of data 
that QDAS can offer could help to navigate the ‘unwieldiness’ that has sometimes been 
associated with MOP materials (Moor and Uprichard, 2014; Casey et al., 2014) and lend 
confidence to my claims about the dataset. As Odena (2013) puts it, ‘researchers are still in 
charge of building up the analysis, having the ideas, engaging with the data and making all the 
decisions about the study. Computers may save time locating a piece of text within a large 
data-set, such as an interviewee’s answer to a particular question, but the relevance of the 
answer and its implications are assigned by the researcher’ (Odena, 2013: 358). Indeed, 
although recognising the concerns associated with the use of QDAS to handle Mass 
Observation materials, Lindsey and Bulloch also decided to use software in their research, 
viewing QDAS not ‘in itself a method or methodology, but rather […] a set of tools that are 
flexible enough to adapt to a range of analytical approaches’ (Lindsey and Bulloch, 2014: 7). 
In particular, the capacity for quick searches of the entire dataset for simple information, 
keywords, the recurrence of codes, etc. and the ability to create coding structures which 
enable clear organisation of the connections made between themes were identified as 
especially valuable. As Haran and O’Riordan (2018) describe of their use of QDAS to handle 
MOP data, such software can help to ‘identify patterns in the digitised material that otherwise 
would have been difficult to discern’ (Haran and O’Riordan, 2018: 691).   
Relatedly, the ability to record information about Mass Observers on QDAS was also identified 
as important for my thesis and its positioning amongst studies of ‘public’ opinion. This meant 
I could record any demographic information provided in the brief biography which opens each 
Directive response (which, as discussed earlier, is voluntary and varies in the level of detail 
given). Although, as was discussed, I have deliberately chosen not to analyse the writings of 
Mass Observers through demographic information, this information may be requested or 
useful in future uses of this data and, as such, the capacity of QDAS to record this was of value.  
Having said this, it is pertinent to note that, although QDAS was used in this thesis primarily 
as a way to handle the dataset, I recognise that each interaction between my data and the 
QDAS are necessarily part of the analytical process and cannot be separated from it. In 
choosing to use QDAS to hold the data and organise my coding of it, it is clear that this will 
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have had a significant impact on my thematic analysis of the writing and my use of it in this 
thesis. Indeed, given the large number of responses, it is unlikely that I would have been able 
to analyse all responses in an organised way without the use of QDAS.  
The particular type of QDAS used in this research was NVivo 12. The decision to use NVivo 12 
was down to the popularity of this software and its free access and promotion through the 
University. Because NVivo12 requires documents to be word-processed to enable search 
functions, the 87 electronic responses to the Directive were uploaded onto NVivo12 first and 
then I had to decide how to transcribe the PDFs of the 72 paper responses. Given the amount 
of paper responses I would have to transcribe, I met with the University of Nottingham’s 
digital research team to inquire about possible ways of expediating this process. With the 
transcription process offering another opportunity to get closer to the data (for discussion of 
transcription of speech, see Kowal and O'Connell, 2014), I did not want to go down the route 
of hiring a professional transcription service. Additionally, the difficulties that Lindsey and 
Bulloch experienced with several professional transcription services in their work with MOP 
documents reinforced this decision, with the authors advising that ‘close, face-to-face 
supervision of the transcription process is necessary’ (Lindsey and Bulloch, 2014: 9).  
In discussion with the University’s digital research team, the option of using the Microsoft 
Computer Vision optical character recognition (OCR) online tool5 was suggested. However, 
this raised ethical and privacy concerns around whether it would require responses to be 
stored on ‘the cloud’ or any other system, with archivists at The Keep clarifying through 
personal correspondence that the data cannot be stored beyond the life of the project. 
Therefore, confirmation was sought through the digital research team that the responses 
would not be stored elsewhere in using this tool. After this was confirmed, I began 
transcribing the paper responses assisted by the OCR tool.  
In using the online transcription tool, I was required to upload one MOP account at a time 
onto the website which would then provide a near-immediate digital transcription of what 
was written. Although I still checked each transcription against the PDFs of the original 
documents for accuracy, this tool aided the expediency of the transcription process, 





transcribe. However, given that many of the MOP paper responses were handwritten, I 
sometimes skipped use of the OCR tool altogether as it struggled to accurately recognise 
words and could not use context to decipher particularly ineligible writing. Once all paper 
responses had been transcribed into Word-processed documents, they too were uploaded 
onto NVivo 12. 
As discussed in the ‘Responding to Directives’ subsection (3.3.1) in the previous chapter, much 
of MOP writing has a physical materiality which provides its own analytical insights and adds 
further interpretive possibilities to readings of the text alone (Moor and Uprichard, 2014; 
Lindsey and Bulloch, 2014). Therefore, in choosing to first make photographic copies of the 
paper responses, then to transcribe them into word-processed documents and upload them 
onto QDAS, my analysis of the documents lost touch with much of their materiality. In their 
analysis of MOP writing, Lindsey and Bulloch analysed PDFs of the original physical documents 
alongside the word-processed versions they had uploaded onto QDAS. They also created 
‘field-notes’ which described the physical documents along with ‘how the physical scripts, as 
well as the views expressed in the writing, had influenced and affected us’ (Lindsey and 
Bulloch, 2014). However, because of my intention to look across the entire dataset of 
responses to the ‘Using animals in research’ Directive, engaging with themes across the 
dataset rather than drawing out the voices of individual Mass Observers, I did not take steps 
to record information about the materiality of the documents. On reflection, attention to the 
particular modes of writing of individual Mass Observers and the identities that these suggest 
would have been an interesting angle to have taken within this research, yet this was 
incompatible with the approach I decided to take.  
4.5 Analysing the dataset 
Following the advice of others who have used MOP materials (Harrison and McGhee, 2003), 
I initially read through all 159 accounts and took notes before coding on QDAS. In making 
preliminary observations, I recorded what I deemed to be interesting or important themes, 
either being recurrent across responses or related to my emerging research questions, with 
these being iteratively formed through my review of the literature and my engagement with 
the MOP writings. As well as this, I asked questions of the data and made refence of particular 
MOP excerpts that could be returned to in greater detail when using QDAS. As stated, because 
my dataset was split into two response formats which were collated at different times, the 
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electronic responses were read and coded on NVivo 12 before the paper responses. 
Therefore, in analysing the paper responses on NVivo 12 my coding was informed by, though 
not limited to, those codes that had already been generated through the initial coding of the 
electronic responses.  
To analyse the responses I took the approach of inductive thematic analysis, reading through 
each account to generate thematic codes which, as Clarke and Braun (2017) write, provide ‘a 
framework for organizing and reporting the researcher’s analytic observations’ (Clarke and 
Braun, 2017: 297). This approach allowed me to remain at a meta-analytical level, looking at 
themes across the MOP responses collectively rather than at each individual response in its 
entirety, as this would not have been possible to do with the entire dataset within the 
timescale of the PhD. When coding, I selected entire paragraphs rather than just sentences 
to help capture more context of what was written. As Mass Observers do not always follow 
the Directive structure in their responses, greater contextualisation would have been helped 
by coding full responses instead of coding extracts. However, given that I intended to look 
across the entire dataset as stated, this level of attention would not have been feasible. 
In employing this analytical approach, I loosely followed Braun and Clarke’s 6 steps of 
inductive thematic analysis, with their approach offering a clear procedure to undertake. 
These are: 1) familiarising yourself with your data; 2) generating initial codes; 3) searching for 
themes; 4) reviewing themes; 5) defining and naming themes; and 6) producing the report 
(ibid, 87). My coding of the MOP responses was a mixture of theoretical and empirical codes, 
though none took a strictly inductive adoption of words and phrases that Mass Observers had 
themselves used. In responding to the data, I followed Braun and Clarke’s (2006) advice to 
code as many potential themes as possible, with the rationale that ‘you never know what 
might be interesting later’ (ibid, 89). This meant that I had a large number of codes and, in the 
end, when I had decided on which themes to focus my data chapters on, some codes 
appeared to be more ‘miscellaneous’ than others, with less connections shared between 
these codes.  
In producing documents for supervision meetings, I made my way through the later steps (4-
6), sharing early thoughts on important themes, reviewing and refining these by creating 
thematic ‘Project maps’ in which connections were drawn between codes and some codes 
were organised into sub-themes. In my use of the map function on NVivo12, I first created a 
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Project map which included all of the codes I had made and organised these under thematic 
headings, i.e. the code ‘Kinship’ was placed under the thematic heading ‘Interspecies 
relations’ (see Appendix C). I used this space to draw broad connections between the codes 
or identify which codes stood ‘alone’ and eventually delete codes which had become 
duplicated under other names. Through this process, I thought about the meta-themes that 
were represented in this Project map and with this visual analytical aid I was then able to 
produce more focused Project maps for the 3 themes I felt were particularly interesting or 
important to my thesis (See Appendix D, E, and F).  
I used this process to form my data chapters, going back and forth between the writing 
process, which I identify as a crucial part of the analysis, and the use of QDAS to assess 
whether all sub-themes were being covered in each chapter and to consider ‘the overall story’ 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006: 87) that my analysis was telling. As Bailey (2012) discusses of her use 
of thematic analysis to analyse MOP writing on funeral attendance for her PhD thesis, the 
‘process begins with one’s fieldnotes, or, in this case, M-O replies, one searches for categories 
and patterns (themes), one marks up the data and re-sequences it to construct the outline of 
one’s thesis’ (Bailey, 2012: 154). In producing Project maps to represent the data insights that 
would be covered in each data chapter for supervision meetings, I reflected on which codes 
could become subthemes of the meta-theme, i.e. the code ‘Emotion’ became a subtheme 
within the meta-themes of both ‘Knowing and not-knowing’ and ‘Care’. However, the Project 
maps do not provide a completely accurate depiction of the themes my data chapters 
eventually focused on, with some of the themes included in them being omitted. Rather, I 
have discussed them here and included them in the Appendices to highlight the role they 
played in offering a space to draw analytical connections. 
Though I agree with Braun and Clarke’s assertion that the prevalence of a theme within the 
dataset does not necessitate its importance to the research (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 82), the 
three meta-themes which inform my data chapters became important in my analysis, in part, 
because of their prominence across the MOP responses. For example, though I was initially 
interested in the concept of necessity broadly, a key reason why my third chapter explores 
necessary biomedical uses of animals is due to the frequency with which necessity was 
discussed in relation to medicine throughout the responses. Of course, each speak to 
something more than quantity, being themes which, as shown in the literature review, I 
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identified as problematically constructed or absent in previous studies of views towards 
animal research. For instance, the first data chapter on the theme of ‘Knowing’ enriches the 
past attention given to knowledge capacity and awareness in studies of views towards animal 
research (see subsection 2.2.3) by understanding knowing as an actively mitigated practice 
and as a spectrum which involves not-knowing. In this way, the themes of my data chapters 
were selected through an iterative process of reviewing the literature and coding the MOP 
accounts. When I had finished coding all of the responses, I was able to look at which themes 
were both recurrent across the dataset and also important to my assessment of problems 
with or gaps in the literature. In using MOP writing in this thesis, then, I aim to illustrate wider 
arguments through my analysis of the excerpts, though I am aware that such steps from the 
data to wider claims are not necessarily representative of the dataset as a whole but rather 
are made from my particular positioning in this area.  
The meta-themes of the first and second data chapters emerged earlier in the analytical 
process, however, as alluded to above, the third data chapter on the meta-theme of 
‘Medicine’ took longer to determine, forming originally around the theme of ‘Necessity’. 
Upon writing about the theme of necessity within the MOP responses, with the perspective 
and feedback of supervisors, I realised that the themes I was exploring in the third data 
chapter were more accurately discussing constructions of necessary biomedical uses of 
animals. As this description of my analysis shows, my process reflects Braun and Clarke’s 
position that ‘analysis is not a linear process of simply moving from one phase to the next’ 
but is more of a ‘recursive process, where movement is back and forth as needed, throughout 
the phases which replies to come back to and read again’ (ibid, 86).  
As stated earlier in this section, I viewed the process of writing my data chapters as a central 
part of the analysis. In writing, I was able to more closely analyse my interpretation of MOP 
extracts and their relation to wider concepts. However, similar to Lindsey and Bulloch’s 
experience of transcribing archival materials as sociologists, I was also unfamiliar with the 
conventions of quoting written texts, and, like them, encountered the methodological and 
ethical issue of deciding whether to transcribe spelling and grammatical errors. Making the 
same decision as Lindsey and Bulloch who ‘consulted the archivists to ask how others quoted 
MOP material, and were informed that researchers tend to reproduce writer's spelling and 
grammatical errors’ (Lindsey and Bulloch, 2014: 8), in the aim of preserving Mass Observers’ 
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individual styles of writing and formatting I chose to include grammatical errors, typos, and 
paragraphing.  
The need to acknowledge formatting decisions is arguably more crucial when dealing with 
MOP documents given the ways in which the writing of Mass Observers is shaped by the 
structure of the Directive (Sheridan, 1993; Pollen, 2014). In responding to the ‘Using animals 
in research’ Directive, the majority of Mass Observers broadly followed the Directive structure 
to guide their writing. Across responses there were varying levels of detail given to each 
prompt and a range of full response lengths. Some Mass Observers wrote multiple pages, 
some a small paragraph, and a few Mass Observers were notable in the brevity of their 
Directive response, expressing a lack of ability to write about the topic or refusing to engage 
with it, in doing so, communicating back to the MOP about their expectations for Directives. 
However, as will be covered in Chapter 5, rather than representing a failure to appropriately 
engage Mass Observers on the topic of animal research, the capacity to record disconnections 
with the issue and hear, even briefly, something from those who feel unable or unwilling to 
discuss it, is recognised in this thesis as of significant methodological value.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented and reflected on the ways I have approached and used responses 
to the Mass Observation Project Summer 2016 Directive on ‘Using animals in research’. My 
use of the MOP to explore views towards animal research generated lots of interesting 
analytical insights, yet given the necessary constraints of the PhD process, I have focused on 
the meta-themes of knowledge, care, and medicine. Hence, the presentation and discussion 
of the MOP responses featured in this thesis are partial and should not be taken as 
representative of the entire dataset. Similarly, as will be emphasised in Chapter 8 when I offer 
further methodological reflections, my use of these Mass Observers’ writings should not be 
taken as proxy for views of the ‘general public’. As well as this, as noted in this chapter, the 
writings of Mass Observers discussed in this thesis are shaped by the Directive design and the 
wider socio-temporal moment at which such writing was elicited. Thus, their writing was 
produced in relation to a particular framing of the topic of animal research. I recognise this 
contingency as a necessary part of all social research rather than a limitation as such. 
Therefore, with the contexts which have shaped these responses in mind, this thesis will now 
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present three data chapters which explore the meta-themes of knowledge, care, and 






















5. Data Chapter One: Knowing and not-knowing about animal research 
5.1 Introduction 
Bearing the current push for openness around animal research in mind, this chapter aims to 
explore the currently understudied aspect of how individuals mediate information on the 
topic. Since the 2014 launch of the Concordat on Openness on Animal Research6, emphasis 
has been placed on informing and educating laypeople on animal research practices. As 
argued in Chapters 1 and 2, fuelled by an assumption that public knowledge of this area is 
lacking, openness strategies function on the basis of correcting this deficit, with the 
suggestion that increased awareness of details such as the UK regulatory framework will 
resolve societal concerns over the scientific use of animals (Festing and Wilkinson, 2007). Such 
openness regimes construct lay publics as passive absorbers of information on animal 
research, their purpose being to witness the enacting of openness. Hence, rather than 
enabling laypeople to contribute to science-society dialogues on the topic, openness on 
animal research often functions as an end in itself, making information ‘available’ in the public 
domain without consideration of how audiences may engage with it.  However, as this chapter 
aims to demonstrate, people can be active in managing their knowledge (and non-knowledge) 
of animal research. 
This chapter considers what Mass Observers want and do not want to know about animal 
research and examines the role that active ignorance plays in negotiating this in the everyday. 
As this analysis will demonstrate, some Mass Observers articulate profound discomfort in 
thinking and writing about animal research and report that the practice raises feelings of 
sadness, guilt, and shame. In order to mediate these feelings, some Mass Observers discussed 
a general avoidance of engaging with the issue and expressed a subsequent ambivalence 
towards the prospect of more openness on the use of animals in the bioscience sector. At the 
extreme end of such discomfort around animal research, a few Mass Observers stated only 
that they could not write about the topic at all. As will be contended, at the centre of such 
reluctance to engage with animal research are questions of power which beg consideration 





On the other hand, some Mass Observers were enthusiastic about the prospect of increased 
openness on animal research. Reinforcing the problems associated with current knowledge 
on the practice, in that one is unable to act on it, key to such support for openness in this area 
was the capacity for it to empower laypeople to intervene in animal research at some level. 
In discussing the benefits of openness on animal research, certain constructions of the ‘public’ 
were mobilised to make claims about who needs to know such information and who can be 
trusted with knowing it. Here, the figure of the ‘general public’ was often imagined as 
scientifically illiterate, therefore requiring knowledge on animal research, and also irrational, 
with such openness thus presenting a source of risk. Hence, the benefits of openness and the 
agentic capacities that it should bestow are embedded in notions of the ‘good citizen’, with 
some Observers constituting themselves as trustworthy knowing subjects in contrast to an 
irresponsible ‘general public’. 
This chapter is organised in three sections. The first will describe the problems associated 
with knowing about animal research and why this is often associated with discomfort. The 
second will explore why practices of not-knowing are employed to mitigate the discomfort 
associated with encountering information on animal research. Finally, the third section will 
consider support for openness on animal research, what this should entail and who its 
intended ‘audience’ should be. By structuring the chapter in this way, my aim is to illustrate 
how ignorance around animal research may, at times, not only be functional but also a 
necessary response to the problems associated with knowing. It is hoped that this analysis of 
Mass Observer reluctance to engage with information on animal research and their 
requirements for openness on the topic to be beneficial will contribute to the development 
of science-society dialogues which are mutually meaningful and productive. This means 
acknowledging that, for many, animal research rightfully remains an uncomfortable topic and, 
therefore, public communications must strive to empower those who choose to engage with 
the issue. In short, this chapter stands to emphasise that openness should not be perceived 
as an end in itself and, rather, must address the existing unequal distribution of power in 
animal research decision-making processes, thus working to foster dialogical processes which 
are fruitful for all involved.  
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5.2 The uncomfortable knowledge of animal research 
They all know it is there, all the people of Omelas. Some of them have come to see it, others 
are content merely to know it is there. They all know that it has to be there. Some of them 
understand why, and some do not, but they all understand that their happiness, the beauty 
of their city, the tenderness of their friendships, the health of their children, the wisdom of 
their scholars, the skill of their makers, even the abundance of their harvest and the kindly 
weathers of their skies, depend wholly on this child's abominable misery.  
- Ursula Le Guin, The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas 
For many, the biomedical use of animals presents a moral conflict between their subscription 
to a value system which promotes the just treatment of animals and the desire for medical 
treatments and advances. Perhaps this goes some way to explaining why animal research 
continues to be regarded as highly controversial and a key bioethical concern (Hobson-West, 
2010). Analysis of writing from the Mass Observation Project on the topic demonstrates a 
palpable discomfort in thinking and writing about animal research, but also reveals that 
feelings of uneasiness around the practice are not straightforward. As Mass Observers 
articulate, disquiet around animal research does not necessarily translate into opposition 
towards the practice. Rather, such discomfort reflects ambivalence towards animal research, 
complicating the simplified ‘for’ or ‘against’ readings of public opinion presented in national 
opinion polls (Ipsos MORI, 2018). Hence, in disliking the scientific use of animals whilst 
recognising their benefiting from this use, some Observers find the topic highly 
uncomfortable to dwell on or discuss.  
5.2.1 Confronting complicity 
Though the harm-benefit model underpins the ethical review of scientific animal use (Animals 
in Science Committee, 2017), this analysis reveals that viewing animal research through a lens 
of harms and benefits does not always help individuals to morally and emotionally justify the 
practice. In valuing medical treatments, the development of which is argued to depend on 
the use of animals (Barré-Sinoussi and Montagutelli, 2015), whilst disagreeing with the 
treatment of animals as experimental subjects, some Mass Observers regard engagement 
with the topic as a confrontation of their complicity in the practice. Given this, animal research 
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is perceived and felt to be an uncomfortable subject to contemplate, as the following MOP 
excerpt demonstrates –  
‘Just seeing written, or heard said, the term 'Laboratory Animal Research' makes me 
feel very sad. Of course I realise over many years cures and treatment for many 
illnesses, some of which were terminal some years ago, medicines now widely used 
safely would not have been 'found' without long years of research and 
experimentation, and probably members of my family, friends and acquaintances 
have benefited from this research, but the poor animals that have been kept 
sometimes in poor conditions who cannot speak but have been used to find some of 
the cures, make me very emotionally upset.’ (Mass Observer D2585) 
This Observer (D2585) opens their response to the Directive by expressing their sadness upon 
encountering the words ‘Laboratory Animal Research’. They go on to acknowledge animal 
research as a facilitator of medical advances, which have personal significance, yet return to 
the mistreatment of vulnerable animals (‘who cannot speak’) and the emotional impact of 
considering this. Like some of the people of Le Guin’s Omelas, the utopian city in which all 
good things depend on one child’s perpetual suffering, this Observer appears to struggle with 
knowing that valued medical benefits come at a cost to the laboratory animals involved in 
producing them. Though it might be argued that work is being done to improve the conditions 
that laboratory animals are kept in7, for this Observer the very nature of using animals in this 
way means that suffering cannot be alleviated entirely, as they go on to write –  
‘I feel, hope and pray that now, as in recent years laboratories have become more 
open about research, the animals are housed in safe conditions, they do not suffer 
(although I'll never believe they do not suffer to some degree)’ (Mass Observer D2585) 
Therefore, for some, the fact of animal research remains an unsettling one and welfare 
interventions can only relieve such concerns up to a point. It is this sense of complicity in 
animal research, a practice which routinely involves the confinement and ultimate killing of 
animals in the name of largely human-oriented biomedical advances that constitutes a moral 
conflict and means that some find the matter emotionally-distressing. In this case, animal 





knowledge which is in tension with our simplified ways of understanding the world. As Rayner 
puts it, ‘uncomfortable knowledge is disruptive knowledge’ (Rayner, 2012: 113). Hence, as 
illustrated, knowing about animal research can be disruptive for some in that it forces the 
recognition of one’s benefiting from the situation of laboratory animals, a recognition which 
can contradict pre-existing self-perceptions.  
5.2.2 Caring about non-human animals 
Crucial to experiencing knowledge of animal research as disruptive and uncomfortable are 
the obligations of care that are felt towards non-human animals. Such care relations are 
experienced intimately and perhaps most saliently in the form of pet ownership. The tensions 
that such interspecies bonds, and the identities that accompany them, can generate when 
deliberating on one’s relation to animal research are evident in the following MOP excerpt –  
‘For me the subject has never come up. I think this is because we all have animals and 
to think of them being harmed is too much to think about. I am aware that this is a 
very ignorant view.’ (Mass Observer R4365) 
As this Mass Observer (R4365) suggests, the conflict between the treatment of companion 
animals (the animals that we ‘have’, that we care for on an interpersonal level) and that of 
laboratory animals makes animal research a challenging issue to discuss. For this 
correspondent, to think about animal research is to imagine ‘their’ animals in the position of 
those used in the biomedical industry, a line of thought which takes an emotional toll, and 
indeed, is ‘too much to think about’. This identification of oneself as an animal ‘owner’ or 
‘lover’ means that confronting one’s complicity in animal research, despite how problematic 
and constrained such acceptance might be, is uncomfortable and threatens one’s self-
identity. Discussing public trust in science, Engdahl and Lidskog (2012) claim that given the 
‘broader social, cultural, and hermeneutical aspects that concern social relations and sense-
making’, and the social context of risk, ‘[c]itizens evaluate the social meanings of an issue and 
the extent to which it threatens or supports their social identities’ (Engdahl and Lidskog, 2012: 
707). Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that Rayner identifies four ‘tacit information 
management strategies’ to mediate one’s exposure to uncomfortable knowledge all of which 
revolve around different forms of not-knowing: ‘denial, dismissal, diversion (or decoy) and 
displacement’ (Rayner, 2012: 113).   
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Rayner uses the notion of ‘uncomfortable knowledge’ as a bridge between Rittel and 
Webber’s (1973) concept of ‘wicked problems’, ‘often characterized by multiple competing 
definitions of what the nature of the problem is’ (Rayner, 2012: 111), and Shapiro’s (1988) 
‘clumsy solutions’, a term which arose in the legal context to describe a solution allowing ‘for 
the coexistence of common, but differently theorized conclusions’ (Rayner, 2012: 112). This 
suggests that if citizens feel lacking in options to resolve the internal moral conflict raised by 
animal research, then other strategies for dealing with the issue may be sought out. Yet, 
writing from the Mass Observation Project reveals that some would rather turn away from 
information on animal research which threatens both their personal identity and that of the 
nation’s as animal lovers, as this Mass Observer (F5890) explains –  
‘All my friends and family are animal lovers and I cannot remember talking about using 
animals for research as it is probably just too raw a subject for us all. I know that now 
if something comes on the television or I see something in a paper or magazine I switch 
channels or turn the page as I find it difficult to deal with and feel that I as an individual 
can do very little to change things.’ (Mass Observer F5890) 
As captured here, seeing oneself as part of a community of ‘animal lovers’ may mean that any 
discussion of animal research becomes taboo. The use of animals to produce new biomedical 
knowledge, the continual production of which can be seen as self-justifying, with scientific 
knowledge valued for its own sake (Callahan, 2003; Wayne and Glass, 2010), is therefore 
disruptive in Rayner’s sense in that it troubles such simplified understandings of ourselves. 
That is, how can we love animals whilst also causing them to suffer? As illustrated in the above 
excerpt, with little capacity to affect change over the situation that causes such 
uncomfortable knowledge, it may be felt that the best course of action is to simply turn away.  
In feeling disempowered to modify one’s relationship to animal research, avoiding or ignoring 
information on the issue may be functional at both individual and collective levels. In 
discussing common responses to images of catastrophe, Kaplan (2011) claims that ‘what 
draws the viewer initially to the image of catastrophe is some sort of empathy. However […] 
the original empathic impulse to help turns back on the viewer or listener because the shock 
is too much; it overwhelms and freezes the subject’ (Kaplan, 2011: 260). In the case of animal 
research, with its proclaimed necessity (Barré-Sinoussi and Montagutelli, 2015) and absence 
of  routes for citizenly intervention, empathetic viewing of images or reading of texts can 
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therefore be immobilising. As will be explored in the following chapter, such encounters with 
animal research practices may become particularly affecting when one feels too near to the 
topic. Whether relating to the practice from a (current or future, personal or relational) 
patient standpoint heightens one’s sense of guilt, or encountering traditional companion 
species, with members of which a correspondent might share their home, as experimental 
models rather than pets or kin (Charles, 2014), animal research can be painful to consider.  
Such literature suggests that it is often rightfully difficult to engage with large-scale socio-
political issues and the multiple edges of conflict they can generate in lived experience and 
this analysis confirms that the same can be said for the topic of animal research. To learn 
about animal research, the types of species involved, forms of research conducted, the 
regulatory framework that structures its practices, and so on, without clear avenues to act on 
what one may come to know, is risky. For some Mass Observers, knowing about the role of 
animals in biomedical research involves facing the vulnerabilities of oneself, loved ones, 
community and species, and our investment in mitigating these through the use, and, to a 
large extent, suffering, of other animals. Given this, active ignorance towards animal research 
might be understood as a sensible approach to guarding oneself against unsettling 
information. It is this practice of not-knowing that we will now turn to explore. 
5.3 Choosing not to know 
Previous arguments made on the subject of openness around animal research have claimed 
that publics wish to remain willingly ignorant and thus providing more information on the 
practice is not encouraged, as Yogeshwar (2011) writes – 
‘The general public, on the other hand, are not a threat. They know that animal 
experiments exist, just as they know how meat is produced and how battery-farm 
chickens are treated. But most are happy to turn a blind eye to these things and accept 
the benefits, from pharmaceuticals to steak and eggs. This is normal, and scientists 
can use it to their advantage’ (Aziz, Stein and Yogeshwar 2011: 459).  
Similarly, an investigation of ‘public views on openness’ undertaken by market research 
organisation Ipsos MORI (2013), intended to feed into the development of the 2014 
Concordat on Openness on Animal Research, found that some participants were hesitant to 
know more about the practice (Ipsos MORI, 2013: 21). As with Yogeshwar, this resistance to 
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knowing about animal research is left without consideration of the structural reasons that 
may make disengaging with the issue appealing to lay publics. However, analysis of MOP 
writings on animal research reveals how this assumed ‘ignorance is bliss’ attitude of publics 
simplifies the ambivalence that some feel around animal research. In exploring the reasons 
that some Mass Observers engage in practices of not-knowing around animal research, this 
section will cover themes of self and collective protection, the role of care in not-knowing, 
and the value of ambivalence in a debate dominated by assessments of what ‘the public’ 
know.  
5.3.1 Protecting self and society 
Although knowing about animal research can generate negative emotions and moral stress, 
practices of not-knowing are themselves not unproblematic. Contrary to assumptions that 
publics are generally happy to remain ignorant about animal research, some Mass Observers 
expressed guilt and shame over knowing and thinking about the uses of animals for scientific 
research and also not knowing or thinking about this. This is demonstrated in the two MOP 
excerpts below –   
‘As regards buying and taking medicines, I don’t think I have ever given the scientific 
research involving millions of animals a second thought which I suppose is rather 
shameful. It’s just something I block out I suppose – back to my feeling of not being 
able to do anything about it.’ (Mass Observer F5890) 
~ 
‘I suppose overall I have a quite a "head in the sand” approach to testing/experiments 
on animals. My instinctive reaction is to say it is wrong and barbaric and should be 
stopped. But when I take medicines I don't give any thought to what animal it might 
have been tested on. So perhaps I am a hypocrite.’ (Mass Observer R5682) 
The sense of shame or hypocrisy articulated by both Mass Observers reflects how although 
avoiding information on animal research might prevent exposure to the issue, knowledge of 
the practice and one’s connection to it cannot be entirely eroded. To ignore something 
implies having some knowledge of that which you ignore and, indeed, knowing and not-
knowing are continual processes. Therefore, at times, an individual may be aware of their 
turning away and sheltering from unsettling information, a practice which may raise feelings 
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of moral guilt or shame. That such feelings accompany the avoidance of information on 
animal research illustrate that partial ignorance is not necessarily blissful and does not bring 
straightforward relief in morally troubling situations. Indeed, shame is intimately tied to our 
sense of morality, as Scheff (2003) describes, ‘shame is a key component of conscience, the 
moral sense: it signals moral transgression even without thoughts or words. Shame is our 
moral gyroscope’ (Scheff, 2003: 254).  
Feelings of shame, guilt, or hypocrisy over one’s lack of thought for laboratory animals, beings 
who are intimately entwined with conceptions of our own health and wellbeing, perhaps 
reflects their common representation through a lens of sacrifice. As Lynch (1988) observed, 
the rhetoric of sacrifice is integral to laboratory conduct, transforming the animal from 
‘naturalistic’ to ‘analytic’, at which point it can be anatomized for its scientific data. In this 
way, as Birke et al. (2007) have also demonstrated, sacrifice is not just euphemistic in 
laboratories. The metaphor of sacrifice enables animals to become models that produce 
knowledge for the wider scientific community. As well as this, understanding the killing of 
laboratory animals through a lens of sacrifice can offer emotional protection for those 
working in the lab. Nonetheless, as Arluke (1988) suggests, although the ‘[o]bjectification of 
laboratory animals provides some degree of emotional protection’ (Arluke, 1988: 99, 
emphasis added), this process is never absolute. Hence, (some) laboratory animals are also 
metamorphized into pets (see Arluke, 1988; Greenhough and Roe, 2018a), enabling 
recognition and fulfilment of subjective interspecies relations.  
Given that the rhetoric of sacrifice may help those within the laboratory to cope with the 
killing of animals, perhaps some of those outside of the laboratory also find comfort in viewing 
the process as sacrificial. Iliff (2002) has suggested that memorial services through which 
laboratory animals can be remembered can offer benefits to many actors involved in the 
biomedical process, satisfying ‘a desire to recognize formally the contributions that laboratory 
animals have made, and continue to make’ (Iliff, 2002: 46-47). They claim that such events 
may ‘allow individuals to break the barrier of silence, to openly share their feelings about their 
job and about animal use’, thus concluding that the community should ‘[c]onsider putting into 
practice this additional "R"—remembering the animals’ (Iliff, 2002: 47). However, as the 
above Mass Observers (F890) and (R5682) suggest, remembering the lives and deaths of 
laboratory animals in the name of biomedicine may be complicated by ambivalence, both 
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wanting and not wanting to think about the matter. In this way, the construction of laboratory 
animals as sacrificial might implicate the lack of recognition for their sacrifice as shameful, as 
though reaping the benefits of their plight without acknowledgment indicates a failure to 
reciprocate our end of the bargain.  
Important to consider here is how emotions, or, as Ahmed (2004) would put it, objects of 
emotion, circulate through the fabric of social life. As they write, ‘emotions are not ‘in’ either 
the individual or the social, but produce the very surfaces and boundaries that allow the 
individual and the social to be delineated as if they are objects’ (Ahmed, 2004: 10). In 
understanding emotion as a cultural practice that creates feeling subjects, Ahmed’s 
perspective enables a more pointed focus on how shame and guilt are produced by the 
language that constitutes what we mean by animal research. Rhetoric of sacrifice and 
openness thus generate expectations of laypeople who are grateful and obliged to witness, 
the failure of which is affectively constituted as guilt or shame.   
However, implicit to these practices of ignorance is the power, or lack of, that an individual 
feels they possess to act upon what they come to know. Surveying two studies in the genetic 
testing domain (the first on Huntingdon’s disease and the second on genetic ovarian-breast 
cancer), Yaniv and Sagi (2005) found that the majority of participants chose to opt out of 
genetic testing when there was no available treatment for the condition being screened for. 
In such cases, they argue that ‘maintaining uncertainty about one’s own predisposition is 
appealing as a form of self-protection’ (Yaniv and Sagi, 2005: 2) and label this practice 
‘protective ignorance’. Also relevant here is Macnaghten’s (2003) qualitative study of 
responses to global environmental issues and how this relates to experiences of politics which 
found that ‘[i]n different ways people were now choosing not to choose to dwell on global 
environmental threats, as a pragmatic response to apparently intractable problems, and in 
order to maintain a positive outlook on life’ (Macnaghten, 2003: 77). Though occurring in 
different contexts, ignorance around animal research appears to be enacted by some Mass 
Observers for a similar protective purpose, for instance, in protecting one’s self-identity as an 
‘animal lover’ from fracturing upon confronting one’s complicity in laboratory animal 
suffering. As in Yaniv and Sagi’s study, a perceived inability to act upon, and, moreover, work 
to resolve the uncomfortable knowledge that animal research represents is instructive in 
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motivating a desire not to know. Without autonomy in this area, laypeople may regard 
ignoring the issue to be in their best interests, as this excerpt shows –  
‘Although I'm a massive animal lover, I tend not to think about animal testing. I never 
use cosmetic products that have been tested on animals if I can help it but I guess I 
shy away from thinking about animals used for testing medicine. The reason I suppose 
is that if a family member or myself was in poor health + the only cure was one that 
had been tested on animals then you would want that cure at any cost.’ (Mass 
Observer W3730) 
The dilemma described by this Mass Observer centres on a lack of choice. For them, cosmetic 
testing is straightforwardly unacceptable and cosmetic products tested on animals can be 
avoided. However, medical research does not present the same opportunity for action and 
its necessity is reinforced in contrast to the frivolity associated with the cosmetic industry 
(this distinction between the medical and the cosmetic will however become blurred in the 
Chapter 7). In choosing to limit their knowledge of animal research, these Observers can be 
seen as enacting a level of control within an arena that is currently disempowering, 
withdrawing their gaze when they feel unable to act upon its implications. As Wynne et al.’s 
(1993) influential study of Cumbrian community’s feelings towards the local nuclear plant 
revealed, denial and ‘fatalistic acceptance’ are often at play in situations where laypeople feel 
disempowered to affect change. Yet, as the writings from the MOP show, protecting oneself 
from such information is not unproblematic, rather, feelings of guilt or shame may accompany 
the acknowledgment of one’s active ignorance of animal research and the suffering they 
associate with the practice. Similarly, in Wynne et al.’s study, fatalistic acceptance was 
accompanied by ‘indications of guilt and even shame at being a 'community' which allowed 
itself to be dictated to so comprehensively’ (Wynne et al., 1993: 40). Perhaps this suggests 
that in resigning themselves to a situation out of step with personal and local values and which 
they feel unable to change, certain social identities of individuals and communities become 
compromised.  
Such guilt and shame induced by turning away from animal research may also be attached to 
a perceived civic duty to engage with issues of social justice. Given the mounting attention 
placed on individuals to take responsibility for global challenges such as climate change (see 
Whitmarsh et al., 2011), for some Mass Observers, animal research may represent yet 
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another ethical issue that citizens feel called upon to engage with though simultaneously 
disempowered by. Studies of public communication strategies around climate change have 
discussed the pros and cons of dialogues which induce guilt in audiences (for an overview see 
Swim and Bloodhart, 2015; Bloodhart et al., 2019), however, such insights from the MOP 
suggest that people may also feel guilt or shame when disengaging with such 
communications. Hence, being aware of social norms around engaging with socio-ethical 
issues such as animal research, which, when viewed through the lens of the ‘animal lover’ 
identity, might become an issue centred on the societal treatment of animals, means that 
active ignorance towards the issue may itself become a source of personal guilt or shame. 
Nevertheless, despite the negative self-perceptions that refusals to engage with the topic of 
animal research might evoke, such ignorance appears generally beneficial in the shelter it 
offers from disturbing information. McGoey (2012) defines this as ‘strategic ignorance’, which 
they claim is ‘distinguishable from deception or the suppression of data by virtue of the fact 
that unsettling knowledge is thwarted from emerging in the first place’ (McGoey, 2012: 559). 
Strategic ignorance may also be used to preserve one’s internal harmony through ‘practices 
of obfuscation and deliberate insulation from unsettling information’ (McGoey, 2012: 555). 
Using the language of denial rather than ignorance, Cohen (2001) also discusses how we 
manage unsettling information. For Cohen, there are three types of denial: literal, 
interpretive, and implicatory. Whereas literal denial is a refusal to accept the knowledge itself 
and interpretive denial is a refusal to accept a particular interpretation of the knowledge, 
implicatory denial is useful to consider here in that it refers to instances where one denies 
the implications of said knowledge. As Cohen states, ‘[u]nlike literal or interpretive denial, 
knowledge itself is not at issue, but doing the ‘right’ thing with this knowledge’ (Cohen, 2001: 
9). In this case, Cohen writes that ‘[w]e turn away from our insights and hide their 
implications. We half-know, but don’t want to discover the other half’ (Cohen, 2001: 34) .  
As both of these concepts suggest, individuals are not entirely absent of knowledge about 
that which they strategically ignore or deny, but rather, what they know about the subject 
propels a desire to not know any more about it. This half-knowing and half-not-wanting-to-
know is demonstrated in another Mass Observer’s (B3227) writing on the proposal of 
increased openness around animal research, in which they reflect – 
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‘If we were asked flat out, Do you approve of secrecy? Are you in favour of greater 
openness?, we would say no and yes, but the truth is that some of us, and some part 
of all of us, are essentially happy to be kept in the dark about unpleasant things.’ (Mass 
Observer B3227) 
This Mass Observer (B3227) acknowledges a cultural valorisation of openness and consequent 
disapproval of secrecy, yet, in an almost confessional tone, claims that such support for 
openness exists alongside a willingness to remain unaware of ‘unpleasant’ knowledge. In 
these circumstances, openness is presented as harmful and secrecy becomes an act of public 
protection. Such writing reframes ignorance and denial as ordinary, everyday practices, 
which, rather than being inherently negative, can be personally and culturally beneficial. 
Challenging the notion that ignorance is something to be eradicated through the gaining of 
knowledge, an epistemology underpinning the classical enlightenment spirit of science 
(Bogner, 2015), such understandings of ignorance highlight both its social and psychological 
utility. When confronted with an opportunity in which one may come to know something 
about animal research and the practice is already associated with uncomfortable knowledge, 
the refusal to know more or engage with the implications of any knowledge acquired can thus 
be seen as a coping mechanism. As Cohen writes, ‘[w]hat looks like denial is an 
accommodation to cognitive threat. The attack on your life assumptions is blunted, and 
threatening information is cut down to tolerable doses’ (Cohen, 2001: 49). 
In the case of knowing about animal research, not only are there limited opportunities to act 
upon knowledge gained if one finds it disturbing (Hobson-West, 2010; Pound and Blaug, 
2016), but given that animal models are claimed to remain essential to medical progress, 
individuals may find it even more crucial to turn away. This is not to conclude that the Mass 
Observers quoted here do not want to know about anything related to animal research, but 
instead lends further emphasis on the need to deeply consider both the kinds of information 
on animal research that are publicly shared and how this is done.  
5.3.2 Not knowing but still caring  
As advocated by this analysis, to take a sensitive reading of unwillingness to engage in 
dialogues on animal research problematises what Jenni (2016) has called ‘moral laziness’, a 
term they use to describe cases where individuals refuse to engage with information on the 
human-inflicted suffering of animals. As they describe, ‘[w]hen someone declines to read or 
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watch films about the brutality of meat (and milk and egg) production, choosing willful 
ignorance over knowledge of what the animals experience, they exhibit moral laziness, as well 
as (often) a kind of cowardice’ (Jenni, 2016: 34). Rather, writings from the MOP emphasise 
the centrality of power in acting upon what one sees or hears, without which knowing may 
be seen as futile and, further, detrimental at individual and collective levels. This reading is 
supported by Hertwig and Engel (2016), who suggest that an important factor in determining 
what they term ‘deliberate ignorance’, defined as ‘the conscious individual or collective 
choice not to seek or use information’ (Hertwig and Engel, 2016: 360), is ‘whether any action 
can be taken in response to the information obtained’ (ibid, 364).  
The significance of the power to act in motivating epistemological engagement with animal 
research can be inferred by the frequency with which cosmetic testing involving animals was 
denounced and held as an unambiguous example of the limits of scientific uses of animals 
across the MOP responses. Cosmetic products and surgical ‘enhancements’ were largely 
regarded by Mass Observers as trivial and beyond the concerns of biomedical science. As will 
be discussed in Chapter Seven, this juxtaposition constructs medical research as intrinsically 
altruistic and exceptional to the restrictions that other forms of research are expected to be 
beholden to. Although cosmetic testing has been banned in the UK since 1998 and in the EU 
since 2013 (UAR, 2018), as suggested by studies of societal views on animal research (Lund et 
al., 2012a; Knight and Barnett, 2008), the practice still appears to remain at the forefront of 
public imaginations around the scientific use of animals. This has been interpreted by some 
in the bioscience community (Festing and Wilkinson, 2007), and research advocacy 
organisations, such as Understanding Animal Research (UAR 2019), as symptomatic of a lack 
of public knowledge about current legislation on the scientific use of animals. However, 
discussions of the unacceptability of using animals to develop cosmetic treatments or 
products may also represent a way in which individuals can demonstrate their agency and 
enact ethical boundaries, something they may feel is less possible in relation to biomedical 
research. As this Mass Observer (C5716) explains –    
‘With regards to medicines, I try not to consider whether they are the product of 
animal testing. I intellectually accept that pharmaceutical companies may need to test 
on animals however morally I don't agree with it. But were I or someone I loved put in 
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a position where the only medicine available to make me/them better was a result of 
animal testing I would not refuse it...  
This may make me seem hypocritical but I imagine that most people would be of the 
same opinion should the occasion arise. Although I can stick to my convictions in 
respect of cosmetic testing I'm afraid that medical testing is an issue that I 'stick my 
head in the sand on'. Not necessarily hoping that it will go away, but pretending that 
it isn't there.’ (Mass Observer C5716) 
Here, it is important to consider the consumer power that citizens have at their disposal in 
relation to supporting or resisting cosmetic items produced through research using animals. 
The sense of choice associated with cosmetic products, whether this is produced by the 
availability of ‘cruelty-free’ cosmetics or by regarding cosmetics as nonessential, enables 
individuals to discuss their discomfort with animal research in a way that becomes closed-off 
when concerning medical treatments. With the need to advance biomedicine often taken as 
beyond question, expressing one’s views towards with the use of animals for biomedical 
purposes might also be felt as taboo. Consequently, as the above quoted Mass Observer 
(C5716) expresses, one’s ‘convictions’ can be maintained in regard to disapproving of 
cosmetic research using animals, but biomedical research is trickier, with distaste for the 
process being mixed with a desire for its expected outputs. Therefore, biomedical research 
and the ambivalence it produces may necessitate turning away from.  
Jenni (2016) argues that ‘moral laziness can be seen as sorrow over and rejection of the 
burdens and effort required to maintain a caring relationship to others – in particular, for our 
purposes, to nonhuman others’ (Jenni, 2016: 39). Yet, maintaining an ignorance of or 
withdrawing from circumstances in which one may come to know about the suffering of 
others does not necessarily mean that one does not care. Instead, such instances may reflect 
uncertainty or vulnerability around what one is able to do with such information once 
processed. As Cohen explains, ‘[p]assivity and silence may look the same as obliviousness, 
apathy and indifference, but may not be the same at all. We can feel and care intensely, yet 
remain silent’ (Cohen, 2001: 9). That empathy drives individuals to turn away from engaging 
with issues they care about is one explanation for the few Mass Observers who stated that 
they were unable to write about the topic, apologised for an uncharacteristically brief 
response, or proclaimed that they would not respond to another Directive on this topic –   
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 ‘Sorry, I can’t write about this.’ (Mass Observer L2281)  
~ 
 ‘Sorry [illegible] but this is going to be terribly disappointing. I’ve never written so 
little in a Directive.’ (Mass Observer W1835) 
~ 
‘No animal should be used in research. 
I don't think animals should be used in research 
I'm totally against it 
I won’t respond if you write about animal testing again 
I find it too upsetting’ (Mass Observer B42) 
Although there is not enough information provided to be certain that discomfort with the 
topic was the main reason for the responses given by the first two Observers (L2281 and 
W1835) quoted above, in the case of Mass Observer B42 it is clear that animal research was 
experienced as an unwelcome Directive topic due to the negative emotions it evokes. Such 
aversion to thinking and writing about animal research could be said to represent a reaction 
to what Pallotta (2016) calls ‘traumatic knowledge’, a term they use to describe knowledge 
of human exploitation of non-human animals. As Pallotta details, ‘[t]raumatic knowledge 
refers to learning the often gruesome facts about what routinely happens to animals used in 
society for food, research and product testing, clothing, and entertainment…’ (Pallotta, 2016: 
180). Contextualising such knowledge of human-inflicted animal suffering, Pallotta states that 
‘witnessing and reporting violence against animals in a socially dismissive context where that 
violence is not acknowledged can result in the development of post-traumatic stress 
symptoms’ (Pallotta, 2016: 181). In addition, as much of the MOP writing signifies, such stress 
is not only induced at the point of learning about unsettling information but is relived each 
time one is forced to confront this knowledge. The moral distress that knowing about animal 
research can cause illustrates the entanglement of knowing and caring, in that it difficult to 
know precisely because one cares. The link between caring and knowing has traditionally 
been theorised as linear, in that the more one can claim to care, the more one must engage 
in knowing. As van Dooren (2014) states, ‘the obligation to ‘know more’ emerges as a demand 
for a kind of deep contextual and critical knowledge about the object of our care, a knowledge 
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that simultaneously places us at stake in the world and demands that we be held accountable’ 
(van Dooren, 2014: 293). However, care for laboratory animals within structural conditions 
which render them expendable and through which laypeople can only act as distant observers 
of their lives, witnessing them through annual statistics, scientific journalism which mentions 
their involvement, virtual laboratory tours8, or activist exposés. Therefore, in the case of 
animal research, laypeople may feel that these barriers to caring for such animals also prevent 
them from knowing more about their lives.  
Furthermore, that grief over animal suffering and death is still widely regarded as illegitimate, 
and is indeed ‘disenfranchised’ (Stewart et al., 1989), may also contribute to the need to turn 
away. This is because to take seriously the killing of laboratory animals for primarily human 
gain is to therefore trouble what Peggs (2009) has termed ‘Human Primacy Identity Politics’, 
an identity ‘[b]ased in unquestioned assumptions about essential human identity as separate 
from and superior to ‘animal’’ and through which ‘discrimination against the subordinate 
‘other’ is achieved and maintained’ (Peggs, 2009: 8). With this in mind, the articulation of 
discomfort around animal research can be seen as affectively challenging the human-oriented 
harm-benefit model underpinning its practice and, in doing so, putting into dispute the 
cultural hegemony of anthropocentric science. Such challenge, whether enacted politically in 
opposition campaigns or affectively through potentially subversive feelings of sadness, guilt, 
or shame, scientific uses of animals can come at a loss to the identity of both individuals and 
collectives. This is illustrated in Twine’s (2014) use of Ahmed’s ‘killjoy’ figure, originally used 
to problematise the construction of feminist identities in patriarchal contexts, to describe the 
characterisation of vegans within anthropocentric contexts. By practicing veganism, Twine 
argues that individuals are ‘contesting the social order’ and are thus ‘in struggle with a 
normative affective community that embeds happiness norms within the status quo’ (Twine, 
2014: 637-638). Hence, to engage with animal research and encounter the negative feelings 
it evokes is perhaps to confront the rooted assumption that human lives matter more than 
those of other organisms, the challenge of which remains culturally subversive. Although as 
Pallotta (2016) argues, expressions of grief over losing a companion animal have ‘undergone 
increasing social legitimization’, there remain ‘other categories of animals who are socially 





[and who] are culturally invisible as individuals […] and to mourn them is to experience 
profound alienation from the mainstream culture and dominant social norms’ (Pallotta, 2016: 
181). Restricting one’s capacity to encounter such animals is therefore to protect oneself from 
facing a culture which renders their suffering culturally invisible and insignificant.  
Metaphors from popular culture such as ‘going down the rabbit hole’ or ‘taking the red pill’ 
exemplify the risk or danger posed in taking steps to learn about particular topics, with both 
metaphors associated with knowledge which is transformative in some way. In pursuing such 
knowledge, one may be aware that its pursuit has the potential to unsettle pre-existing values 
and, once known, such information cannot then be unknown. In the case of animal research, 
the threat of knowing comes from an expectation that it will conflict with one’s ethical values 
yet cannot be outright opposed due to belief in the necessity of its intended outputs (i.e. 
effective medical treatments) and trust that the use of non-human animals is vital to attain 
these. As the full paragraph of the excerpt from Mass Observer R5682, quoted at the 
beginning of this subsection, illustrates –  
‘I suppose overall I have a quite a "head in the sand” approach to testing/experiments 
on animals. My instinctive reaction is to say it is wrong and barbaric and should be 
stopped. But when I take medicines I don't give any thought to what animal it might 
have been tested on. So perhaps I am a hypocrite. I do think there should be more 
openness from scientists/the government about animal research. The public has a 
right to know and we should be living in an age of transparency, rather than secrets. 
But I have a feeling that some things are kept secret from the public because those in 
power know there would be a huge outcry if certain experiment were made known. I 
think most people would be appalled to hear about cruel experiments on animals and 
if such research became known about there would be a huge backlash by the general 
public, as in general the UK is seen as a nation of animal lovers and I think this is pretty 
much the case.’ (Mass Observer R5682) 
Here, the sense of being caught between conflicting positions is twofold, with this Observer 
feeling stuck between opposing animal research whilst wanting the medicines such 
experimentation promises and supporting institutional openness whilst also wanting to bury 
one’s ‘head in the sand’ and not risk the disruption of a public outcry. The characterisation of 
the UK as a ‘nation of animal lovers’ in this excerpt acts as a caution against raising awareness 
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about animal research, as it is imagined that, if aware, such a public would be outraged. This 
reflects that practices of not-knowing are often collective, in that one can only turn away from 
certain information if others also work to maintain a cultural veil of ignorance.  
The risks of rupturing such collective ignorance are discussed by Wicks (2011), who argues 
that when ‘distancing from unpleasant information is a collective enterprise, it can be seen 
as the social organization of denial […] The costs then also become social’ (Wicks, 2011: 189). 
Although Wicks claims that engaging in collective denial may generate social losses through 
the exhaustion such ‘serious collaborative effort’ (ibid) requires and the amount of tension it 
produces, the interruption of collective denial by acknowledging the ‘elephant in the room’ 
also poses a social threat. As she goes on to suggest, ‘[c]haracterized by a strong emphasis on 
avoidance, taboos frequently manifest themselves in the form of strict prohibitions against 
looking, listening or saying. Those who defy or ignore these prohibitions are universally 
regarded as social deviants’ (Wicks, 2011: 192). Therefore, acknowledging the controversy of 
animal research may be disruptive at the local lay level, in raising the issue with friends, family, 
or colleagues with whom the topic remains taboo, and also at the hegemonic level, in either 
challenging an entrenched anthropocentrism or a rhetorical national identity of animal lovers. 
The aim of this section has thus been to acknowledge the difficulties that can accompany 
knowing about animal research. In exploring this, this analysis of MOP writing suggests that 
the topic can evoke both internal and interpersonal tensions which can make its active 
avoidance appealing or even necessary. In this way, the writings of Mass Observers challenge 
the dominance of deficit-model understandings of public opinion on animal research, instead, 
revealing the strategic ways in which knowledge of the issue is managed. In turning away from 
the issue of animal research, these Mass Observers demonstrate the entanglement of 
knowing and caring, reflecting that, just as caring can compel the desire to know, it can also 
compel the desire not to know. As this suggests, the motivation to disengage with or ignore 
the topic of animal research illustrates the ambivalence of feeling around the issue. Yet, 
ambivalence may have its own power in relating to animal research and it is to this area that 
we now turn.  
5.3.3 Reclaiming ambivalence  
As this analysis of writing from the MOP shows, how Mass Observers report their feelings 
about animal research is nuanced and Observers often reflect on their own ambivalence 
103 
 
towards the issue. However, through the construction of views on animal research as 
irreconcilably polarised (for critique of this in UK and US contexts, see Marris, 2006; Levin and 
Reppy, 2015; DeGrazia and Beauchamp, 2019), ambivalence around animal research has 
traditionally been overlooked and minimised. Yet, as their writing reveals, the discomfort that 
many Mass Observers feel around animal research does not necessarily manifest in outright 
opposition to the practice and, with their own investments in its continuation, dwelling on 
the matter consequently offers little appeal. This contrasts with the approach of biomedical 
research advocacy organisations like UAR (2016), who, in an online pamphlet entitled ‘Where 
do medicines come from?’, set out their aim as ‘to achieve broad understanding and 
acceptance of humane animal research in the UK to advance science and medicine’ (UAR 
2016: 1). Rather, this analysis of writings from the MOP reveals that acceptance of or trust in 
the current necessity of animal models does not always render knowledge of the practice any 
less disconcerting. As the following Mass Observer (O3436) suggests –  
‘The general public should be allowed to learn about animal research but only if they 
want to. The relevant establishments should be monitored so that there is as little 
cruelty as possible. I am not keen on knowing all details but I realise this work is a 
necessary evil. I understand that we all benefit hugely from this research but I really 
hate having to think of it.’ (Mass Observer O3436) 
Unlike Lund et al.’s (2014) study of public views of animal research in Denmark, this analysis 
of MOP writing reveals that those without clear positions on the issue may prefer to disengage 
with animal research altogether rather than considering each individual case in order to reach 
a definitive position. Indeed, rather than deciding ‘to approve or reject animal research on a 
case-by-case basis by weighing the animal costs and human interests’ (Lund et al., 2014:441) 
mirroring the process of harm-benefit analysis through which experiments are licensed or 
not, some ambivalent Mass Observers were troubled by the harm-benefit model itself. As 
expressed by the following Mass Observer (N5744) –  
‘I’ll never feel entirely comfortable with the fact that creatures have probably been 




As this excerpt reflects, rather than providing reassurance in justifying the practice, thinking 
about the issue through the frame of harms and benefits, with animals bearing the brunt of 
the former and humans the latter, appears to be one of the very facets that makes animal 
research such an acute source of discomfort. As Michael and Brown’s (2004) qualitative work 
on societal views on xenotransplantation also shows, laypeople do not treat the harm-benefit 
model uncritically. Instead, Michael and Brown contend that ‘lay discussion of such 
arguments quickly goes beyond and beneath cost–benefit to encompass a series of concerns 
and views that eventually render those cost–benefit arguments highly spurious, and which in 
the longer term, and potentially at least, again challenge the credibility of both advocates and 
critics’ (Michael and Brown, 2004: 394). As their research suggests, such data complicates the 
approach of both ‘advocacy’ and ‘opposition’ organisations who frequently operate on the 
assumption that they can win public favour by offering their version of the ‘truth’.  
With little room for ambivalence in the polarised representations of debate around animal 
research, there exists a pressure for individuals to ‘pick a side’ and identify with a clear-cut 
position ‘for’ or ‘against’ the use of animals in scientific experiments. In such a context, 
reluctance to engage with animal research may also reflect a way of resisting such 
expectations. Drawing on Sedgwick’s challenge of the homo/hetero distinction in 
‘Epistemology of the closet’ (1990), McGoey (2012) describes an ‘emancipative ignorance, 
where deliberate ambiguity becomes a weapon against the dogmatic certainties and 
schematic impositions of others’ (McGoey, 2012: 7). As this reflexive MOP excerpt below 
demonstrates, practices of not-knowing may provide room for one’s ambivalence around 
animal research –  
‘I have not really thought about animal research beyond the fact I do not approve of 
it at all. I do not make any real effort to keep up to date with protests or media 
coverage. I suppose I should. I do feel a hypocrite in saying that I do not want animals 
to be tested on, but I and family and friends freely use medicines that have been 
tested on animals. But the truth is, I can use medicines and also not want them to be 
tested on animals.’ (Mass Observer D3644) 
Though acknowledging a conflict between their disapproving of animal research whilst 
accepting the medicines it plays a part in producing, this Mass Observer (D3644) resists 
adopting a definitive position or drawing the conclusion that they are a hypocrite. Instead, 
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they assert their claim to a middle ground from which they can consume medicines and 
simultaneously oppose the use of animals in their current development. As well as providing 
space for ambivalence, such ignorance around animal research may also reflect Michael’s 
(1996) suggestion that acknowledging and defending one’s scientific ignorance ‘is part of an 
effort to maintain social independence from science and, possibly, to challenge the authority 
of interests using ‘science’’ (Michael, 1996: 120). Ignorance is hence not only enacted as a 
defensive strategy but can also be used to challenge dominant framings of an issue and 
consequently reclaim a level of autonomy over it. Although such acceptance of one’s 
conflicted feelings towards animal research was rare in the MOP responses, the point that 
one can proclaim their right to medical interventions whilst opposing the use of animals in 
their development is still pertinent to acknowledge.  
Ambivalence around openness on animal research is also demonstrated through concerns 
about how such transparency initiatives will work in practice, as the following MOP excerpt 
illustrates –  
‘I’m wary of calls for more openness, because they’re predicated on an ability to deal 
with the information which has been opened. I forget whose government it was, 
probably ours or the US, who responded to calls for openness by just dumping data - 
‘this is every email we’ve sent in the last year, you sift through it for something useful’. 
We can’t do that, there is more information than any individual can deal with. So we 
sift it through authorities - ‘X in the Daily Paper has sifted them, and they say IT IS 
BAD’. I worry who the authorities would be. […] On the other hand though, I’ve been 
morally negligent largely because I’ve been allowed not to think about this. If you gave 
me a warning like I get on cigarette packets, my life would be a lot easier, and my 
morality a lot more consistent.’ (Mass Observer J5734) 
Writing on the practicalities of how openness is enacted and the tendency for governments 
to ‘dump data’, this Mass Observer (J5734) articulates their mistrust towards how such 
information is then filtered and publicly communicated. Yet alongside their concerns over 
such information being used to promote certain agendas, this Mass Observer (J5734) also 
criticises the ease of individual indifference towards animal research that the sector has 
permitted. Warning labels like those featured on cigarettes packets are suggested here as an 
example of product transparency which would support ethical consumption practices. Such 
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scepticism towards governmental openness practices echoes Moore’s argument that ‘[w]e 
might have much more public data available to us, but, for many people, the means by which 
we might understand, act upon and collectively challenge that information have been slowly 
eroded’ (Moore, 2017: 426). Ambivalence is here demonstrated in wanting to be held 
accountable to one’s moral beliefs around animal research whilst also being uncertain about 
the forms of openness that citizens have come to expect from government.  
Although it is important to explore ambivalence towards controversial issues such as animal 
research, rarely is it valued in the processes by which science-society relations are 
represented. This is demonstrated in the treatment of ambivalent attitudinal categories in 
the 2018 Ipsos MORI poll, which states on the topic of trust in regulation that ‘[t]hree in ten 
(31%) neither agree nor disagree, suggesting that they do not feel they know enough to give 
an opinion either way’ (Ipsos MORI, 2018: 29). However, to conclude that ambivalence 
reflects only a deficit of knowledge is to undermine the complexity of lay knowledge of 
science. As Bucchi and Neresini (2008) argue, ‘[f]actual information is only one ingredient of 
lay knowledge, in which it interweaves with other elements (value judgements, trust in the 
scientific institutions, the person’s perception of his or her ability to put scientific knowledge 
to practical use) to form a corpus no less sophisticated than specialist expertise’ (Bucchi and 
Neresini, 2008: 451). Yet, that polls are not designed to enable participants to explain why 
they have responded a certain way obscures their ambivalence towards animal research and 
renders it analytically meaningless.  
Such restriction of lay contributions is, however, useful for guiding science-society dialogues 
into conclusions which allow for biomedical research using animals to continue without 
interruption. In this way, Irwin’s (2006) claim that the call for further science-society dialogue 
put forward in the landmark 2000 House of Lords Select Committee report on Science and 
Technology ‘is intended to secure what the Lords see as science’s ‘licence to practise’, but not 
to restrict it’ (Irwin, 2006: 308) remains relevant to the modern rhetoric around openness in 
the bioscience sector. To serve such ends, societal views on scientific issues are chiefly 
constructed as matters of knowing the ‘right’ information or not and therefore, as Irwin aptly 
puts it, ‘[t]he clear implication is that society must understand science better rather than vice 
versa’ (ibid).  
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This section has aimed to show that encountering information around animal research can be 
uncomfortable and, at times, even emotionally immobilising. Without routes to intervene in 
the practice and resolve one’s relation to it, or, more accurately, sense of complicity in it, this 
analysis has found that Mass Observers engage in practices of not-knowing through which 
the topic is avoided and ignored. Such turning away from animal research therefore cannot 
be said to indicate indifference to the topic but rather has been shown here to represent 
strategies that protect the self, social relations, and wider hegemonic norms. Given this, 
ambivalence is not only understandable around animal research, an issue which, as will be 
discussed further in the following chapter, generates tensions between practices of caring 
towards the self and others, both near and far and human and non-human, but can also 
provide a space for lay empowerment. Recognising the validity of ambivalence around the 
scientific use of animals may move the dialogue on from an expert affair which can be won 
with rational arguments and facts to one which is enhanced by sociocultural values and 
feelings, which include discomfort and uncertainty. In doing so, perhaps encounters with 
animal research can offer laypeople a way to relate to the issue that is not polarising or 
steeped in guilt or shame.  
In making these points through analysis of MOP writings, it is important to appreciate the 
ways in which methods such as the MOP can enable laypeople to not only articulate what 
they know or do not know about around the issue, but to also assess the value of such 
knowledge, which, as contended in this section is at times immobilising and unwelcome. In 
this way,  methods such as the Mass Observation Project allow for the ‘ways of thinking which 
do not imply that all ‘deficits’ can and should be avoided’ that Irwin (2014) has called for. 
Through the reflexive writing of Mass Observers, considering their own knowledge, where it 
is limited, how it is managed, and what such knowing means and feels like, the controversy of 
animal research is shown to be irreconcilable by increasing the availability of information 
alone.  
5.4 Wanting to know 
Not all Mass Observers responding to the Directive expressed an aversion to increased 
openness on animal research, indeed, some articulated support for such proposals. 
Enthusiasm for openness around animal research differed on what kinds of information 
should be publicly communicated and who needs to know. Some Mass Observers desired 
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more openness around the possibility of alternatives to animal models or more information 
about ‘everyday’ research, rather than the sensationalised media reports about cases of 
malpractice or particularly controversial experiments. Yet, such suggestions for openness 
initiatives were not simply concerned with providing specifically focused information. Also 
key to support for openness around animal research was the capacity for such knowing to 
enable one to act on what they come to know. Given the problems of knowing about animal 
research detailed earlier, interest in openness on the practice was often shaped by an 
expectation that such information will then allow laypeople to participate or intervene in 
some way. Yet, also significant in accounts which endorsed the suggestion of further 
openness on animal research were allusions to who can be trusted to know which often relied 
on deficit-model constructions of an irresponsible ‘general public’. It is on the three matters 
of empowering knowledge, who should know, and who can be trusted to know that this 
section will now focus.  
5.4.1 Empowering knowledge 
Though discomfort towards the topic of animal research was a common theme in MOP 
writing, not all Mass Observers were averse to the proposal of increased openness from the 
bioscience sector. Key to much of the support for openness initiatives in this area was the 
capacity for openness to enable laypeople to act. As the following excerpts demonstrate, the 
agentic prospects expected to manifest from openness on animal research varied across MOP 
accounts –  
‘I have heard animal rights protesters say there are other ways of testing medicines + 
doing research. This is perhaps a taboo subject that should be brought into the open 
more. What are the other alternatives? Would they be as effective? The case was well 
made against animal testing for cosmetics so the debate should be moved onto health 
research more.’ (Mass Observer W3730) 
~ 
‘I think it would be sensible for the general public to know more about animal testing. 
I, for one, am not very knowledgeable on the topic, and I feel that most of what people 
know is from scandalous reports. If people were made aware of everyday research, 
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then the line between what is humane and what is not might be made more clear.’ 
(Mass Observer W5572) 
~ 
‘I feel that it would be useful for the general public to know more animal research to 
help them decide what is acceptable.’ (Mass Observer H5741) 
~ 
‘I think their ought to be more openness about animal research. At least not just to 
say who does it but to be able to legitimately justify it. If the same trials & tests can be 
done without animals but it costs more then I think so be it. Profit should not come 
before animal welfare.’ (Mass Observer G4296) 
For these Mass Observers, proposals to increase openness around animal research should 
enable publics to act in some way. In its potential to offer laypeople the means and modes to 
participate in varying ways, I will call this ‘empowering knowledge’. This can be seen in how 
the first Observer (W3730) links openness around alternatives to fostering wider debate on 
the topic, the second (W5572) and third (H5741) call for information which will enable publics 
to make informed decisions on which kinds of research can be called ‘humane’ or 
‘acceptable’, and the fourth Observer (G4296) emphasises the importance of openness 
strategies which publicly justify the scientific use of animals. Due to the prompt on openness 
provided in the ‘Using animals in research’ Directive describing openness as directed at the 
‘general public’ (i.e. ‘Some people claim that the general public needs to know more about 
animal research, and that more ‘openness’ from scientists and the government is therefore 
needed. What do you think of this suggestion?’ (see Appendix A), the benefits of openness on 
animal research were often interpreted in relation to this mass entity. Given this, MOP writing 
on openness around animal research often contrasted with the largely first-person based 
expressions of discomfort towards the topic discussed earlier, with Observers here being 
called on to assess wider societal impacts of such openness.   
In each of these accounts the availability of such information in and of itself is not the key 
focus, rather, significance is placed on what agency such information can bestow upon publics 
in this domain. Information that enables publics to draw boundaries between necessary and 
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unnecessary, humane or inhumane, and acceptable or unacceptable biomedical uses of 
animals is important in that it permits publics to be active co-constructors, rather than passive 
consumers, of scientific knowledge. Yet, making certain data available as a way of appeasing 
a public characterisation of the sector as secretive without also providing ways for publics to 
act upon such information falls short of this. Such openness practices fail to deliver what Forst 
(2014) has emphasised as the foundation of justice – the right to justification. As Moore 
summarises, ‘for governance to be ‘adequately justified’, the state must take an active role in 
explaining, evidencing and defending decisions and actions’ (Moore, 2017: 425).  
A key element of enacting openness around animal research which Mass Observers 
characterise as useful to publics appears to be that such strategies work towards fostering 
reciprocal science-society dialogues around the practice. Openness within such a framing is a 
mechanism which can enable publics to engage with the issue in meaningful and productive 
ways, rather than as an end in itself. As the following Mass Observer (T1843) reflects, 
openness is not only about transparency from the sector which can then be witnessed by 
public spectators, openness also signifies that an issue is open to public involvement –  
‘I think there should be total openness about the issue, just as there should be around 
abattoirs in fact. We should not flinch from knowing how we get from a to b: we 
become too protected from the truth about how we conduct ourselves in society in 
order to have what we supposedly want. As it's an ethical issue, everyone should be 
involved in it, particularly when it comes to medical research.’ (Mass Observer T1843) 
This Mass Observer’s (T1843) conception of openness seems imbedded in a sense of societal 
duty, with awareness of the steps in our consumption chains (i.e. ‘abattoirs’) being 
constructed as almost a civic responsibility. Similar to the writings on not wanting to know 
discussed in the previous section, this Observer (T1843) regards ignorance around animal 
research as a form of protection – being ‘protected from the truth’. However, in 
characterising animal research as an ethical issue, they determine that everyone has an 
obligation to know about it and act accordingly. This links back to the feelings of guilt and 
shame expressed by the Mass Observers quoted earlier in this chapter, with their self-
confessed practices of ignorance towards animal research perhaps felt as a shirking of the 
obligation to get involved that the above Observer (T1843) discusses.  
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As discussed in Chapter 3 (see subsection 3.4), this sense of civic duty is a significant element 
of the Mass Observer identity, with the role itself having been based in citizen journalism and 
local history which encourages writing on the behalf of one’s self and surroundings (Kramer, 
2014). Given this, Mass Observers are perhaps a sample primed for thinking about issues at 
both the individual and collective level and inclined to promote the value of socio-political 
participation at a broad level. However, as will be discussed next, in describing what forms of 
openness should be afforded to the ‘general public’, divisions were sometimes made between 
members of this public, their need to know, and their capacity to participate.  
5.4.2 Who should know? 
Given that the Directive features a question asking what Mass Observers make of claims that 
the ‘general public’ needs to know more about animal research (see Appendix A), some 
Observers articulated their support for openness through their agreement with this 
suggestion. In doing so, the public entity was often constructed as scientifically illiterate, 
ignorant, close-minded, or irrational. Openness, in this case, presents an opportunity to 
educate and inform such a public and quell any concerns around animal research by restating 
its necessity to scientific and medical advancement. As this Mass Observer (S5292) suggests 
–  
‘I think that the public needs to know more about animal research, but it needs 
educating in science generally. There is an increasing view that science is somehow 
'optional' within the decision making process. There is also a disconnect in the public 
view of animals. More people are vegetarian, many of the rest get their meat, not cut 
up in front of them in a butcher's shop, but in sterile 'tasteful' packages that do not 
betray the origin from within a living creature. My opinion is - Openness, Yes, but with 
'Willingness to learn' as the public's end of the deal.’ (Mass Observer S5292) 
In this account, the public body is characterised as lacking in knowledge of both science and 
the reality of animal lives. For this Mass Observer (S5292), modern practices of meat 
consumption symbolise a disconnect between the public’s imagination of how products 
(food, medicine, etc.) come to be and the reality of their production. The image of the 
responsible consumer as one who is knowledgeable about the production of commodities is 
used here to make the case that publics as patients, or medical consumers, should also be 
aware of how healthcare products and treatments are produced. However, in the context of 
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food consumption touched on in the excerpt, there is evidence that some publics do not want 
to know the whole story of how food products are made. As Cook et al. (1998) found in their 
study of consumer understandings of food origins in North London, there exists a ‘“structural 
ambivalence” at the heart of consumer engagements with systems of food provision’ which 
stems ‘from the combination of a desire to use food to construct a domestic realm with some 
autonomy from the public sphere, and the reliance upon public systems of provision to realise 
that desire’ (Cook et al., 1998: 165). This means that in constituting the domestic sphere, 
knowledge about food items must be gained, for instance, to ensure food safety, and then 
forgotten so that the product can then be used ‘without the burdens of responsibility’ (ibid). 
As this study demonstrates, in exploring consumer understandings of food it is not simply the 
quantity of knowledge possessed that is necessary to consider, but ‘the character of 
consumer knowledge; its form, its source and its use’ (ibid, emphasis added).  
In constructing such a public and commenting on what they need, this correspondent 
suggests that they themselves are a responsible scientific and political citizen and thus stand 
apart from this wilfully ignorant public body. Such technopolitical citizenship is thus 
associated with a trust in and deference to expertise and, therefore, for the general public to 
participate in dialogues around animal research they must show a ‘willingness to learn’. Again, 
it is important to note that when Mass Observers discuss the ‘general public’ they are, in turn, 
relating to their role as ‘the people's representatives’ (Shaw, 1998), with the authority to offer 
comment on what ‘the people’ need.  
This differentiation between Mass Observers and the wider public imaginary reflects 
Michael’s (2009) distinction between two types of publics: ‘publics-in-general’ (PiG) and 
‘publics-in-particular’ (PiP). Michael states that the PiG can be ‘regarded as an 
undifferentiated whole that is distinguished from science that is itself characterized globally 
in terms of some key dimension’, echoing a ‘version of society seen to be “uniform and total” 
for which everyone was held to be a member’ (Michael, 2009: 620). Whilst PiPs are 
characterised as ‘those publics that have an identifiable stake in particular scientific or 
technological issues or controversies’ (Michael, 2009: 623). With the particular positioning of 
Mass Observers as interested documenters of ‘everyday life’, their writing to the archive can 
be seen as performative of a particular version of citizenship. In enacting this role, Observers 
write from both inside and outside of the public and through such writing the identity of both 
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the Mass Observer and the ‘general public’ are co-constituted, with the figure of the ‘general 
public’ authenticating the credibility of the Mass Observer to speak both for and of the 
people. Hence, as Michael suggests, ‘laypeople in enacting themselves as “members of the 
public” do so in the ongoing processes of discussion, and through identification with, and 
differentiation from, other actors that might be experts, but might also be other publics of 
various sorts’ (Michael, 2009: 620).  
5.4.3 Who can be trusted to know?  
In implicitly placing themselves outside of the figure of the ‘general public’ when discussing 
the usefulness of openness initiatives around animal research, some Mass Observers not only 
reinforce a deference to scientific expertise but also condemn public mistrust of science and 
government. As this Observer (T3155) discusses, ‘the public’ is only to be trusted with 
openness around animal research if this trust is reciprocal; ‘the public’ must trust ‘the system’ 
–  
‘A great many truths are hidden from Joe publics eye. Politicians, bend the truth to 
conceal what's going on, what they cannot reveal, with no benefit to us if they did. 
The doctor that hides the truth from a nervous patient, the 50/50 scenario.  
The fireman cutting out a seriously injured crash victim, telling ‘all will be well’.   
How open are we with our children, a rare example, my brother in law would not tell 
his children of Santa Claus, because that was a lie!  
If we wish to know about animal research, first visit an abattoir. Paul McCartney 
recommends it, as a method to turn a person into a vegetarian. He has sheep on his 
land that die of old age, and local farmers laugh at it!.  
If we are to open up information, just to use it as ammunition to ‘knock’ the system 
I'm dead against it.’ (Mass Observer T3155) 
Illustrating the importance of public trust by drawing comparisons to other relationships 
characterised by an imbalance of expertise, this Mass Observer (T3155) reframes the secrecy 
associated with animal research as a protective act to safeguard publics. Here, the 
withholding of information is, in certain contexts, presented as a form of care. The 
relationships outlined here, within which knowledge may be concealed for the good of the 
114 
 
other, are marked by trust in the expertise of the knowledge-holder. In the contentious and 
polarised context of animal research, such reinforcement of the authority of the expert and 
construction of an uninformed or irresponsible public body can also be seen as an attempt to 
establish oneself as a good and trustworthy citizen. Michael and Brown (2005) found similarly 
that publics reproduced images of ‘the public’ as prone to spectacle when discussing their 
understandings of xenotransplantation. Again, such efforts are performative in enabling one 
to differentiate themselves from this public imaginary. As they point out, in demonstrating 
their self-awareness and epistemological limits ‘one can see such accounts as resisting a 
totalizing charge of irrationality’ (Michael and Brown, 2005: 47). In mobilising such a figure of 
the public, this generalised lay body is framed as in need of management, either by 
withholding information or, as the following Mass Observer (O4521) quips, withdrawing trust 
–  
‘I would be more open and agree with the suggestion. Animal research clearly occurs 
– we clone sheep now and grow ears on mice, it should not be the ‘corner case’ 
exceptional news items – the freak shows if you will, that get the new headlines. Be 
open and honest – let’s make informed decisions (but not trust the UK to vote on the 
matter (Brexit sarcasm).’ (Mass Observer O4521) 
As this excerpt shows, MOP writing on openness and public dialogue around animal research 
also draws on other ongoing discourses, as demonstrated by the reference made to the 2016 
United Kingdom European Union membership referendum. This reflects how public 
understandings of animal research and their relationship to it as a scientific and 
governmentally regulated practice are both personal and political, they involve personal 
feelings towards the issue which are co-constituted by judgments of the political landscape 
in which it takes place. This means that in writing about the proposal of increased openness 
around animal research whilst distancing themselves from the ‘general public’, Mass 
Observers are also reflecting on the premise that such openness will set for the participation 
of other citizens.  
Methodologically, such references to ‘Brexit’ also illustrate the importance of the temporality 
in researching particular issues (Hobson-West et al., 2019), here underlining how scientific 
practices, particularly areas which remain controversial, are embedded in the wider politic 
and current notions of democracy. It is perhaps unsurprising that at a time when British 
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society was marred by distrust, situated both in a public body characterised as distrustful of 
the establishment (Hobolt, 2016) and in the distrust directed between ‘remain’ and ‘leave’ 
voters, that such constructions of the British public as irresponsible are mobilised in 
discussions on governmental and institutional openness and science-society relations. As the 
above excerpt suggests, mistrust towards the ‘elite’ or the ‘system’ can also manifest as 
mistrust between publics, as individuals work to distinguish themselves from those groups 
who cannot be trusted with democratic power.  
In regard to animal research, such management of this untrustworthy public body appears 
intimately linked to the issue’s history of activism and extremism, with the British public 
historically  characterised as a source of risk (Raman et al., 2018: 240). As the following Mass 
Observer (E5014) demonstrates, this irrational public is not only felt to be politically 
untrustworthy but is also potentially dangerous –  
‘The idea of openness seems laudable, however I have a fairly low opinion of the 
British public and don’t believe that they are capable of drawing rational conclusions 
on any subject (as demonstrated in the recent BREXIT result). I’m quite sure that the 
first sight of a cuddly animal being experimented on would result in acts of violence 
and intimidation against those working in animal experimentation.’ (Mass Observer 
E5014) 
The assumption made here is that with the British public unable to understand the scientific 
rationale of experimentation, seeing only ‘a cuddly animal being experimented on’, openness 
around animal research will lead to violence against laboratory staff. This echoes Welsh and 
Wynne’s (2013) claim that the 21st century’s intensifying focus on local and global risk has 
increasingly treated publics as politicised subjects requiring policing and surveillance. Under 
these norms, they argue that ‘[p]ublic obstruction of technoscience, identified as commercial 
innovation, is thus likely to be labelled as anti-science and as a security threat’ (Welsh and 
Wynne, 2013: 555). Similarly, Moore claims that contemporary transparency initiatives are 
disposed to ‘conceive of the public through the lens of trust, in terms of a problem to be 
solved rather than a co-participant in the creation of an open society’ (Moore, 2017: 427). 
Yet, the characterisation of protests against animal research expressed by the above Mass 
Observer (E5014) are particularly interesting when considering their following claim that –  
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‘any action that could raise the state of fear around animal welfare protest would be 
counterproductive, as those who would like to raise legitimate concerns would 
become afraid to do so for fear of being labelled as extremists. It could also possibly 
incur the wrath of the extremists for not being extreme enough.’ (Mass Observer 
E5014) 
If, as touched on here, some concerns around animal research are indeed legitimate, yet 
public contestation of animal research is characterised as irrational or imagined to be 
extremist, then it appears that this Mass Observer (E5014) feels such legitimacy is out of reach 
for the ‘general public’. Yet, without providing lay publics with opportunities to learn of and 
understand ongoing animal research practices their ability to voice concerns is limited. 
Perhaps such concerns reflect the historic characterisation of animal rights protestors in the 
mid-2000s UK as extremists (Munro, 2005; Mills, 2013; Yates, 2011) and a subsequent 
absence of ambivalence around the issue. Stepping back, what this again signifies is the 
positionality that Mass Observers occupy, writing from both within and without this notion of 
a ‘general public’ which permits them to make such observations. Though being ‘ordinary’ 
has been, and continues to be, crucial to the Mass Observer identity (Bloome, 1993), by their 
very presence on the MOP panel, Observers are already taking a step to identify as a group 
that witness, indeed, observe, and document ‘everyday life’. That is to say, Mass Observers 
constitute a particular public of their own and, therefore, taking on the role of Mass Observer 
is somewhat performative in distinguishing them from the ‘general’ population before they 
even ‘step foot in a Directive’ (Hobson-West et al., 2019). 
This section has demonstrated how Mass Observer enthusiasm towards the proposal of 
increased openness on animal research is tied up with notions of agency, hinging on the 
potential of knowledge gained through openness to enable laypeople in general to get 
politically, morally, economically, or rhetorically involved with the issue of animal research, 
what I have termed ‘empowering knowledge’. However, in constituting themselves as 
trustworthy with openness on animal research, some Mass Observers construct the ‘general 
public’ as irresponsible knowing subjects. In doing so, deference to expertise and political 
docility are at times reinforced as normative citizenly values. Such analyses emphasise the 
positionality of Mass Observers and also, apparent in the numerous sardonic references to 




This analysis of MOP writing demonstrates that individuals may take active responsibility for 
how they manage information on the topic of animal research. In taking this seriously, gaps 
of knowledge identified in public understandings of animal research are reframed through 
this analysis as not simply a failing of the education system, media, or publics themselves, but 
rather as sometimes reflective of deliberate epistemic and emotion management strategies.  
Section one demonstrated that the ways in which knowing about animal research can be 
unsettling, generating tension between one’s appreciation for the medical benefits that 
animal research is understood to produce and one’s ethical views on the acceptable 
treatment of non-human animals. Interspecies care relations are crucial to why many Mass 
Observers find animal research uncomfortable to discuss, with their ambivalence towards the 
scientific use of animals seen to unsettle their moral identity and values.  
In exploring how Mass Observers manage the discomfort generated by the issue of animal 
research, section two looked at the role of not-knowing as a way of sheltering from disturbing 
information. In their discussions of not only what they know or do not know about animal 
research but also why this is so, Mass Observers reveal the functionality of practices of not-
knowing, in providing protection from morally and emotionally unsettling information and 
creating room for ambivalence. Such deliberate avoidance of the topic of animal research 
raises larger questions about the ways in which science-society relations play out in this 
domain and the role that publics are currently able to perform within these, as witnesses of 
openness or vessels of knowledge and opinion (Hobson-West, 2010). As writing from the MOP 
indicates, the occurrence of ‘public ignorance’ around animal research is not simply a problem 
to be corrected through approaches which explain the regulatory framework, the science, or 
the outcomes such experiments are expected to provide. Indeed,  as Evans and Durant (1995) 
have shown, greater scientific understanding does not necessarily raise support for scientific 
research and this link is particularly fraught in relation to controversial areas of research. 
Rather, the writings of Mass Observers who struggle with the expectation that they should 
know about animal research problematise the notion that knowledge acquisition is inherently 
positive.   
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On the other hand, the final section of this chapter considered those Mass Observers who 
articulated support of further openness on animal research. In expressing enthusiasm for 
increased openness, the writings of these Mass Observers emphasise the significance of the 
role of agency and being able to act on what one comes to know in everyday life, without 
which knowing can become futile and problematic. Openness should therefore offer 
individuals a participatory route, enabling them to intervene in the practice of animal 
research at some level. Alongside this, in envisioning beneficial ways of knowing about animal 
research, some Observers identified risks that such openness might generate, constructing an 
irresponsible ‘general public’ who could not be trusted to know and act and, in doing so, 
constituting themselves as good citizens. In this way, the chapter has highlighted how Mass 
Observers vacillate between responding from ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the public imaginary.  
Stepping back, the empirical analysis presented in this chapter develops previous studies of 
views or understandings of animal research by providing insights into how epistemological 
relations with animal research play out, in doing so, highlighting the presence of ambivalence 
in relations with animal research, rather than polarised dualisms of acceptance or opposition, 
openness or secrecy. Such an analysis signifies that challenge of deficit-model assumptions 
about ‘lay’ or ‘public’ knowledge on animal research does not need to be grounded in 
affirming what individuals do know about the issue, but rather, can underscore the prudence 
behind choices not to know given current limits on what can be done with such knowledge.  
Furthermore, in illustrating the entanglement of knowing and caring, this data analysis raises 
broader questions around the obligations that institutions have to care for laypeople and their 
capacity to manage knowledge which may be distressing. This is not to suggest that public 
communication on sensitive topics such as animal research should necessarily be limited, but 
instead to emphasise that such communication must be mediated by care for its audience, 
who may be upset by such information precisely because they care about the topic. Simply 
making information available to citizens without consideration of the resources they have to 
process and action such knowledge may therefore force interested or caring publics to turn 
away from the issue. As Hobson-West and Davies (2017) have shown, animal research 
regulation is informed by societal concerns, and the local ethical review process not only 
considers the effect of experimental procedures on animals but also on the human 
community outside of the laboratory. One might therefore argue that how openness around 
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animal research is enacted should also be subject to similar consideration. This point will be 
returned to in Chapter Eight (see subsection 8.3.2), but, for now, the next chapter will more 























6. Data Chapter Two: Caring and not-caring about animal research 
6.1 Introduction 
As covered in the literature review (see the end of subsection 2.3.4), the practice of care 
within animal research environments is subject to growing interest from both academics 
studying multispecies relations within these spaces (Holmberg, 2011; Greenhough and Roe, 
2011; 2018b; a; Friese and Latimer, 2019) and stakeholder organisations, such as the NC3Rs 
(Brown, 2014), who seek to cultivate caring research environments and facilitate the 
circulation of ongoing institutional care practices. In seeking to explore the role of care in how 
those outside the laboratory relate to animal research,  this chapter will analyse the role of 
care in MOP writing on animal research.  
In exploring the theme of care, this chapter is laid out into three sections covering not caring 
about animal research, caring through animal research, and caring about animal research. 
This triad has been chosen to structure the data analysis in order to reflect how animal 
research fits into the traditional caring for/caring about dualism (Silk, 1998; Smith, 1998; 
Milligan and Wiles, 2010; Barnett and Land, 2007). Firstly, as a socio-ethical issue, animal 
research can be cared about or not and, for some Mass Observers, animal research was 
described as a low priority and not actively cared about, with other issues being identified as 
more deserving of care. Secondly, in caring about the health and wellbeing of others, animal 
research may, for some, present an opportunity to indirectly care for, with the practice being 
seen as a process through which to channel care. Further, in examining how animal research 
can be cared through, this second section will end with a focus on those who are implicated 
within this process not as objects of care but as conduits who enable care to be directed 
towards others. Finally, animal research and the actors it involves can be cared about as 
objects of care themselves, with both the wellbeing of laboratory animals and laboratory staff 
being explored as important considerations in MOP writing. Rather than affirming a 
straightforward prioritisation of human needs over animals, this analysis illustrates how the 
categories of ‘human’ and ‘animal’ are not always determining factors when considering who 




6.2 Not caring about animal research 
In thinking about the role of care in how Mass Observers understand animal research, it is 
first important to recognise that, for some Mass Observers, animal research was not 
identified as an issue that they particularly care about. Capturing this articulated disinterest 
towards the topic is a significant benefit of using the MOP, with the shared process of Mass 
Observation being open to critique from Mass Observers as to what ‘proper’ Mass 
Observation work involves, i.e. which topics and what kinds of answers are appropriate 
(Sheridan, 1993; Kramer, 2014). Enabling the expression of indifference to the topic of animal 
research is methodologically valuable because it reveals how the issue is culturally situated 
amongst other socio-political issues that demand care in the ‘everyday’. Therefore, as the 
following subsection will examine, for some Mass Observers animal research was deemed as 
less important than other issues.  
6.2.1 Not a priority 
For some Mass Observers, animal research was considered to be of less important than a host 
of other causes which warranted their care. As implied by the following Observer’s admission 
that animal research is a ‘low priority’ issue for them personally, animal research as an object 
of care is one situated amongst many other socio-political issues –   
‘I am afraid that on the scale of issues, this is a low priority one for me. I am involved 
in so many issues to do with justice and human rights for people that I feel to be too 
preoccupied with this would be a kind of luxury when human tragedy is all aroube 
allowed tond us. Having said that, however, I do believe that a society which is civilised 
in its treatment of animals is also more likely to be civilised in its treatment of people, 
so I am aware that these things are not separate entirely.’ (Mass Observer S4743) 
In this case, caring about animal research is weighed against caring about what are deemed 
to be exclusively ‘human tragedies [sic]’. When located within such a landscape, this Mass 
Observer regards attention spent on animal research as ‘a kind of a luxury’. In making a 
distinction between which issues demand care and which are of less consequence, it appears 
that this Mass Observer draws on species boundaries. However, this separation between 
humans and other animals is then troubled, as the Mass Observer (S4743) then remarks that 
social norms around the treatment of animals also influence treatment of humans.   
122 
 
Species as a boundary of care towards animal research is suggested in another Mass 
Observer’s account, as they write – 
‘At the end of the day I do feel for any animals that suffer in the service of humanity, 
but there are a lot of issues in the world that I think are more pressing. And let’s face 
it, we didn’t get to be top dog on this planet by being nice to other species (or our 
own) – nor are animals, as a rule, nice to each other.  
I just hope our scientific understanding and control over the natural world can 
advance to a point where survival does not demand that we make moral 
compromises.’ (Mass Observer T5672) 
Here, the exceptionality of humans is regarded as having been achieved through the struggle 
for survival that all animals engage in, with the biomedical use of animals reflective of a 
natural, evolutionary fight for dominance. When taken as representative of this species 
struggle for survival, animal research is therefore viewed as a low priority matter, with ‘a lot 
of issues in the world’ considered ‘more pressing’. Such species divisions work to justify caring 
for one’s ‘own kind’, however as the second line in the excerpt above expresses, it is hoped 
that scientific endeavours for human survival do not entail ‘moral compromise [sic]’; there 
are ethical limits to species survival.   
However, as the following Mass Observer illustrates, even amongst Observers whose care 
priorities were not bound by ties to one’s own species and, indeed, expressly cared about 
‘animal issues’, some still felt animal research to be relatively unimportant – 
‘There are other pressing matters related to animal cruelty that I find myself far more 
concerned about, such as dog fighting, irresponsible and unmonitored breeding, over-
breeding, neglect and abuse.’ (Mass Observer R5647) 
The ‘pressing matters related to animal cruelty’ identified by this Mass Observer detail a 
particular focus on dogs and their treatment and management as companion animals. The 
practices mentioned here as of particular personal concern may reflect the physical and 
affective proximity that certain species share with humans and the special sociocultural status 
they occupy. Now existing largely as ‘companion species’, Haraway (2003) emphasises the 
intricate evolutionary intertwining of dogs and humans ‘who shape each other throughout 
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the still ongoing story of co-evolution’ (Haraway, 2003: 29). Moreover, Charles’ (2016) 
analysis of MOP responses to a Directive on kinship between humans and other animals 
demonstrates that Observers’ ‘kinship practices construct a world where dogs and humans 
are part of the same social group’ (Charles, 2016: 10). Such species often live intimately 
amongst us and do so in ways which unsettle traditional notions of ‘family’ and, therefore, it 
is perhaps understandable that issues relating specifically to dogs are prioritised above other 
‘animal cruelty’ issues. However, as will be explored later in this chapter, for other Mass 
Observers, relationships shared with companion animals can also act as a catalyst to caring 
about animal research.  
That, for some Mass Observers, species might present a barrier to caring about animal 
research supports the argument that where one directs their care is never neutral or 
unproblematic. One cannot care about everything, because, as stated earlier, caring about 
requires understanding and responding to the particular situation and needs of that which or 
whom such care is directed towards. Therefore, where one directs their care is necessarily 
limited and always involves exclusions. To direct one’s ‘care-full’ attention (van Dooren, 2014) 
in a particular direction must mean there are sites and subjects left unattended to as a 
consequence. As Puig de la Bellacasa (2012) puts it, ‘where there is relation there has to be 
care, but our cares also perform disconnection. We cannot possibly care for everything, not 
everything can count in a world, not everything is relevant in a world – there is no life without 
some kind of death’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2012: 204).  
Given the necessary confines of care, the use of species distinctions as a guide for caring that 
might construct animal research as a trivial or superfluous issue to care about reflects wider 
sociocultural values around who deserves our limited care. In the case of caring about animal 
research, then, anthropocentric discourses which shape many areas of our social worlds and, 
indeed, are foundational to the biomedical use of animals, may make one’s caring attention 
towards laboratory animals questionable when such effort could instead be directed towards 
humans. Though, of course, animal research involves and impacts myriad multispecies bodies, 
as discussed in the previous chapter in terms of knowing, caring about issues which are often 
defined as chiefly ‘animal’ within anthropocentric contexts may be subject to particular 
scrutiny. As Peggs (2009) describes of ‘Human Primacy Identity Politics’, ‘a human sense of 
advanced human morality confirms human notions of the pre-eminence of human needs’ 
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(Peggs, 2009: 96). Acknowledging the many care relationships that individuals are, intimately, 
locally, and globally, part of necessitates that certain groups and sites are, at times, left 
unattended to and deprioritised. Hence, given how animal research is embedded within a 
culture of using animals for human interests, it is understandable that, for some, the issue 
does not resonate as something they care about.  
Although there was by no means a majority of Mass Observers who expressed a lack of 
interest or care towards animal research, such disconnections with the issue are significant 
to acknowledge as they reveal how the practice is culturally situated amongst other socio-
political issues and regarded in the ‘everyday’. Furthermore, that caring about animal 
research is seen by some as a low priority or a luxury emphasises the work that is required in 
order to care. The emotional energy that caring requires is indicated in the following 
Observer’s discussion of why they feel ‘curiously indifferent to the suffering caused by animal 
research’ –  
‘I never consider scientific research when I buy products. I don’t like thinking of any 
animal being distressed. But I know that products must be tested. I feel curiously 
indifferent to the suffering caused by research. There is so much pain and unhappiness 
in the world. I’m aware of it but take the lazy option of not letting it bog down my 
daily life. I can’t afford to take on the pain and despair of every living thing. If I did that 
I’d be a tortured mess.’ (Mass Observer E5551) 
The way in which caring about issues such as animal research is described by this Observer, 
as something which can ‘bog down [sic] daily life’ if allowed to do so, illustrates the affective 
labour such attentiveness requires. Caring is here conceptualised as necessitating that one 
must ‘take on the pain and despair’ of others, and as this Mass Observer (E5551) expresses, 
such relating is seen to take an emotional toll. Characterising their indifference to the 
experiences of animals in research as ‘the lazy option’ signals that caring is not merely 
attitudinal, but requires energy expenditure and can be draining, as Puig de la Bellacasa puts 
it, ‘too much caring can asphyxiate the carer and the cared for’ (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2012: 
212). This feeling may be particularly acute when considering, as suggested above, that ‘every 
living thing’ might warrant such care. Again, this deliberate withdrawal of care towards 
certain issues emphasises their location amongst other causes for concern. Indeed, a similar 
turning away was observed in Macnaghten’s (2003) study of responses to environmental 
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concerns which suggested that ‘reflexive strategies of non-engagement with ‘the big picture’ 
– a term which embraced global environmental issues alongside other global issues such as 
poverty, aids, debt, ‘the future’, and so on – reflect the ways in which such issues tend to be 
grouped together as ‘negative issues’ where personal engagement is felt as likely to be both 
inconsequential and personally damaging’ (Macnaghten, 2003: 78). Given this understanding 
of what is involved in caring, as a process which demands that one considers and attends to 
the suffering of others, caring carries risks and, thus, there is a need to preserve one’s own 
wellbeing and care for oneself.  
In summary, such writing around not caring about animal research or not caring about it as 
much as other socio-political and ethical issues highlights the necessary partiality of care, how 
it is limited and actively employed in some directions and withdrawn from others. To 
recognise that some Mass Observers feel this way is not to depict them as failing to act 
ethically or failing to recognise the importance of the issue. Rather, this analysis suggests that 
animal research is situated within wider landscapes of care, in which it may at times be felt 
as important or unimportant.   
6.3 Caring through animal research  
Another way in which care was prominent in the MOP writings was in the construction of 
animal research as a way of channelling care, as a process which enables indirect caring for 
others that one cares about, and as an issue which instigates care towards particular others. 
These others are both human and non-human, near and far, in the present and the future. 
However, the presence of care does not negate the moral problem of animal research. 
Indeed, as the following section touches on, tensions around unequal distributions of care 
and whose care is prioritised, can work to exacerbate the emotional toll of engaging with the 
topic of animal research.  
6.3.1 Caring about the self 
As this section aims to demonstrate, analysis of MOP writing reveals how Mass Observers 
may conceive of animal research as a way to care for the self and one’s own healthcare needs 
in the present or an imagined future. However, it is first important to account for those who 
expressed that feeling too close to animal research could conversely act as an obstacle to 
caring about the issue. Often, this tension was articulated through experiences of ill health 
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and reliance on medical treatments arising from experimental uses of animals, whether 
writing about one’s individual need, that of their loved ones, or of an imagined future in which 
either may come to need such interventions. Feeling somewhat dependent on animal 
research in this way meant that the Directive was a challenging topic for some, as the 
following Mass Observer discusses – 
‘This is such a difficult topic for me! l know that as a cancer patient for the last 11 years 
my treatments will probably, highly probably, been tested on animals and I love 
animals and believe that as creatures of the world they have a right to a good and free 
life.  
[…] 
My views have changed, perhaps because of my condition and perhaps because my 
husband wants me to live longer. I try not to think too much about this when I have 
my chemotherapy.’ (Mass Observer A4820) 
As the above writing suggests, animal research may prove a particularly difficult topic to 
engage with when writing from the position of a current (or future) patient.  Connecting their 
views about the treatment of non-human animals, their reliance on medical interventions as 
a cancer patient, and their husband’s investment in their health and longevity, this Mass 
Observer highlights how multiple subjects are implicated in one’s caring about animal 
research. This example demonstrates how feelings of dependence on or complicity in the use 
of animals in research can make knowing and caring about animal research distressing, 
generating tensions between one’s care priorities and unsettling hierarchies of whose care 
comes first.   
A similar sentiment was expressed in another Mass Observer’s discussion of their dependence 
on insulin and the experimentation with dogs involved in its creation – 
‘Unfortunately, I am having to take commercial medicines daily to stay alive. I need 
insulin twice a day besides other medications. I do know the story of how insulin came 
about. It breaks my heart having to take this medication as I often think as to how 
many dogs were sacrificed and in severe pain , in order that this medicine be created.’ 
(Mass Observer H1470) 
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Similar to the previous Mass Observer’s (A4820) discussion of their dependence on 
treatments derived through animal use as a cancer patient, this Mass Observer expresses a 
sense of regret towards their continual use of insulin. Importantly, this Observer’s feelings 
towards their insulin use suggests that the emotional distress caused by the use of animals in 
developing medicines is not necessarily lessened if said animal use was in the ‘past’. Rather, 
the initial use of animals in research and development of a medicine that one is now reliant 
on can still be meaningful to those who care about animals, with certain species, such as dogs 
in this case, arguably having particular emotional resonance.  
Additionally, being reliant on medications at the time of writing might not only make thinking 
about animal research uncomfortable, but in periods of acute or longstanding illness, one may 
find it difficult to even consider their relation to the practice beyond an individual need for 
effective medical treatment. As can be inferred from the following Mass Observer, in such 
times of ill health, broader thinking around medical consumption and animal research may 
be out of reach –   
‘It is not fair that some diseases get more research funding than others. It is not fair 
when medicines and treatments exist but people cannot afford to have them because 
companies want to make a profit as well as support research and development. But it 
is not a perfect world. All I want when I buy medicine is to feel better. If you want me 
to think more widely, ask me when I'm not ill!’ (Mass Observer M5113) 
As captured here, broader concerns than simply the need for medical treatment when ill are 
raised by this Mass Observer (M5113) as they highlight the lack of fairness around funding 
priorities in biomedical research and the accessibility of medical treatments. However, such 
concerns are drawn back to the principal interest in the role of medicines to make one feel 
better when ill. Significant here is the implied difficulty to care about others when one needs 
to be cared for themselves, echoing Smith’s (1998) characterisation of disadvantaged groups 
who might be ‘too preoccupied with feeling the need for care, or with the difficulty of 
providing it, to think of much else’ (Smith, 1998: 16). Indeed, such responses also emphasise 
the significance of timing when asking questions which touch on health and illness. Given the 
shifting ways that individuals relate to their state of health or illness, it is important to 
recognise that solicitations of writing on animal research may come at moments when 
engagements with the topic feel unmanageable. As said, at such times, the urgency of 
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addressing one’s own care needs may be felt as obstructing wider thinking and, in turn, 
requests to engage with the topic of animal research and the moral and emotional burden it 
can pose may be experienced as inappropriate for those feeling acutely entangled with the 
practice. 
6.3.2 Caring about family 
Yet, as mentioned, current dependencies on medical treatments and the role that animal 
research is seen to play in providing them were not the only ways in which Mass Observers 
related with animal research through healthcare. Future imaginaries which may hold illness 
for oneself or one’s loved ones, particularly those for whom we are explicitly obliged to care, 
such as children, were also important in shaping who can be cared about in relation to animal 
research. The conflicts that caring for oneself and one’s loved ones through the use of animals 
in biomedical research can generate are demonstrated in the hypothetical scenarios 
pondered by the following two Mass Observers – 
‘As for which animals should be used or not used in research purposes then none 
should be used would be the ultimate aim, but then how would new drugs be tested 
and introduced to society. Not an area I have thought about, it is difficult if a loved 
one or I became very ill and no drug was available or a new on may be being developed 
then testing would certainly be considered however should animals be tested on, no 
oh what a dilemma. Feel I am not being useful in this topic.’ (Mass Observer C4988) 
~ 
‘If either of my children were ill, would I want them to accept a treatment that had 
been developed using animal tests, no matter how terrible the tests were? Yes, of 
course. I would do anything to protect my family.’ (Mass Observer T5672) 
In the scenarios posed by both Mass Observers here, their ethical stances on animal research 
are assessed by what the latter Observer (T5672) calls an ‘acid test question’ which 
theoretically asks if one would approve the use of medical treatments derived from animal 
research if they or their loved ones became ill. The hypothetical and future-oriented nature 
of such relating to animal research reflects that rather than being a static and complete socio-
ethical issue for deliberation, biomedical research and the possibilities of medical 
intervention imbued within it may be viewed as a project whose ethics and merits cannot be 
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confined to and judged only in the present moment. In caring not only for one’s own health 
and wellbeing but also for loved ones, it may be that using animals for biomedical research 
offers a sense of health security for potential futures and thus any resistance to this may be 
seen as undermining one’s caring responsibilities. In this way, the ethical problem posed by 
the (mis)treatment of animals in biomedical research is pitted against the (mis)treatment of 
loved ones if such research or the resources it generates for patients were to be opposed. 
Animal research thus becomes a way to defend oneself and loved ones against the threat of 
illness, as implied by the latter Observer’s (T5672) statement: ‘I would do anything to protect 
my family’.  
Although such interpretations of whose care comes first seem to centre on the pre-eminence 
of human needs over those of non-human animals, key to the above Mass Observers’ 
priorities towards animal research are familial bonds. The ways in which we relate to animal 
research are not merely situated in Ryder’s (2000 [1970]) concept of ‘speciesism’, i.e. the 
prioritisation of the interests of our species before all others, they are enmeshed within 
relationships which are interpersonal rather than simply genetic. In making sense of animal 
research and those implicated within it, Mass Observers often draw on their prominent and 
intimate care relations. Such partiality displayed towards particular individuals and groups is 
arguably necessary for sustaining intimate relationships. As Friedman (1991)  discusses, ‘I 
favor my children, my friends, and so on, because such favoring expresses the love I feel for 
them, promotes their well-being which is of special concern to me (and, in some cases, is also 
my responsibility), differentiates my close relationships from relationships to people whom I 
do not particularly love and respects the uniqueness of those I love by the specifically 
appropriate responsiveness which I show to them’ (Friedman, 1991: 819-820). In this way, 
she argues that if ‘personal relationships are necessary for integrity and fulfillment in life, 
then, to that extent, partiality is instrumentally required as a means to achieving those 
morally valuable ends’ (ibid, 820).  
This assumed partiality to family members before unknown, distant, or indeed, different 
others, features often in the rhetoric of animal research advocacy organisations. In pitting the 
lives of family members, particularly children, against the lives of laboratory animals, 
particularly rodents, such groups construct the choice that publics have to make on the 
matter as one of either/or and life/death. This is captured succinctly in a billboard campaign 
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by US-based biomedical research advocacy organisation The Foundation for Biomedical 
Research (FBR) which juxtaposed an image of a white rat, symbolic of the laboratory, with 
that of a young girl and asked passers-by ‘Who would you rat/her see live?’ (see Harrison, 
2011). Although certain care relations are legally obligated, as in the case of children, 
Friedman adds an important qualification to the righteousness of partiality as she contends 
that the moral justification of partiality expressed in close relationships can only be assessed 
by the moral worth of those particular relationships themselves (Friedman, 1991: 820). In 
other words, not all close relationships are morally or even interpersonally good. 
Furthermore, although partiality towards certain others might seem common-sense given the 
need to distinguish some relationships as special or intimate, when thinking about how we 
should care and who we should care for and about, such partiality can become questionable. 
In discussing the dichotomy made in animal research dialogues between caring about family 
members and animals, one Mass Observer flipped the argument in order to draw attention 
to the perspective of the ‘other’ who is sacrificed for the sake of ourselves or our loved ones 
in such scenarios – 
‘When discussing situations such as this, a person will often say “if it was you or one 
of your family that needed a cure, you’d be in favour of testing on animals.” To which 
I reply, “if you, or one of your loved ones, was kidnapped and tortured or murdered 
for the purpose of medical research that helped a stranger, would you feel it was 
justified?”’ (Mass Observer N5744) 
By questioning the assumed duty to care for oneself and family before and over others, this 
Mass Observer (N5744) appears to be encouraging a sense of empathy for those whose lives 
are offered up through such reasoning. By inverting the hypothetical scenario posed here to 
test if such reasoning holds if it were the individual themselves or one of their loved ones 
being sacrificed for the good of a stranger, being the provider rather than receiver of such 
life-saving potential, it seems this Observer is attempting to question the ethical nature of the 
dilemmas at the core of such arguments. Shifting the focus from commitments to close 
relationships and instead positioning ourselves and loved ones at the point of sacrifice helps 
to reveal the vulnerabilities that connect all those who can suffer and die.  
Such partiality to one’s ‘own’ can only go so far and, as the above Mass Observer (N5744) 
suggests, at a certain point conflicts with other normative claims around care within which 
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the existence of systemic care for unknown others, e.g. the welfare state, is inscribed. As 
Tronto (2012) discusses of global ethics, ‘everyone is not responsible for everyone else’s care. 
But in any society, decisions about who cares for whom, how, and why, underpin the way the 
society or social system is organized’ (Tronto, 2012: 309). Similarly critical of simplistic 
conceptualisations of care as based in partiality, Barnett and Land (2007) contend that the 
‘idea that care’s value lies only in the intense familiarity of circumscribed personal 
relationships is not sustainable once we recognize the degree to which any caring practice 
depends on mediating practices, relations of professional competency, and various 
institutional and material infrastructures’ (Barnett and Land, 2007: 4). In other words, the 
care networks which include those whom we actively care for and about intimately hinge on 
relations with others whom we will never meet. Because such relations matter morally, this 
analysis shows that caring through animal research is not unproblematic and prioritisations 
of care for one’s nearest and dearest at the expense of distant and different others are not 
necessarily harmonious.  
6.3.3 Caring about kin 
However, such close relationships are themselves not necessarily drawn according to species 
boundaries. The practice of keeping animals as pets in Britain is not new, nor are the intimate 
human-animal bonds we now often expect to accompany such interspecies relationships (see 
Thomas, 1983 [1933]). There is much research documenting the intimacy and legitimacy of 
relations between humans and their companion species (see Cudworth, 2011; Fudge, 2014) 
and, as Charles (2014; 2016; 2017) claims, writings from the MOP also confirm the importance 
of relationships with non-human animals. Therefore, for some Mass Observers, their intimate 
social circle includes non-human animals, who, though accepted as different to humans, 
constitute a valuable member of one’s family, kinship, or friendship group (Charles, 2016). 
Indeed, Charles (2014) suggests that such MOP accounts demonstrate that ‘relationships with 
animals were valued not only because animals were ‘almost human’ but also because they 
were not’ (Charles, 2014: 725).  
As mentioned in the literature review, the experience of pet-keeping has also been examined 
as a factor influencing views towards animal research (Hepper and Wells, 1997; Hagelin et al., 
2002). However, such studies focus on how pet-ownership impacts levels of acceptance or 
opposition to animal research, rather than considering how relationships shared with 
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companion animals might shape understandings of biomedical animal use and care practices 
across species boundaries. Yet, this analysis of MOP writing reveals that relationships with 
particular non-human animals play an important role in defining care obligations, extending 
care outwards from an individual animal to other unknown species members. In this way, as 
the following Mass Observer (H2639) discusses, traditional companion species such as cats 
and dogs are often felt to be unacceptable experimental subjects, particularly when 
compared with traditional laboratory animals such as mice and rats – 
‘I have always loved cats and so did my father so we always seemed to have pet cats 
when I was young, and several years after I married our daughter and myself finally 
won my husband over into becoming the owner of cats, needless to say after several 
months of living with them he became a real "softie" with them and loved having them 
around. 
This is why I would be horrified to think a beloved cat was being experimented on in 
the name of Medicine, and the same applies to dogs. I would hope that Research 
Scientists would be able to test prospective Medicines in some other way and not on 
animals. Many years ago I read an article which told me how scientists had discovered 
Insulin which helped Diabetics, by experimenting on dogs. I thought this was awful, 
however when I weighed up the effect of Insulin and how it had saved so many Human 
lives. People who had gone on to lead productive lives, even perhaps becoming 
Doctors or Researchers themselves perhaps it could be justified. I must also confess 
that using Rats or Mice for experiments does not seem so bad as other animals 
because these creatures have always been thought of as vermin who actually brought 
diseases.’ (Mass Observer H2639)  
In their discussion of the species used in experiments, this Mass Observer (H2639) writes of 
their long love for cats, having ‘pet cats when [sic] young’ and later convincing their husband 
to share their house with cats. Due to this, the Observer writes that they ‘would be horrified 
to think a beloved cat was being experimented on in the name of Medicine, and the same 
applies to dogs’, with dogs likely included here due to their common grouping with cats as 
companion species. However, the special connection identified with such species is placed in 
tension with the biomedical value of dogs as scientific models, here captured in the example 
given of experiments leading to the development of insulin, an outcome this Observer deems 
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may justify the use of dogs due to the number of human lives saved and the potentiality those 
human lives possess, ‘perhaps becoming Doctors or Researchers themselves’. In this way, the 
biomedical use of dogs becomes a way to care for other humans.  
By their common status as ‘vermin’ and carriers of disease, rats and mice are contrasted 
against dogs and cats. Through powerful historical framings of rodents, particularly rats, as 
harmful to humans, being dirty and overpopulous (Knight et al., 2000), such species often 
become excluded from interspecies care networks. As suggested by the above Observer’s 
(H2639) comment that rats and mice ‘have always been thought of as vermin who actually 
brought diseases’, the association of such species with zoonotic disease transmission lends 
itself to the notion that such animals deserve ill treatment; they do not enact care for us, so 
we shall not care for them. Yet, rather than simply demonstrating cultural hierarchies of 
animal species and human superiority or exceptionalism, as denoted in Arluke and Sanders’ 
(1996) concept of a ‘sociozoological scale’, expressions of care for certain species over others 
also emphasise the importance of experiencing affectual relationships with individual non-
human animals. For instance, although cats and dogs are the species most often mentioned 
in MOP writing on animal research as being loved or special in some way, the following Mass 
Observer (D4736) reflects that those who keep mice and rats as pets may also feel a special 
affinity with these traditionally unloved species –  
‘Are there some species of animals that shouldn’t be used for research? I think cats 
and dogs are exceptional companions for mankind and I would draw the line there 
because of the unique relationship we have with them. It is hard to do that though, 
people keep mice and rats as pets and would probably say the same.’ (Mass Observer 
D4736) 
In considering that people who keep mice and rats as pets might categorise such species as 
‘exceptional companions for mankind’, this Observer (D4736) finds drawing boundaries 
around which species of non-human animal are acceptable for biomedical research ‘hard to 
do’, with the value of animals as companions and the moral status this imbues them with 
being relational. Thus although some may regard rodents as outside of the special bond that 
humans are seen to share with cats and dogs, others may feel differently. Indeed, some 
ethicists have argued that it is precisely this ability that is essential to the construction of a 
moral community. For example, looking at levels of community through the concept of 
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‘solidarity’, Mason (2000) shows how ‘members must give each other’s interests some non‐
instrumental weight in their practical reasoning’ (Mason, 2000: 27). In short, through this lens, 
‘ethics’ becomes a communal exercise. To return to the data analysis of the MOP writings, 
this suggests that enacting care also involves accounting for the interests and relations of 
others in one’s community.  
Furthermore, as Charles (2014) identified in MOP writing on the topic of ‘Humans and 
animals’, the writing of some Mass Observers suggests that ‘relationships with animals can 
be experienced as providing more stability and consistency than those with human family 
members but also that they are deeply embedded in family relations and are often 
understood in terms of kinship’ (Charles, 2014: 726). That non-human animals may be 
included in some Mass Observers’ sense of family or kin is significant in considering their 
views on animal research, with such relationships signifying how caring about those who are 
tied up in and with the practice, from the breeding of experimental animals, the experimental 
process, to the expected outcome for patients and publics, is not strictly determined by 
species barriers. In this way, communities that are relevant to understandings of animal 
research both directly and indirectly encompass the more-than-human. 
6.3.4 Conduits of care 
So far, this section has deliberated on how animal research is understood in relation to caring 
about multiple others. This subsection will focus specifically on the beings who are 
constituted as enabling such care to be provided, being implicated only as a means to care for 
others by their own exclusion from networks of care.  
As touched on earlier, in writing about animals used in biomedical research Mass Observers 
often make distinctions between species, drawing varyingly on notions of cultural status, 
sentience, scientific efficacy and translatability, and experiences of intersubjective 
interspecies relationships. Drawing on such resources appears to enable the formation of 
boundaries around which bodies are ethically and scientifically acceptable for experimental 
use and which are not. At first sight, it would be possible to conclude that such an analysis 
points to an absence of care for certain beings. However, as this subsection will aim to show, 
an alternative reading is that certain beings are constituted as conduits of care, channelling 
the care they receive into caring ends for others. In this way, such entities can be seen as 
disconnected from care themselves, their bodies instead representing an instrument in 
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meeting the care needs of others. For example, writing as part of a wider human collective, 
this Mass Observer identifies distinctions made between certain species and finds that rats 
and mice are most societally acceptable for scientific use – 
‘I think what you may find is that most folk would have no objection to researching on 
rats as they are classed as vermin + seem dispensable. But we are rather uneasy when 
it' a monkey (as they are not so different from us) or dogs (as we class them as pets). 
In the end most humans think of themselves at the top of a hierarchy + those at the 
bottom end (rats, mice) are fair game for research. I think it's our survival instinct 
kicking in.’ (Mass Observer W3730) 
This Observer (W3730) suggests that rats and mice are ‘fair game for research’ due to the 
case being that ‘most folk have no objection to researching on rats as they are classed as 
vermin + seem dispensable’. On the other hand, the scientific use of dogs or monkeys is 
regarded as generating discomfort due to the proximity such species share with humans as 
companion animals and as close genetic ancestors. In such hierarchical framings of the animal 
world, rats and mice are deemed low-ranking. Being culturally and legally defined as ‘pests’, 
treated as intruders in both agricultural and urban spaces occupied by humans or their assets, 
such species have long been a part of a process of, in Haraway’s (2008a) words, ‘making 
killable’.  
However, as alluded to above, in the case of animal research, we can go further with this 
analysis to think about how the use of one species enables the care of others. This is because 
making laboratory animals killable is entwined with a process of ‘potentializing’ (Svendsen 
and Koch, 2013). For these animals, death bestows the potential to become something else, 
a final transformation into scientific object, through which their bodies are infused with hope 
for biomedical progress and the alleviation of human suffering. As the MOP writings discussed 
in this chapter reflect, thinking and writing about laboratory animals is often bound up with 
experiences and expectations of human health and illness and within such framings 
laboratory animals become symbolic of recovery and cure. In this way, disconnections of care, 
such as a lesser concern for mice and rats, may actually enable publics to care for other 
humans. Not caring or caring less for some means that care can be practiced for others. 
136 
 
Another concept we can utilise to make sense of this complex relationship between animal 
use and human benefit is  Ginn et al.’s (2014) use of the ethic of ‘flourishing’, a tenet ‘which 
enshrines life’s emergence and the prospects or conditions for life’s emergence as the good 
to be upheld or nurtured’ (Ginn et al., 2014: 114). They contend that ‘[f]lourishing always 
involves a constitutive violence; flourishing does not imply an ‘anything goes’ free-for-all, but 
requires that some collectives prosper at the expense of others’ (ibid, 115). This helps us make 
sense of the finding that, for some Mass Observers, human survival is seen to justify the use 
of certain species in scientific experiments.  
In summary, caring about laboratory species (or not) is a process deeply entangled with caring 
about other humans. Indeed, such an argument is sometimes made by stakeholders in 
support of animal research. For instance, as physiologist Nicoll (1991) puts it, ‘we not only 
have a need and a right to protect ourselves from harm, but we also have an obligation to use 
all resources available to prevent or cure diseases and relieve suffering in humans and 
animals’ (Nicoll, 1991: 308). More recently, UAR have made similar arguments around the 
topic of the COVID-19 pandemic, stating that the widespread suffering caused by the 
coronavirus and the need for animal models to tackle it show ‘that those attempting to falsely 
discredit animal models are serving a principle of never using animals over the ethical choice 
of saving millions of lives’ (Magee, 2020). Such arguments have also been made outside of 
the scientific community, for instance, bioethicist Harris (2005) has claimed that animal 
research is required by the ‘powerful duty of beneficence, our basic moral obligation to help 
other people in need’ (Harris, 2005: 242). As they explain, ‘[m]ost, if not all diseases create 
needs, in those who are affected, and in their relatives, friends, and carers and indeed in 
society. Because medical research is a necessary component of relieving that need in many 
circumstances, furthering medical research becomes a moral obligation’ (ibid). 
However, it is not only certain species of non-human animal who are deemed by some as less 
deserving of moral consideration in relation to biomedical research. Human populations are 
also sometimes suggested as more appropriate experimental subjects, as in the case of prison 
inmates. People in prison, defined by their incarceration, are sometimes mentioned in public 
dialogues around animal research as a more ethical alternative to using animals for research 
purposes due to their characterisation as deviant in contrast to the innocence of animals. The 
circulation of this argument is reflected in commentary by stakeholders in animal research, 
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such as an article by UAR entitled ‘Why Testing on Prisoners is a Bad Idea’ (Holder, 2015a), 
which refers to the recurrence of such themes in comment sections to online articles and 
videos on animal research. Such narratives around the ethics of animal research are important 
to address as they highlight the fragility and contingency of the very categories of ‘human’ 
and ‘animal’. As shown throughout this section, such identities are not a given. Rather, they 
are power-laden and do not provide a straightforward reflection of care allegiances.  
Though deeply problematic, notions of ‘deservingness’ in the context of animal research 
reveal a critique of the ways in which animals are used across society and the normative 
frameworks which construct their use as natural. Furthermore, through suggestions of using 
prisoners who are sometimes seen as particularly ‘deserving’ of such (mis)treatment, the 
practice of animal research is itself constructed as a process which is primarily a form of 
punishment.  
Mention of the use of prisoners was rare in the MOP accounts. In one of the few allusions to 
the topic, the following Mass Observer mentions the use of prisoners when discussing 
biomedical research using dogs by the charity British Heart Foundation and then, in a later 
excerpt, their ailing mother’s use of medicines derived from animal research –  
‘I remember in the last two or three years, I've read articles in the Sunday Express 
about very cruel experiments done on dogs by the British Heart Foundation. They 
were forcing the dogs to have heart attacks over a period of weeks. How horrendous 
can you get? That seems like licensed animal cruelty and it makes me feel ill to imagine 
how those poor dogs felt during all that. I was so upset by the story, I decided I could 
never support the BHF again and I always tell my family not to give to them any more. 
They should find human volunteers or use prisoners - not innocent creatures. 
[…] 
When my mum was dying and she had to take chemotherapy tablets, that was the 
only time I've ever thought: the animals that died to make this drug don't mean 
anything and if it works then I'm glad, whatever the cost. But now I think it should be 
human test subjects such as prisoners. How can we possibly extrapolate from a mouse 
or a rabbit or a pig to a human? And who are we to decree that they should suffer for 
us?’ (Mass Observer B5342) 
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The first reference made by this Observer (B5342) towards the experimental use of prison 
inmates is in connection to reading about ‘very cruel experiments’ involving dogs conducted 
by the British Heart Foundation, a charity that the Observer states they ‘could never support 
[sic] again’. Following this, ‘human volunteers or [sic] prisoners’ are suggested for biomedical 
research as opposed to using ‘innocent creatures’. Later in their account, this Observer 
discusses how their dying mother was prescribed oral chemotherapy and suggests that this 
was the ‘only time’ they felt unconcerned with the biomedical use of animals. Yet, ‘now’, at 
the point of writing, the Observer states that experimental subjects ‘should be human test 
subjects such as prisoners’, with the suggestion that this might resolve issues of translating 
results from animal models to humans and also address the moral quandaries posed by using 
animals.  
This example could be read as revealing the shifting nature of care relations and how one’s 
ethical principles can become strained or diminished when sensed to conflict with lived care 
obligations. In making sense of such suggestions, Butler’s (2004) notion of ‘grievability’ is 
perhaps useful to consider, with the exclusion of those in prison from moral communities 
reflecting how the social stigma of the prisoner identity has stripped away their ‘grievability’. 
Butler contends that, ‘the differential allocation of grievability that decides what kind of 
subject is and must be grieved, and which kind of subject must not, operates to produce and 
maintain certain exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human” (Butler, 2004: xiv-
xv). However, this analysis of MOP writing presents a partial challenge to the reinforcement 
of human life as exceptionally sacred as Butler’s sense of grievability suggests. Instead, human 
volunteers and prison inmates, consenting or otherwise, are suggested for use as biomedical 
experimental subjects in the face of the ethical issues inherent to the human exploitation of 
non-human species. However, as Butler posits in earlier work (1993), constructing the 
human/animal divide and the moral implications that accompany this, i.e. the formation of 
moral boundaries, is a project of degrees. As Butler puts it, ‘the construction of the human is 
a differential operation that produces the more and the less “human,” the inhuman, the 
humanly unthinkable’ (Butler, 1993: 8).  
Relatedly, in exploring views towards the genetic modification of animals, Michael (2001) 
argues that 'one can accept the value of animal experiments, and recognize associated ethical 
problems not simply because of some complex calculation of costs/ benefits but because 
139 
 
animals in themselves are polysemic, and the identities of the respondents are multiple in 
relation to animals’ (Michael, 2001: 215). However, as this data analysis shows, ethical 
judgments about animal research are not always based in mobilisations of a human/animal 
divide. As such problematic discussions around replacing the use of animals in experiments 
with prison inmates highlight, the ‘human’ identity is also used in ways which seeks to draw 
borders within the human species, excluding some from the full moral and political status that 
the category is held as offering. Indeed, attention is drawn to the intra-divisive nature of the 
human identity by bioethics and animal studies scholar Wolfe (1998), who contends that 
humanism ‘is species- specific in its logic (which rigorously separates human from nonhuman) 
but not in its effects (it has historically been used to oppress both human and nonhuman 
others)’ (Wolfe, 1998: 43). Therefore, turning back to the MOP excerpt above, in mobilising 
the notion of ‘innocence’, non-human animals are contrasted with prison inmates, suggesting 
that, by their deviance, such groups are less deserving of the moral status given to the 
normative human.  
Though not suggesting the replacement of non-human animals with prison inmates in 
biomedical research, relevant here is another Mass Observer’s recollection of how they 
became interested in animal rights. In detailing how they became interested in the topic, this 
Observer discusses a documentary which featured the execution of a prison inmate and a 
rabbit in a gas chamber and considers the societal propensity for killing animals – 
‘I don’t have experience of working in an environment where research involving 
animals has ever been carried out but animal rights are a reoccurring theme in my life. 
My interest in the topic began in an unorthodox fashion when I watched a 
documentary about an American man who was convicted of murder. Prior to his 
execution in the gas chamber, a rabbit was placed in there. It was so that the prison 
officers could test that the equipment inside was working properly. It was. The rabbit 
died slowly and in obvious distress, just as the condemned inmate also did later that 
day. It struck me as quite bizarre that this horrendous penalty, which is reserved for 
the most despicable individuals, was casually inflicted upon a harmless animal. It 
spoke volumes to me about how little empathy people have for their fellow creatures’ 
(Mass Observer N5744) 
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This Mass Observer’s (N5744) reflection on how ‘casually’ this ‘horrendous penalty’ was 
‘inflicted upon a harmless animal’ again demonstrates the salience of notions of 
deservingness and innocence in ethical relating to the societal treatment of animals. Again, 
such writing implies that human exceptionalism is less relevant in making ethical judgments 
than concepts of (un)deservingness which transcend species boundaries.  
Overall, this section has demonstrated the ways in which animal research is understood as a 
means of generating care, with some being included within the practice’s encompassing care 
network only as an instrument to care for others. With the care provided through animal 
research requiring decisions on whose care is prioritised, whether this be the sacrifice of 
laboratory animals so that human patients can receive the expected medical benefits, this 
data analysis has shown how care in one direction can cause conflict elsewhere. Because of 
the way in which multispecies care obligations become tangled and strained in relating to 
animal research as a socio-ethical problem, this section has illustrated the distress that 
accompanies even those who are accepting of the scientific use of animals to provide certain 
benefits. Ultimately, this reflects that caring through animal research is not unproblematic; 
the benefits of using animals in science can be recognised as important in distributing care to 
others, yet still be felt as morally and emotionally conflicting.  
6.4 Caring about animal research 
Having considered how animal research can be perceived as a way of producing care, as a 
process which care runs through, this section will examine how some Mass Observers 
articulated care towards the topic of animal research in and of itself. In doing so, this section 
begins with an analysis of how laboratory animals are cared about, before moving onto care 
towards humans in the laboratory, namely laboratory staff. 
6.4.1 Caring about laboratory animals 
In contrast to some of the previously discussed MOP extracts which made sense of animal 
research through narratives of human survival, some Mass Observers were more hesitant 
about giving preferential treatment and consideration to certain species over others. In 
critiquing the reliance on categories such as intelligence for determining the moral 
acceptability of using non-human species in biomedical research, this Observer focuses on an 
experience that is central to defining living organisms as sentient, that of ‘suffering’ –  
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‘If you’re asking about whether some animals should be tested on and not others, 
then no – no animals should be tested on. There is a fashion for realising animals are 
more intelligent than we thought they were – crows can solve basic puzzles, elephants 
mourn, chimps have a sense of injustice, and so on – and so they should be exempted. 
As if having no cognitive framework in which to understand pain made that pain any 
better. No, if we’re imagining a future world, we’re imagining it without suffering, and 
so we stop the suffering we are causing. And if I am working towards a world in which 
there is no suffering, I need to stop allowing things to suffer on my behalf, and give up 
the pills.’ (Mass Observer J5734) 
The assumption that it is more ethical to use species deemed as possessing lower cognitive 
capacities for scientific research is questioned here, with the infliction of suffering, regardless 
of how such experiences may manifest between different species, considered to be an ethical 
issue in itself. The Mass Observer (J5734) concludes this section by dwelling on their individual 
responsibility towards the issue and identifying medicine consumption as a possible way to 
act upon it. Such reflection on the vulnerabilities shared across species can be seen here as 
leading to this Observer’s consideration of the responsibilities that ‘we’, both as a species and 
as individuals, might bear towards other animals.  
In considering their accountability for the suffering of other animals in pursuit of human 
health advancements, the Mass Observer (J5734) concludes by stating ‘I need to stop allowing 
things to suffer on my behalf, and give up the pills’, an act that requires not only recognition 
but also acceptance of one’s own vulnerability. This sentiment connects with Bird Rose’s 
(2013) argument that, ‘[t]o understand one’s self as part of a community of life is to accept 
responsibilities, and also to accept vulnerability’ (Bird Rose, 2013: 311). However, as the same 
Mass Observer muses earlier in their writing, accepting one’s vulnerability and ultimate 
mortality and resisting the defences and treatments that biomedicine is seen to offer, is easier 
said than done –  
‘were we to end animal testing tomorrow, and so medicinal advancement, I would be 
fine with that, with the caveat that we spend the money on hospice care and social 
support. We live longer than we should, and we fetishise death. The fact we’re 
prepared to harm animals to postpone our own passing shows only how unhealthy 
our attitude to mortality is. I suppose the challenge for me is that in most cases we’re 
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not talking about insta-death. I take blood pressure tablets which were most-likely 
tested on animals. If I stop, I guess I die at some point, but it’s probably not for a while. 
It’s not like a cancer treatment which gets me another 6 months NOW, this is a vague 
tablet-taking which gives me another 10 minutes for every day I take them. The 
benefit is more disparate, which in an odd way makes the refusal less salient. I’m 
thinking out loud, I’ll need to come back to this. But I think, sensibly, I’m going to have 
to stop’ (Mass Observer J5734) 
Although, as living beings, mortality is one experience we all share in common, as reflected 
on here, death does not mean the same thing to each of us. Rather, death and dying are 
culturally and temporally situated (Kenny et al., 2017) and as this Mass Observer (J5734) 
articulates, resisting medicine consumption at a point of stable health is both symbolically 
and pragmatically different to declining medical interventions when one’s health is declining. 
However, as this Observer highlights, provisions for adequate social care are also important 
aspects to consider when thinking about ill health and dying. Although, as detailed earlier, 
biomedicine is seen as playing a key role in how people care about those with health 
conditions, with much hope invested in research aiming to advance medical knowledge and 
treatments, care practices which support patients in living with, rather than overcoming, such 
conditions are important considerations in thinking about the ethical legitimacy of animal 
research.  
Though without clear routes for action, the discomfort this Mass Observer (J5734) expresses 
towards how ‘we fetishise death’ serves to complicate the standard assumption that medical 
advancement is inherently positive. Theorists have also attempted to question the often 
taken-for-granted struggle against human mortality. For example, Haraway (2008a), 
observes, ‘I do not think we can nurture living until we get better at facing killing. But also get 
better at dying instead of killing. Sometimes a "cure" for whatever kills us is just not enough 
reason to keep the killing machines going at the scale to which we (who?) have become 
accustomed’ (Haraway, 2008a: 81-82). As will be explored further in the following data 
chapter, not all biomedical endeavours are perceived necessary and the extension of the 
human lifespan at the expense of other animal lives is, for some, an area of particular concern.  
This data analysis also revealed how, rather than being treated as in opposition with one 
another, in some cases, the suffering of both laboratory animals and humans were connected. 
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How this connection between the bodies of laboratory animals and humans can play out 
outside of the laboratory, mediated by care, is demonstrated in the following Mass Observer’s 
discussion of a school experiment and its later impact on their pregnancy –  
‘We did do one experiment on water fleas that I did find very disturbing and it still 
disturbs me. We had to keep giving the fleas caffeine and record the effect it had on 
their heartbeats, basically until their little hearts gave out. I was part way through 
doing the experiment when it struck me that I was killing a living creature. It still 
haunts me now – when I was pregnant with my daughter, I gave up caffeine 
completely as soon as I heard her heartbeat for the first time because I kept thinking 
of the effect it had on the little flea’s hearts.’ (Mass Observer S4002) 
The connection that this Observer (S4002) draws between the experiment they conducted at 
school with water fleas and their subsequent avoidance of caffeine during pregnancy suggests 
how even when not being used as explicit models for human physiology, laboratory animals 
are imaginatively tied up with human counterparts. Indeed, it is the accomplishment of 
greater understanding and management of human bodies that justifies the entire biomedical 
pursuit.  
In summary, then, the above excerpt implies a recognition of the shared vulnerability of both 
flea and foetus. To make sense of this, it is helpful to turn to Acampora’s (2006) notion of 
‘cross species awareness of vulnerability’ (Acampora, 2006: 83) as an important part of ethical 
relating and interspecies care. As Acampora puts it, ‘such minimal mutuality of common 
carnal nature suffices phenomenologically to establish compassionate concern for the other’ 
(ibid, 130). In the case of animal research and as suggested in the MOP excerpt above, the 
vulnerabilities that such animals share with human bodies can produce moral trouble and 
societal concern whilst simultaneously determining their use as models in the first place. This 
issue has been commented on by other scholars looking at the biomedical research domain. 
As Svendsen and Koch state of their study of piglets used for neonatal research, ‘human 
health is entangled with the lives and deaths of animals’ (Svendsen and Koch, 2013: 118). 
Importantly, it is also worth noting that despite the concern that this Mass Observer (S4002) 
shows here for the water fleas, being invertebrates, they remain unprotected under the 
current legislation which, through a 2013 amendment of the EU Directive 2010/63/EU, only 
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provides protection for one group of invertebrates, those being cephalopods (Fiorito et al., 
2014). 
In their writings on animal research, some Mass Observers were critical of the prioritisation 
of human needs underpinning the use of animals in biomedical experiments. For some, in 
enacting beneficent care, as in the form of charitable giving, who they care about might be 
structured in explicit contestation of the obligations expected towards humankind, as the 
following Mass Observer’s charitable practices suggest –  
‘[…] I don't like the idea of any animal suffering and if I support/give to any charity it 
is always animal /environment related. Makes me sound horrible but I would never 
give to a charity related to humans. We're too selfish and have caused most of the 
problems in today's world!’ (Mass Observer R5682) 
That this Mass Observer (R5682) justifies their aversion to donating to charities ‘related to 
humans’ by claiming that humans as a collective are at fault for ‘most of the problems in 
today’s world’ suggests that, again, notions of deservingness are evoked in enacting care 
boundaries. Given the current socio-political emphases on notions of environmental justice 
and individual responsibility for the, now declared, climate crisis (see Whitmarsh et al., 2011), 
such articulations of care for those whose suffering is identified as symptomatic of human 
activity perhaps reflect shifting relationships and priorities of care in the Anthropocene.    
In relating such feelings specifically to animal research, the same Mass Observer (R5682) 
continued to articulate their sympathy for non-human animals and the environment, which, 
in relation to, humans are ultimately seen as a negative force –  
‘I've always been uncomfortable with experiments on animals and felt it was cruel and 
that such tests should be done on humans. But then I have to ask myself would I 
volunteer/be prepared to have experiments done on myself/other humans in the 
place of animals? I would like to think I would. It sounds an awful thing to say but I 
have more sympathy with animals and mother nature. I look at the damage that 
humans have inflicted on the planet and really think that planet earth would be better 
off without us. Sorry - rather a negative train of thought to develop from writing about 
experiments on animals/animal liberation!’ (Mass Observer R5682) 
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In their disapproval of the ways in which human life has impacted on the planet, which, as 
they put it, ‘would be better off without us’, the Observer (R5682) can be seen as 
fundamentally challenging a key aim of biomedical research: the advancement of human 
health. Caring for humans through biomedical research at the expense of animal lives is here 
clearly situated in a point in time in which we are increasingly being told of the negative 
effects of human activity on the planet and the other forms of life it hosts. Chakrabarty (2009) 
contends that in this new historical epoch of anthropogenic global warming and climate 
change, ‘it is no longer a question simply of man having an interactive relation with nature 
[…] Now it is being claimed that humans are a force of nature in the geological sense’ 
(Chakrabarty, 2009: 207). In such a context, species distinctions and discourses of human 
exceptionalism in biomedicine which calculate non-human life as expendable if the benefit to 
humans is judged worthy are perhaps less salient and thus, for Observers like the above, offer 
little justification for such treatment of animals.  
Disputing co-founder of PeTA Ingrid Newkirk’s oft-quoted phrase ‘a rat is a pig is a dog is a 
boy’ and its implied challenge of anthropocentric notions of moral status and care obligations, 
US veterinarian and biomedical researcher Morrison (2002) argues that ‘[n]ot only do such 
statements trivialize humanity, they impede progress toward reaching consensus on how 
animals should be treated’ (Morrison, 2002: 16). However, within the more recent global 
context in which scientists are highlighting cross-species vulnerabilities to ecological threats, 
and the role of humans in generating these, perhaps, for some, making moral distinctions 
between species is increasingly dubious and, as such, is deemed as requiring re-evaluation of 
our care obligations towards more-than-human life. Relating to this point, another Mass 
Observer discusses the current societal treatment of animals – 
‘I believe we have to stop thinking of animals as possessing some sort of ‘otherness’ 
that is fundamentally different from ourselves. We can no longer use the necessity for 
food, for instance, as an excuse to harvest other species. This is the 21st century. There 
are other dietary options. Can we still, with a clear conscience, argue the need for 
laboratory experiments on animals too? I don’t think we ever could but that has never 
made any difference.’ (Mass Observer N5744)  
In their critique of the cultural regard of animals as ‘other’ to humans, this Mass Observer 
(N5744) implicitly questions the human exceptionalism which grounds many of the ways in 
146 
 
which we relate with animals. Drawing an analogy with animals used in food production, the 
Observer implies that animal research is outdated – ‘This is the 21st century’ – and expresses 
doubt towards its moral justification. In prescribing different modes of ethical relating to 
other animals, this Mass Observer can be seen as relating to their membership of the human 
species. This reveals how such forms of caring about animals involved in structural practices 
such as animal research may play out on a macro scale which demands collective change to 
the ways that ‘we’, as a species, enact care. However, it should be noted that these 
human/animal and nature/culture distinctions are made from within a specifically Western 
humanist paradigm and suggested calls for a collective planetary ethics that decentres the 
human are problematic in their neglection of the non-Western cultures which do not practice 
such ontological separations (Salmón, 2000; DeMello, 2012) and the sustainable ecologies of 
some Indigenous communities (Apffel-Marglin and Marglin, 1998; Cajete, 1999). 
Nevertheless, such reflections on the problems of human exceptionalism suggest that the 
anthropocentric underpinnings of animal research are, for some, fracturing.  
For some Mass Observers, then, caring about experimental animals is aligned with a radical 
reframing of wider human-animal relations and a questioning of the human exceptionalism 
that such practices are based upon. As the excerpts in this section have shown, in caring about 
laboratory animals, the treatment of non-human animals at large has been reflected as of 
both personal and global significance, with consideration of the human impact across 
domains and even at the planetary level driving critical self-reflection on the ways in which 
non-human animals are used for human ends.  
6.4.2 Caring about laboratory staff 
In demonstrating care towards animal research, some Mass Observers also directed their 
attentions towards laboratory staff. In such MOP accounts, with many Observers having 
minimal personal experience of those who work in biomedical research facilities, impressions 
of laboratory staff were often framed in terms of hopes and expectations. As the following 
Mass Observer touched on, such hopes may include regulation and organisational support for 
those working in laboratories –  
‘I hope that those working in such laboratories would employ humane methods as 
dictated by law and their own or their employer’s code of ethics. I can’t imagine it 
would be a pleasant job, and as such I would hope that they receive support should 
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they suffer mentally as a result. However I appreciate that whilst I might struggle to 
do this job there probably are people who can do it without any issues at all.’ (Mass 
Observer E5014) 
Firstly, this Mass Observer (E5014) conveys hopes around the practice of animal research and 
the treatment of laboratory animals, specifically that laboratory staff ‘employ humane 
methods’ which are inscribed either in legislation or institutional protocol. In this way, we can 
note how those outside of the laboratory demonstrate care towards laboratory animals 
through expectations of laboratory staff conduct. Yet, given that this Observer ‘can’t imagine’ 
working in such laboratories to be ‘pleasant’, care is also shown towards laboratory staff, 
who, it is hoped, have access to support services ‘should they suffer mentally as a result’. 
Finally, the Observer acknowledges that such assumptions about those who work in animal 
research laboratories are based in projections of their own feelings towards working in such 
an environment and that others may feel differently.   
In such expressions of concern for the working conditions of laboratory staff, it is evident that 
caring about animal research is not simply caring about non-human animals. Rather it hoped 
that animals and humans alike are protected by and cared for by the structures in place 
around using animals in biomedical research, whether at the legislative or institutional level. 
Expectations of the regulatory framework were key to how some Mass Observers imagined 
those who work in biomedical laboratories, with regulation being implicitly or explicitly 
mentioned in around a fifth of all responses. This suggests that discomfort with the practice 
of animal research did not necessarily lead to resentment towards those involved in such 
work. Rather, as the following Mass Observer implies, judgement may be directed at the 
policy, rather than individual, level –  
‘On the question of my opinions of the people that work in research laboratories, I 
find this quite difficult to answer. I assume that all people working in such laboratories 
are subject to strict controls and ethical policies etc., and as such I do not view them 
as bad people individually. I wouldn't consider somebody to be a bad person purely 
based on the fact that they worked in a research laboratory in which experiments on 
animals took place. I also assume that the people working in such facilities are 
qualified in science in some capacity - assuming that the experiments on animals are 
taking place to address legitimate issues; I would hope that the people involved in 
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such experiments are genuinely passionate about addressing the issues which 
experimentation on animals can help to address. As such, assuming that staff 
members conduct themselves in an ethical and humane manner, I do not view them 
badly.’ (Mass Observer W5345) 
This Mass Observer (W5345) frames their opinion of those who work in animal research 
laboratories through their expectations of the regulatory framework, assuming that such 
work and workers are subject to ‘strict control and ethical policies’ and, as a consequence, 
meaning that the Observer does ‘not view them as bad people individually’. This example of 
locating the work of laboratory staff in broader governance structures when giving an opinion 
on the workers themselves reveals the role that trust plays in caring. In caring about distant 
others, such as laboratory workers and non-human animal subjects, whose everyday lives are 
largely hidden from lay-publics, it is crucial that citizens are able to trust the frameworks 
which regulate the treatment of both groups. Discussing the practice of care networks over 
distance and difference, Barnett and Land (2007) observe that ‘we are in fact bound up with 
and implicated in the lives of all sorts of people living in all sorts of different places’ (Barnett 
and Land, 2007: 5). Given the distance between those who work (and are worked with) within 
laboratories and the wider populace, the barriers which obstruct direct forms of caring for, 
trust in the policies that guide laboratory staff conduct is paramount. As shown in the above 
MOP excerpt, such policies are assumed to protect not only the non-human animals involved 
in research, but also to safeguard staff themselves from any negative impacts such work may 
present.   
Validating this Mass Observer’s (W5345) focusing of attention towards policy rather than 
individuals is the respected credibility of those ‘qualified in science in some capacity’ and the 
association this bears with a scientific dedication to solve ‘legitimate issues’. Like the 
regulation governing animal research, commitment to the science underpinning this use of 
animals is regarded as investing further credibility in such work. Hence, this Observer’s hope 
that ‘the people involved in such experiments are genuinely passionate about addressing the 
issues which experimentation on animals can help to address’ reveals the importance of staff 
dedication to the scientific goals of such research. In this way, as Camporesi et al. (2017) put 
it, the ‘expertise and authority of science is also an object of trust’ (Camporesi et al., 2017: 
25). Therefore, as this Mass Observer implies, assumptions of those who work in this arena 
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as being driven by the science may, for some, justify the enterprise and the involvement of 
those who work within it.  
For other Mass Observers, impressions of laboratory staff were grounded in the view that 
they are simply doing a job. As the following Mass Observer suggests, for some this is an 
unpleasant but ultimately necessary job, and, as they themselves relate, external pressures 
can mean that job preferences are not always viable –  
‘Firmly being in the world of work and doing a job I no longer enjoy I know that some 
people are doing a particular job because they have to, just to pay the mortgage. I 
don't suppose anyone ever wakes up and says "I want to become an animal tester". I 
imagine that because of the threat involved and the moral question it's quite a well-
paid job. My guess is they must have a strict vetting procedure so that people doing it 
for the wrong reasons don't get through. It's one of those jobs that nobody probably 
wants to do, but someone has to, like being an undertaker or working in an abattoir.’ 
(Mass Observer C3210)  
This Mass Observer (C3210) assumes that those who work in animal research laboratories do 
not relish their work, yet, like the other jobs listed (which, interestingly, are both concerned 
in different ways with death) they conclude that such work must be done by someone. Again, 
institutional protocols are mentioned as a safeguarding measure, here ensuring ‘that people 
doing it for the wrong reasons don't get through’ the interview process. Such understandings 
of laboratory workers perhaps reflect the MOP’s emphasis on the ‘everyday’, meaning that 
Mass Observers are predisposed to thinking about issues at the mundane, ordinary level. 
Through such a lens, Mass Observers with little experience of the details of working in an 
animal research environment may instead, as demonstrated by the Mass Observer above, 
relate to those who work in such an area in the basic and empathetic sense that they are 
doing a job to pay the bills. This contrasts with impressions of laboratory workers which centre 
on the scientific nature of the enterprise, as previously discussed. Rather, relating to 
laboratory workers as ‘doing a job’ which is, at least at times, perceived to be distressing but 
overall necessary suggests an empathetic recognition of those doing work ‘that nobody 
probably wants to do, but someone has to’. Unlike the focus on regulation articulated by the 
previous Mass Observers which directed judgement at the policy level, thinking about 
laboratory workers as doing a job that needs doing presents a way to relate to those in this 
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arena as people. Such understandings of laboratory staff are important to acknowledge given 
the historic sensational caricaturing of those who work in this area (Wolfensohn, 2006; Fox, 
2014; McLeod, 2018).  
Relatedly, many Mass Observers were critical of anti-animal research activism and were 
sympathetic towards laboratory staff who have sometimes been the target of such activities. 
Some of the criticism of activists involved the previously discussed arguments, that laboratory 
staff are ultimately just doing a job which is difficult but necessary and therefore should not 
be subjected to disruption and derision. This can be seen in the following MOP excerpts –  
‘Those people who work in laboratories using animals for research are often subjected 
to violent condemnation and criticism from certain extremist sections of the public - 
"Animal Rights" etc. who hold protests at the laboratories targetting the staff with 
insults and physical threats to themselves and their families. This I feel is totally 
unacceptable. The scientists we doing a valuable and essential job even though we 
may not like the idea of animals being used. No one (hopefully) thinks' I'd like a career 
which involves hurting animals' - these are professionally trained staff who realise the 
validity of their work, and must presumably accept the use of animals for the medical 
benefits gained.’ (Mass Observer T2543) 
~ 
‘I respect those people who work in animal research - it is a tough environment that 
few people would choose to work in unless they were particularly committed. The 
scientists who work on animal research surely have the right to get on with their work 
and not to be intimidated by the press or by activists.’ (Mass Observer G4374) 
Again, in both of these excerpts, animal research is taken to be necessary work. Those who 
work within the field are held in high esteem due to the dedication which is assumed to be 
essential to work in such a ‘tough environment’ (Mass Observer G4374), performing a task 
that many people find disagreeable, i.e. ‘though we may not like the idea of animals being 
used’ (Mass Observer T2543). There is a sense in both excerpts that the perceived difficulties 
of such work imbue laboratory workers with a sense of trustworthiness, in that, as the first 
Observer (T2543) puts it, ‘few people would choose to work in unless they were particularly 
committed’ (Mass Observer G4374). Similarly, the second Observer (G4374) references the 
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perceived difficulties of such work, ‘‘No one (hopefully) thinks' I'd like a career which involves 
hurting animals’’, as a marker of the necessity of using animals, ‘- these are professionally 
trained staff who realise the validity of their work, and must presumably accept the use of 
animals for the medical benefits gained.’ (Mass Observer T2543). Here, that people are willing 
to work in such an environment, with its particular challenges, is taken as endowing research 
using animals with a professional credibility. Holmberg (2011) discusses the faith that 
scientists place in animal models, through which ‘animals thus come to embody the hope for 
future breakthroughs’ (Holmberg, 2011: 154). This analysis of writing from the MOP suggests 
that, for some, the trust that scientists place in the use of animal models reflects outwardly 
to lay publics, signifying that they can also place their trust in this scientifically-sanctioned use 
of animals.  
However, though not wanting to generalise in their judgements about those who work in 
animal research laboratories, some Mass Observers still held reservations about the character 
of a person who could work in such an environment. As the following Observer expresses –  
‘It is wrong to make generalisations about any group of people – we are all individuals 
– but I cannot fathom how anyone with what could be considered a normal degree of 
empathy could conduct research on animals every day without finding it continually 
upsetting. Have the laboratory workers ever had a close bond with a pet? Anyone who 
has ever had a cat or dog for example knows that they have subtle ways of 
communicating what they want, often insightful ways that would be missed by anyone 
other than their attentive owner.’ (Mass Observer N5744) 
In perceiving the use of animals for research purposes to be emotionally challenging, this 
Mass Observer (N5744) expresses their inability to imagine how a person with ‘what could be 
considered a normal degree of empathy’ could cope with the emotional toll of such work. 
Given this, working in animal research is seen to put into question the capacity to have a ‘close 
bond with a pet’ and vice versa. Consequently, this is taken to suggest that laboratory workers 
are unable to properly care for animals, with the job seen as necessitating a lack of the 
intuitive sensing of an animal’s needs, an ability this Observer describes as characteristic of 
those living with cats or dogs. Such reasoning reveals how, for some Mass Observers, the 
nature of work in animal research environments is seen to require employees who are 
indifferent to the interests of animals. In such assumptions, the explicit instrumentalisation 
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of animal bodies that characterises their use in scientific research is perceived as entirely at 
odds with interspecies practices of care.  
Such perceptions of how animal research is put into practice by laboratory staff are 
understandable from outside of the contradictory logic of the laboratory, within which the 
entanglement of ‘good science’ with ‘good care’ is now asserted as a guiding principle (Davies 
et al., 2018; Friese et al., 2019; Druglitrø, 2018) and animals can be both cared for and killed. 
As ethnographic research has shown (Birke, 2008; Holmberg, 2011; Giraud and Hollin, 2016; 
Greenhough and Roe, 2018), interspecies care is practiced on both affectual and technical 
levels in the laboratory and acts as a current guiding much of the work undertaken within its 
confines, influencing not only what but also how things are done. As Druglitrø (2018) puts it, 
being ‘skilled’ at caring in the laboratory involves both technical and affective forms of care, 
with this standard of care ‘involving the handling and coordination of various technologies, 
people, and animals’ and also ‘affective (embodied) investments of various kinds’ (Druglitrø, 
2018: 660). For animal technicians, then, the development of such intersubjective 
connections, attuning oneself to the preferences and peculiarities of animals as species 
groups and individuals, is precisely part of performing one’s job well. Indeed, as Holmberg 
(2011) observes, animal technicians often define their role through narratives which 
emphasise an affective care, with love and friendship being key characteristics of their work. 
In this way, Holmberg identifies that ‘in the laboratory there is no clear-cut boundary between 
personalised animals (‘pets’) and others; being an ‘animal friend’ creates certain moral 
obligations to all individuals’ (Holmberg, 2011: 159). Yet, for those on the outside, perhaps 
most clear are the limits of human-animal bonds in the laboratory which are ultimately 
marked by a fatal instrumentalisation. 
In summary, this section has considered the ways in which Mass Observers articulate care 
towards laboratory animals and staff. As has been demonstrated, caring about laboratory 
animals is often entwined with care towards non-human animals in a broader sense and lends 
to critical reflexivity on the exceptional positioning of human needs. Interestingly, for some 
Mass Observers, caring about laboratory humans, those who work within animal research, 
entails hopes that staff are supported in ways which care for them and enable them to care 
for the animals in their charge. For some correspondents, the perceived difficulty of the job 
suggests a commitment to the higher good of the science. For others, being able to perform 
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such work implies a lack of empathy with non-human animals.  And for other Mass Observers, 
impressions of those who work in animal research laboratories were shaped through an 
understanding that not everyone has the capacity to be particular when it comes to 
employment and, like other lines of work, the use of animals in research represents jobs that, 
though unpleasant, need to be done.  Overall, this analysis shows that caring about laboratory 
animals does not necessarily mean not caring about laboratory staff. Conversely, for some 
Mass Observers, caring about experimental animals requires caring about the conditions that 
laboratory staff work within and the support they receive, revealing a recognition of the care-
full interdependence at play within biomedical research.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The first section of this chapter has illustrated the location of animal research as one ethical 
issue amongst many others in a landscape demanding care in multiple directions. For some 
Mass Observers, species presented a barrier to caring, with human problems deemed as more 
important. For others, animal research was considered a low-priority animal-related issue. 
Recognising the situation of animal research amongst other problems also helps us to 
understand expressions of needing to withdraw one’s care towards such issues, which can 
take an emotional toll, to enact care for oneself. Hence, highlighting disconnections of care 
towards animal research articulated by some Mass Observers emphasises the nature of care 
as a limited resource which is necessarily employed in some directions over others.  
The second section of this chapter analysed how animal research can be understood as a way 
of caring for others, as a process through which care passes towards known and unknown 
recipients. In caring about the self, family, and kin, for some Mass Observers animal research 
represents a means of generating (health)care for those who are cared about. However, given 
the necessary exclusions of the non-human animals at the centre of biomedical research, the 
ways in which they must be confined and killed so that humans may benefit, this analysis has 
also reflected on the conflicts that emerge through such caring. For some Mass Observers, 
caring through animal research was enacted along with an exclusion of caring about certain 
beings, with these particular humans and non-humans being implicated in such networks as 
an instrumental means of caring for others.  
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The third section of this chapter examined how Mass Observers care about the issue of animal 
research itself, looking at care towards laboratory animals and staff. This analysis revealed a 
recognition of the interdependence of laboratory animals and laboratory humans, with care 
towards one often entangled with care towards the other. For some Mass Observers, caring 
about laboratory animals invoked reflection on the wider care duties that humans have for 
other animals and for the planet at large, with the scientific use of animals for human benefits 
representing an example of human egotism and abuse of the world. For some, then, caring 
about the issue of animal research requires personal and collective change, though this is not 
without ambivalence, given the prevalence of biomedical frameworks of health.  
Stepping back, this chapter suggests that studies of views towards animal research should 
acknowledge that the issue is not merely a matter of knowing the ‘facts’ (as suggested by UAR 
2009; FRAME, 2020a) or making abstract ethical calculations (as critiqued by Macnaghten, 
2004). Rather, as this data analysis has contended, an important way in which animal research 
is made sense of is through near and far care practices, in which the prioritisation of human 
interests is not always comfortably accepted. Indeed, as suggested, caring about animal 
research may require radical shifts in how ‘we’ as individuals and as a human collective relate 
to the more-than-human world. As will be explored more in Chapter 8, the importance of care 
to understandings of animal research raises broader questions around the obligations that 
scientific institutions have to engage with public audiences in care-full ways, ways which are 







7. Data Chapter Three: Constructing and constricting the 
‘necessary’ use of animals for biomedical research  
7.1 Introduction 
Whilst it is claimed that animals have been used as models to understand human bodies for 
over 2000 years (Ericsson et al., 2013), comparative vivisection of animals became an 
established part of biomedical science in the 19th century (Rupke, 1987). In contemporary 
bioscience, research using animals is claimed to remain essential to scientific advancement 
(Barré-Sinoussi and Montagutelli, 2015; Phillips and Roth, 2019), although there is now much 
challenge of the scientific validity of animal models (Shanks et al., 2009; Knight, 2011; Bailey 
and Taylor, 2016; Bailey and Balls, 2019; and see Herrmann and Jayne, 2019). As scientific 
models, animals often become surrogates for human bodies, as Birke (2012) suggests, 
‘[a]nimal bodies, whether alive or dead, thus stand in for human ones, representing our 
diseases – so much so, that lab animals can be said to represent our salvation from the terror 
of our own mortality’ (Birke, 2012: 157). It is in this representational sense that this final data 
chapter aims to explore how Mass Observers understand the scientific use of animals as 
necessary or unnecessary, in doing so, looking at the construction of medical research and 
‘cosmetic testing’.  
It has been claimed that public support of animal research is stronger in relation to the use of 
animals for medical purposes, which can encompass ‘basic (experimental), clinical, and 
epidemiological research’ (Röhrig et al., 2009). For instance, the 2018 Ipsos MORI biannual 
national survey on public attitudes to animal research claims that ‘[m]ost of the public accept 
the use of animals in scientific research for medical and scientific purposes (65% and 68% 
respectively)’ (Ipsos MORI, 2018: 6). From such data, animal research advocacy organisation 
Understanding Animal Research (UAR) concluded that ‘[p]ublic acceptance of animal research 
remains high but is conditional on research being conducted for scientific and medical 
purposes and with high animal welfare standards’ (Understanding Animal Research, 2019).  
Bearing such claims in mind, this chapter explores how Mass Observers construct medical 
research, what hopes and expectations they place in it and what kinds of anxieties it can 
generate. In analysing how some forms of animal research are judged as necessary or 
unnecessary, this chapter does not deal with metaphysical concepts of necessity such as those 
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associated with Kant (1871) or Hegel (1874) or try to pin down a particular definition. Rather, 
the aim here is to understand how the distinction between necessary and unnecessary 
research is made, what this characterisation achieves, and the ways in which this boundary 
can become blurred. I have chosen to examine ‘necessity’ rather than related concepts such 
as ‘(un)acceptability’, because of the frequency with which the terms ‘necessary’, 
‘unnecessary’, and ‘necessity’ were used across the MOP responses and the common 
description of animal research as a ‘necessary evil’ (Blakemore, 2008; Masterton et al., 2014; 
Franco and Olsson, 2016).  
In exploring these concepts in relation to animal research, this chapter is organised in three 
sections. The first of these looks at the advancement of medicine as a necessary purpose for 
using animals in research and the stipulations within this. The second considers the 
construction of cosmetic-related research as unnecessary, the role this plays in justifying 
medical research using animals, and how this distinction can be challenged through points at 
which the medical and cosmetic divide becomes blurred. Finally, the third section explores 
how Mass Observers may disrupt the authority and reach of biomedicine itself, articulating 
different visions of health and illness.  
7.2 The necessity of biomedicine 
In much of the MOP writings on the topic of ‘Using animals in research’, scientific uses of 
animals for medical purposes, whether advancing medical knowledge, providing medical 
training, or developing medical treatments, are explicitly mentioned as areas of particular 
value and necessity. This section will explore how in many of the MOP responses, biomedicine 
is central to understanding the scientific use of animals as necessary. In doing so, three key 
aspects of necessary medical uses of animals will be considered: the importance of advancing 
the field of medicine, the application of medical knowledge gained through animal use, and 
the prioritisation of particular elements of health and illness.  
7.2.1 Advancing medicine 
In identifying medical purposes for scientific animal use as necessary, the need to advance 
the medical field was frequently mentioned by Mass Observers, as the following excerpts 
illustrate –  
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‘I'm vegetarian so I'm against animal testing - BUT..... I'm one of those annoying people 
who can always appreciate both ways of an argument, so I can absolutely understand 
how medical scientists can argue that there would be no advances in medicine if one 
wasn't allowed to practice and experiment on animals.’ (Mass Observer A1706) 
~ 
‘My views have perhaps become more informed over time rather than changing. It is 
the sort of thing you just accept as happening, or is necessary. I don’t think I would 
have ever believed it was entirely unnecessary because of the need to advance our 
medical knowledge and capabilities, as well as educating those going into that 
profession.’ (Mass Observer D4736) 
~ 
‘My immediate gut reaction is always “No, no, no” as I am a real animal lover and 
cannot bear to imagine ever doing anything deliberate to hurt an animal – but I think 
of all the advances in medicine which would never have happened if not for laboratory 
animal research.’ (Mass Observer F5890) 
~ 
‘Although using animals for research may seem barbaric, so much in the medical field 
has been discovered, it is time to look at this issue more positively.’ (Mass Observer 
M2061) 
~ 
‘In common with in many people, I don't dwell on the suffering of the animals involved 
in research, but accept the necessity for the advancement of medical knowledge.’ 
(Mass Observer T2543) 
As the above excerpts suggest, Mass Observers might regard animal research as ethically 
problematic or unpleasant and yet still deem it to be necessary for the purpose of advancing 
medical understanding and practice. Despite discomfort with animal research in general, as 
some of the Observers above articulate, such purposes for using animals appear to be given 
exceptional status, with medical advancement taken to be a largely necessary endeavour. In 
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relating to the notion of medical advancement, progress made through animal research is 
embedded within constructions of the past, present, and future. For instance, the current 
state of medicine is taken as emblematic of the progress made by using animals in research, 
i.e. ‘I think of all the advances in medicine which would never have happened if not for 
laboratory animal research’ (Mass Observer F5890), and also is indicative of the need to keep 
using animals ‘for the [further] advancement of medical knowledge’ (Mass Observer T2543).  
In regarding animal research as a crucial factor in the development of today’s medical 
practice, the suggestion is that non-human animals as scientific tools represent a building 
block for its future advancement. With this, there is the suspicion that the important medical 
provisions available now may have been jeopardised if the use of animals in research had 
been disrupted in the past and therefore the same logic can be applied to future 
developments. In other words, disturbances in the use of animal models now may threaten 
the success of the medical field in the future. Such projections of the past onto the future are 
reflected in Engdahl and Lidskog’s (2012) analysis of how citizens make sense of science. As 
they claim, ‘[c]itizens’ interpretation of science always includes projection of the familiarity 
of the past onto the unfamiliarity of the future’ (Engdahl and Lidskog, 2012: 708). Hence, 
implicit in readings of today’s medical treatments as evidence of the efficiency of animal 
research are expectations of continuing advancements, and, as will be discussed later in this 
section, such expectations are particularly concerned with ‘cures’ for certain health 
conditions and ending human suffering more generally.  
Also important to such understandings of medical progress is trust in expert opinion on the 
matter. As demonstrated in the first quoted Mass Observer’s (A1706) explanation that ‘I can 
absolutely understand how medical scientists can argue that there would be no advances in 
medicine if one wasn't allowed to practice and experiment on animals’, the claims of relevant 
experts can be crucial for individual sense-making of the use of animals in research. Such 
expressions of trust in claims made by those in the biomedical community on the necessity of 
animal research to medical progress are imbued with a clear sense of reciprocity. By trusting 
that animal research is integral to medical progress and validating the necessity of such uses 
of animals Mass Observers expect to reap the rewards promised, such as the discovery and 
deliverance of new treatments and cures for illnesses and disease. As another Mass Observer 
(H260) explains –  
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‘Today we have sanitation and antiseptics to cure filth, but it is only due the people 
who experiment to find these cures. In the past I have seen so much change and am 
also grateful for the pills and potions that keep me living a fairly pain free life. My 
Parents and Grand-Parents were not so lucky and I have seen them suffer without 
help. So I say to the scientists keep on working and finding new cures. We, the public, 
do not need to know too much about your experiments. We must trust you to keep 
the animals pain to a minimum, in order to keep our pain to a minimum!! 
Keep on using your wonderful brains, for which we are grateful.’ (Mass Observer 
H260) 
Here again, the necessity of animal research is seen as justified by healthcare improvements 
witnessed through personal experiences over time. This Mass Observer (H260) constructs 
health in terms of the prevention or management of pain. Their ability to live a ‘fairly pain 
free life’ is attributed to the development of pharmaceuticals, ‘pills and potions’ and, 
correspondingly, ‘the people who experiment to find these cures’. Here, animals in the 
context of scientific research become linked to human bodies through the health benefits 
they are seen to produce and the eventual cures they promise. This view of laboratory animals 
is observed by Haraway (1997) as she writes about the rhetoric around Oncomouse, the first 
patented mammal, genetically modified to have an active cancer gene. Critical of such 
perceptions of animal models as sacrificial saviours, Haraway identifies that ‘S/he is our 
scapegoat; s/he bears our suffering; s/he signifies and enacts our mortality in a powerful, 
historically specific way that promises a culturally privileged kind of salvation----a "cure for 
cancer” (Haraway, 1997: 79). Such understandings of animals as models for human bodies, in 
sickness and health, also echo a finding of Lund et al.’s (2012) study of attitude formation 
towards animal research, in which participants ‘readily associated “benefits” with the notion 
that animal research is employed by scientists in order to model humans and their diseases’ 
(Lund et al., 2012a: 481).  
Appearing to address the biomedical community on behalf of ‘the public’ and also appeal to 
their fellow members of the public, the above Mass Observer (H260) goes on to emphasise a 
citizenly trust in biomedical researchers by stating that ‘We, the public, do not need to know 
too much about your experiments. We must trust you to keep the animals pain to a minimum, 
in order to keep our pain to a minimum!! Keep on using your wonderful brains, for which we 
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are grateful’. Trust is configured here as an unequivocal faith, through the cultivation of which 
researchers can act without the constraint of public accountability and intervention. 
However, such a reading does not mean that the trust directed towards biomedical scientists 
is blind and without expectation. Rather, one way of interpreting such admissions of trust is 
to understand them as performative, serving to emphasise what is at stake in the practice of 
animal research and the responsibility that scientists bear to publics and the animals that are 
used on their behalf. On this point, Szerszynski (1999) claims that ‘[e]xpressions of trust in 
institutions can be […] directive declarations whose intention it is to remind institutions of 
their obligations to live up to that trust – to fill an empty trust, belatedly, with its justification’ 
(Szerszynski, 1999: 250). Given the prominence of understandings of the MOP as building a 
socio-historical record of everyday life (Sheridan, 1996), such writing may indeed be 
intentioned to address a public audience and to fulfil part of their role as a panellist to observe 
and document the practices and opinions of others.   
In this way, pleas for other members of the public to trust that the conduct of biomedical 
researchers will meet societal sensibilities, that those involved will minimise the pain of the 
animals they use, can be interpreted as performing multiple functions. In emphasising the 
trust that ‘we’ on the outside must have in scientists’ minimisation of the pain that laboratory 
animals might experience, the above Observer (H260) can also be recognised, following 
Szerszynski, as appealing to scientists to fulfil this expectation, the implementation of which 
then represents a way for them to personally justify the endeavour. With this, the costs 
accrued, i.e. the harms suffered by laboratory animals, for ‘our’ benefit can be reconciled as 
a necessity. Ultimately, then, using non-human animals in ways which may inflict pain and 
suffering upon them, albeit pain which is hopefully minimised, is trusted as a central way for 
preventing human pain and is thus regarded as an enterprise that ‘we’ as a society should 
faithfully support.  
7.2.2 Applying medical knowledge 
In identifying animal research as an important contributor to biomedical progress, some Mass 
Observers also voice explicit concerns about research activities that do not have clear 
applications for the knowledge they aim to produce. Basic research, research which is often 
characterised as ‘curiosity-driven’ (Duronio et al., 2017), was viewed by some as disconnected 
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from the development of clinical treatments and thus less justifiable. As the following Mass 
Observers describe –  
‘I’ve always had very mixed feelings myself. I really don’t like the thought of it at all 
and when you read some of the horrific stories of the type of experiments carried out 
in the name of research it makes you very angry. But I do feel that trying out drugs or 
surgical procedures on animals prior to their use on humans is a valid option, but I 
don’t agree with experiments just for the sake of it to see what happens.’ (Mass 
Observer R1025) 
~ 
‘I am not against using animals in research but I think there should be a specific 
rationale and goal in mind that is, at least potentially, likely to be of benefit to mankind 
or, indeed, other animals. This would be along the lines of medical research into 
combating diseases, developing vaccines and improving treatments.’ (Mass Observer 
R4526) 
Here, both Mass Observers articulate concerns around research using animals which is 
conducted ‘just for the sake of it to see what happens’ (Mass Observer R1025) or does not 
have ‘a specific rationale’ (Mass Observer R4526). In both excerpts, legitimate reasons for 
using animals in experiments are suggested in terms of developing and safety-testing medical 
treatments for human health issues. Suggested in such writing is that animal research is made 
legitimate, necessary, and morally acceptable through the witnessing of tangible clinical 
outputs. As discussed earlier, given that the benefits of animal research may be understood 
as part of a promised future of medical progress, ambivalences over curiosity-driven research 
hint at the limits of such futuring. In other words, the outputs of animal research may be 
viewed as belonging to a future but, in order to legitimise the current use of animals, this 
future cannot be too distant or vague. Given that in 2019, over half (57%) of the experimental 
procedures involving animals conducted were categorised as for basic research (Home Office, 
2020: 10) such anxieties are of no small consequence.  
In a similar vein, some Mass Observers recalled high-profile cases of developmental biology 
research involving cloned animals, such as ‘Dolly’ the sheep, the first mammal cloned from an 
adult cell, and tissue engineering research such as the ‘Vacanti’ mouse with an ear-like 
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structure grafted onto its back. Given the frequency with which both animals were mentioned 
across MOP responses to the Directive on ‘Using animals in research’, it is fair to say that they 
remain icons of animal research with resonance in the United Kingdom. For many, such stories 
and the images that accompany them continue to represent the power of biomedicine and 
its role in creating potential futures that might be anticipated with both anxiety and 
excitement. For the following Mass Observers, Dolly the sheep and the Vacanti ear-mouse 
are reflected on as, on the one hand, an example of the futility of some research endeavours 
and, on the other, evidence of the cumulative and unpredictable nature of scientific progress, 
in which societal benefits sometimes only become clear in retrospect –  
‘I specifically remember when Dolly the sheep was cloned and it was on Newsround 
and explained in a typical child-friendly way. I just accepted it back then, whereas now 
I think it's like something from a sci-fi film, and I wonder what benefit the feat actually 
brought us? It was a bizarre, freaky thing to do and I can't help but think of all the poor 
little animals that must have been slaughtered to or achieve the end goal. It seems 
like useless science to me. We shouldn't play God to that extent. I feel like genetic 
abnormalities are triggered when we do things against nature, and that clones will die 
awful premature deaths of terrible diseases. Without looking it up, I can't remember 
if Dolly the sheep happened in Britain, or somewhere like Korea. I think it's wonderful 
that British scientists cracked the DNA code, but when they do pointless things it's 
stupid. 
I also remember the mouse with an ear grafted onto it very vividly. It has a very 
shocking image and I found it difficult to look at. I can't remember what point it 
actually proved. Things like that come across as wanton cruelty and that's why people 
get so upset about it. Sometimes I wander what these scientists think about when 
they close their eyes at night.’ (Mass Observer B5342) 
~ 
‘Dolly was about cloning, and although I thought it was a pointless and a cruel thing to 
do at first, I think now that there was a point to it. Scientists have discussed cloning as 
a medical treatment for a long while, and perhaps it is better to try it on a sheep rather 
than a human, although poor Dolly got arthritis. It is quite exciting to think that some 
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of the research resulting from Dolly could improve and save lives in the near future.’ 
(Mass Observer T4715) 
Key to the way in which Dolly and the Vacanti mouse are made sense of in the above MOP 
excerpts is the expectation that the suffering of research animals should bear clear and 
deliberate outputs. As the second Mass Observer (T4715) notes, such benefits may only be 
fully comprehensive later down the line, with time enabling a recasting of such experiments 
as worthwhile and of the harms amassed through them as necessary. Contrasting with 
concerns that clinical benefits of research should not be too far in the future, such 
retrospective writing reveals how necessity can be constructed over time, instilling something 
felt to be abstract and pointless at the time with a newfound utility. Similar concerns about 
the application of research findings were observed in Macnaghten’s (2004) study of current 
and future applications of animal biotechnology via lay focus groups, within which some 
participants questioned ‘the apparent ‘usefulness’ of the prospective applications and their 
known and unknown consequences' (Macnaghten, 2004: 545).  
Indeed, this reflection on the realisation of valuable research benefits over time can be 
understood as evidence of the overlap or interdependence identified between basic and 
applied or ‘translational’ research (Flier and Loscalzo, 2017). Correspondingly, some reject the 
justification of an ethical distinction between the two categories. As Stefan Treue, head of the 
German Primate Centre in Göttingen is quoted as suggesting in a news piece for Nature, ‘It’s 
not a logical argument to say, ‘I accept applied research but I don’t want the underlying basic 
research’, because you can’t have one without the other. I have to admit that partly the 
science community is to blame for not explaining that more clearly and more frequently in 
public’ (Cressey, 2011: 453). However, although the distinction between basic and applied 
research may not be as clear-cut as their separation first indicates, this data analysis shows 
that the distinction between these forms of research matters in terms of everyday 
expectations of benefits to tangibly and materially justify the harms inflicted upon animals.   
Such consequentialist interpretations of the necessity of animal research are evident in the 
harm-benefit analysis which underpins the ethical review of each experiment proposing to 
use animals. However, given the need to anticipate the benefits of a procedure before it is 
completed, the generation of ‘actual’ benefits through such work is always subject to 
uncertainty. As the advisory body Animals in Science Regulation Unit (ASRU) discuss in a 2015 
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advice note, ‘[s]ince the HBA is done before the work is started, there is always some 
uncertainty about benefit delivery. This makes the evaluation of benefit difficult. It is, by 
necessity, a value-laden judgement of the benefits and the likelihood of their delivery’ 
(Animals in Science Regulation Unit, 2015a: 17). Therefore, given that the future benefits of 
biomedical research are often unknowable it is understandable that considerations of risk are 
also involved in Mass Observer understandings of whether certain uses of animals are 
justifiable. This relates not only to the potential harms of the animals involved in such 
research but also, with a lack of control over where the research might lead, what outputs it 
might generate, what precedents it may set, and the creation of potentially harmful futures 
for humans.  
In the case of animal biotechnology, particularly that which involves genetic modification, lay 
concerns around such risks have been well-documented (Frewer et al., 1997; Macnaghten, 
2004; Lassen et al., 2006; Črne-Hladnik et al., 2009) and are often bound up with a valuing of 
‘naturalness’ and a juxtaposition of science and nature. Lay responses of this manner are 
documented in a 2005 public consultation on animal research conducted by the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, which states that many respondents were ‘opposed to the genetic 
modification of animals on the grounds that they felt it was unnatural and breached the 
intrinsic value of an animal’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2005: 306). Articulating a similar 
concern, the former quoted Mass Observer (B5342) writes about the creation of Dolly the 
sheep, ‘I feel like genetic abnormalities are triggered when we do things against nature, and 
that clones will die awful premature deaths of terrible diseases’ (Mass Observer B5342). 
Suggested here is that by interfering with the genetic nature of animals, scientists will cause 
unintended harms, which this Mass Observer implies is retribution for transgressing nature 
and venturing to ‘play God’. Yet, that such concerns are expressed alongside the judgment of 
this case of cloning as ‘useless science’ perhaps reveals how ideas of naturalness and the limits 
of science are also influenced by expectations of discernible biomedical benefits. With the 
research effort that produced Dolly the Sheep seen as failing to proffer any substantial wider 
benefits, for this Observer (B5342) the harms incurred are thus unjustified. The case of Dolly 
the sheep is contrasted with work around the human genetic code, with the Mass Observer 
stating, ‘I think it's wonderful that British scientists cracked the DNA code, but when they do 
pointless things it's stupid’ (ibid). Implied here is that lay understandings of the necessity of 
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animal research are not limited to either purely deontological or consequentialist 
frameworks, but may, at times, mobilise both. Overall, this reflects that, when considering 
the application of biomedical knowledge produced through animal use, Mass Observers may 
mobilise a harm-benefit framework which also involves trust and risk mitigation. 
Furthermore, this data analysis illustrates that the benefits upon which acceptance of animal 
research hinges may be subject to particular time-bound expectations. 
7.2.3 Identifying medical priorities 
In constructing the use of animals for medical research as necessary, not all medical 
applications are judged as equal. In describing outcomes of research using animals which are 
seen to justify the endeavour, Mass Observers often referenced such aims as ‘saving lives’ or 
‘preventing suffering’. As the following MOP excerpts suggest, such medical and moral 
imperatives are largely held as being necessary or more necessary than other research goals 
and their expected outcomes perceived as outweighing the problems around this use of 
animals – 
‘If it can help save human lives in the future, then I see nothing wrong with it, generally 
speaking.’ (Mass Observer K798) 
~ 
‘[…] if drug testing on animals could support the creation of life- saving treatments 
nowadays, I would think that animal testing would be fine and acceptable.’ (Mass 
Observer P5940) 
~ 
‘It is true I have been disturbed by pictures of animals growing physical bits which 
should not be there, but on the whole I am not disturbed by controlled 
experimentation which is designed to lead to reduced human suffering.’ (Mass 
Observer W2322) 
Saving human lives and minimising human suffering are discussed here as largely acceptable 
reasons for using animals in experiments. Such motivations for using animals become 
exceptional in that they represent not only medical imperatives but also moral imperatives. 
Drawing back to the previous chapter on the role of care obligations in shaping how Mass 
166 
 
Observers relate to laboratory animals, expectations of medicine as a field can thus be seen 
as shaped by care obligations to alleviate, and work to end, human suffering. In articulating 
the moral good of medical interventions into human morbidity and mortality, such 
expressions perhaps reflect that though non-human animals are at some level included in 
one’s moral community, what are seen as the ultimate human interests (i.e. to live without 
suffering) are still to be prioritised at their expense. Suggested by such boundary-formation 
around which medical aims justify animal research is that this enables those who find animal 
research morally uncomfortable to demonstrate a ‘balanced’ ethical stance on the issue, 
conveying consideration and care for both humans and non-humans. In other words, by 
constructing acceptable scientific uses of animals as those which concern matters of ‘life or 
death’, the ethical problems raised by using animals in science perhaps become less nuanced, 
with the stakes presented as of critical urgency.  
Related to this denial of nuance, in constructing necessary uses of animals in research as 
framed by ‘life or death’ decisions, the above Mass Observers rely on generalising phrases 
and abstractions. This can be seen in the former and latter Observers’ use of phrases such as 
‘generally speaking’ (Mass Observer K798) and ‘on the whole’ (Mass Observer W2322), and 
questioning of the pragmatic potential of animal research, i.e. ‘if drug testing on animals could 
support the creation of life- saving treatments nowadays […]’ (Mass Observer P5940). Such 
devices work to provide distance from the specifics of scientific experiments using animals, 
whether caused by a lack of detailed knowledge or the desire to maintain consideration of 
animal research at a broad level, at which it cannot be threatened by the minutiae of 
individual cases. Indeed, the use of such rhetorical positioning as a ‘trump meta-argument’ in 
discussions of the acceptability and necessity of animal research was observed in Michael and 
Brown’s (2004) study of lay views towards xenotransplantation. As they describe, ‘[t]here is 
recourse to some vision of a generic life—life per se—which trumps all critical views or 
negative valuations of any biomedical innovation’ (Michael and Brown, 2004: 387).  
However, as the conditionality of the MOP excerpts above suggest (i.e. their hinging on ‘ifs’), 
such constructions of animal research as a matter of life and death and of freedom from 
suffering are also subject to uncertainty. Therefore, in demarcating particular research 
endeavours as necessary uses of animals, these Mass Observers are perhaps attempting to 
call such a reality into being. In this way, such hopes reflect not only affectual investment in 
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biomedical research but, as Novas (2006) puts it, ‘a political and economic materiality that 
seeks to bring to fruition the many future possibilities inherent in the science of the present’ 
(Novas, 2006: 289). This analysis of MOP writing suggests that, in the case of biomedical 
research using animals, support for the practice often hinges on hopes for advancements 
towards what Michael (2017) has termed ‘big futures’, futures which ‘imply very substantial, 
qualitative changes (eg some sort of epochal ‘break’), that are widespread and far-reaching, 
whose spatio-temporal horizons are relatively large-scale’ (Michael, 2017: 510), here being 
futures in which major diseases have been cured. Therefore, rather than representing an 
overall acceptance of the use of animals for medical research, such admissions might instead 
signify an active hoping that such motivations for using animals are actualised. Such a 
‘rhetoric of hope’ (Mulkay, 1993) can thus be interpreted as performative, articulating 
citizenly expectations of science in the aim of supporting their fulfilment.  
In the context of animal research, particularly salient are Brown’s (1998) observations of hope 
discourses in biotechnological innovation, which characterise hope as ‘capable of designating 
a vocabulary of survival in situations and environs of action where survival itself is at stake’ 
(Brown, 1998: 21). They continue that, generally, ‘discourses of hope in modern biomedicine 
[..] are tied into what counts as a meaningful response to death and dying’ (Brown, 1998: 22). 
It is this emphasis on overcoming and, indeed, surviving the future and the threats to health 
it continues to pose that underlies much of the animal research community’s rhetoric on the 
medical necessity of using animal models (UAR 2012; UAR 2020a) and which also shapes how 
Mass Observers construct medical imperatives that justify animal use. In other words, the 
construction of health as survival lends to the construction of medical advancements as 
necessary. Through the investment of hope in animal models as a defence against a 
threatening future, the prohibition of their use therefore becomes akin to leaving patients 
and eventual-patients vulnerable to the future, unable to pre-empt or defend against the 
suffering it will inflict.  
Though articulated through the culture surrounding cancer, Jain’s (2007) concept of ‘living in 
prognosis’ is useful to consider here as a standpoint which influences the way that many Mass 
Observers related to animal research. Jain writes that through prognosis of cancer, ‘[o]ne is 
moved into an abstraction that seems explanatory through its gesture toward universality, 
yet one will only ever live or die. Either way, one’s future will only be absorbed into the truth 
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of prognosis, a truth that recursively projects a future as it acts as a container for a present’ 
(Jain, 2007: 79). Such a future of totalising prognosis can be seen as attached to animal 
research and its representation as a mode of safeguarding against an impending future which 
threatens individual and collective human survival. The mobilisation of such risk-averse 
futures therefore constructs a world in which the possibility of human illness and death in the 
future becomes more salient than the suffering and death of animals in the present, in that 
such a future will arrive and is thus demanding a response in the present.  
In their hoping for a future that animal research can either bring into being or prevent, Mass 
Observers often described particular health conditions as having more justificatory power in 
relation to the scientific use of animals, as the following two excerpts suggest –  
‘I am not against the use of animals for medical testing though I think testing for 
cosmetics should not occur. I suppose it’s a case of the ends justifying the means. If 
we can eradicate diseases like ebola, malaria, if we can learn more about cancer, 
multiple sclerosis, heart failure, diabetes and all the other dreadful diseases which 
afflict people then I think that carefully controlled experiments on animals are 
justified. I think the control is of fundamental importance – and suffering should be 
absolutely minimised.’ (Mass Observer S4743) 
~ 
‘I would never, knowingly, buy a product that I don’t deem as a necessity – eg. 
makeup, perfume, cigarettes (not really applicable as I don’t smoke) that has been 
tested on an animal bred for the purpose. I have a different attitude to animal testing 
in relation to drugs, but then again, it would have to be drugs that are life saving, for 
cancer for example.’ (Mass Observer E743) 
Both Mass Observers above can be read as indicating that some health conditions are of 
higher priority and research in these areas which uses animals is therefore more morally 
justifiable. The conditions mentioned may be associated with high mortality rates or reduced 
lifespan, highlighting the attention given to extensions of life, as the first Mass Observer 
(SE743) qualifies ‘it would have to be drugs that are life saving, for cancer for example’. Again, 
such research aims are discussed in a way which relates to their ends, suggesting expectations 
that related uses of animals will work to ‘eradicate’ (Mass Observer S4743) a targeted ailment 
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and ultimately save lives. As briefly detailed earlier, these types of expectations circulate 
around medical research more generally. However, here, they work to justify the ethical 
problems that animal research raises, reflecting affective investments in the material reality 
promised by the harm-benefit model and not just acceptance of its intentions. In other words, 
such expectations signify an apparent ‘accepting’ of animal research which is premised on the 
condition that experiments deliver substantial medical benefits.  
Inevitably, the other side to judging some health conditions to be more deserving of research 
attention and as justifying the use of animals is that other health conditions may be regarded 
as undeserving. As the following Mass Observer (F4813) indicates, health conditions that are 
seen to be brought on by or as having the potential to be resolved by an individual’s own 
actions may be felt as medical issues of lesser importance and thus the use of animals for such 
research judged as less justifiable –  
‘To my knowledge I have never come directly in contact with someone working in 
laboratories using animals for research. I have, however, often seen people on 
documentaries carrying out work in this environment and they come across as serious 
scientists who are using their skills to carry out work which they feel will be of benefit 
to others; such documentaries, however, are usually focused on work relating to 
development of treatments/cures for serious medical conditions rather than on work 
relating to development of cosmetics/weapons/treatments for conditions which 
could be avoided through lifestyle changes (e.g. nicotine patches for those trying to 
give up smoking who could instead just go "cold turkey") and I think I would feel less 
kindly towards animal researchers working in these fields’ (Mass Observer F4813) 
At a general level, such boundary formation between ‘serious medical conditions’ and 
‘conditions which could be avoided through lifestyle changes’, a differentiation which is 
acknowledged as a societal concern in the Animals in Science Committee’s (ASC) review of 
the HBA  (Animals in Science Committee, 2017: 61), perhaps reflects the prevalence of 
personal health responsibility narratives under neoliberal healthcare regimes. As Peacock et 
al. (2014) observe, neoliberal discourses ‘cohere around a valuing of the self-regulating, self-
surveillant and autonomous self, where those who are not equal to this task face both strain 
and fears that others will judge them as insufficiently responsible’ (Peacock et al., 2014). 
Given the emphasis on individualism and personal rather than state responsibility in 
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contemporary neoliberalism, the mobilisation of narratives around personal responsibility for 
one’s health and illness in relation to animal research may be unsurprising. Indeed, the impact 
of neoliberalism on public healthcare provisions in the industrialised West and cultural 
understandings and practices of health more broadly have been well documented (see 
McGregor, 2001; Teghtsoonian, 2009; Ayo, 2012). Thus, with these shifts towards the 
privatisation of healthcare, Rose (2001) claims that ‘[e]very citizen must now become an 
active partner in the drive for health, accepting their responsibility for securing their own 
well-being’ (Rose, 2001: 6).  
Discussions of health responsibility have been particularly pertinent in relation to the 
transplantation of organs which are often associated with ‘self-inflicted’ unhealthy lifestyle 
choices, a prime example of which being liver transplants (Glannon, 1998; Brudney, 2007; 
Glannon, 2009). Representations of ill health as the product of personal failings to be healthy 
may not only have ramifications on equal access to healthcare but also, as suggested by the 
above Mass Observer (F4813), on research priorities and the subsequent development of 
medical treatments. Yet, such categorising of medical conditions more widely reflects that 
research funding is not equal and priorities are already made in practice which mean that 
certain health conditions, and the people that experience them, have more or less clinical 
treatment options at their disposal. Such boundary-formation around which health 
conditions warrant scientific investigation using animals also works to construct animal 
research as a method that deals primarily with ‘cures’ and not prevention, with the latter 
represented above as within an individual’s control and not requiring medical intervention, 
i.e. one ‘could instead just go "cold turkey"’ (Mass Observer F4813).  
Regardless of the validity of such claims that certain health conditions are preventable, 
perhaps this thinking demonstrates a way of unsettling the ultimate prioritisation of interests 
represented through animal research, that being the preference given to improving human 
life at the expense of non-human animals. Reading the above Mass Observer’s (F4813) writing 
through the dominant harm-benefit framework demonstrates that human health does not 
always trump that of non-human animals. In this context, mobilising personal health 
responsibility narratives might signify a way of balancing considerations for laboratory 
animals alongside humans who require medical interventions by employing hierarchies of 
human health and illness which destabilise the prioritisation of human interests.   
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Overall, the data analysis presented in this section demonstrates that constructions of 
necessary scientific uses of animals hinge on advancing the field of medicine. Yet, this 
overarching objective has particular conditions, with the application of medical knowledge 
and the witnessing of this through personal experiences of healthcare developments over 
time being crucial to legitimising animal research as necessary. As well as this, many Mass 
Observers discuss certain aims and areas of health and illness as priorities for biomedical 
research using animals. Hence, medical purposes for using animals in science are shown as 
having conditionalities, the fulfilment of which is central to accepting their necessity.   
7.3 Defining medicine 
In further exploring understandings of medical advancement as a necessary purpose for using 
animals in research, this second section will analyse a distinction frequently made throughout 
MOP responses between the ‘medical’ and the ‘cosmetic’. In doing so, the example of 
cosmetics and product testing as a way of contrasting and thus defining what constitutes 
medicine will be examined, along with Mass Observers’ reflections on instances where this 
dichotomy becomes blurred.  
7.3.1 Medicine as not cosmetics 
In articulating the necessity of using animals in medical research, many Mass Observers 
contrasted medical research and its underlying drives, i.e. advancing medical knowledge and 
treatments, alleviating human suffering, and ‘saving lives’, against the use of animals for 
developing and safety-testing cosmetic products. Indeed, such a distinction is also evident in 
the scientific literature (Kabene and Baadel, 2019). As the following excerpts illustrate, in 
making the case for the exceptionality of using animals for medical purposes, common across 
MOP responses were uses of the example of cosmetics and product-testing as a ‘foil’ to 
validate the distinction being made –  
‘I consider work on cosmetic products frivolous but people working on medical 
research which has tangible benefits for people’s lives I consider to be doing good 
work.’ (Mass Observer S5780) 
~ 
‘As a teenage girl I applauded the introduction of cruelty free cosmetics, because 
cosmetics aren't necessary to keep a person alive – that comes under my dislike of 
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cruelty for recreational purposes mentioned above. But drugs are made to prevent 
human suffering and I am grateful for the human work and animal life that has gone 
into providing that for me.’ (Mass Observer C5831) 
~ 
‘I find it a really tricky subject and I think I have probably changed my views over time. 
I am more aware now of the scientific advances which have used animal testing before 
applying to humans, and I do think that this is valid. I don’t however think that there 
is justification for animal testing in non-medical areas (such as cosmetics) – to me if it 
has the potential to save lives or help combat illnesses then that is where I think there 
is a justification.’ (Mass Observer S3711) 
The juxtaposition of using animals for the development or testing of cosmetic products with 
medical research was common across MOP accounts, with the former often described as 
frivolous and absent of the association that medical research bears with saving lives and 
alleviating suffering. In making this distinction, the use of animals for ‘cosmetic testing’ was 
often presented as self-evidently unjustifiable in comparison to medical research, which, as 
can be inferred from some of the above excerpts, was taken to be nuanced but ultimately 
worthwhile. In this way, cosmetic testing is raised in order to act as an unambiguous example 
of the socio-ethical parameters of using animals for research, parameters that often become 
blurred when discussing the use of animals for medical purposes. In doing so, evoking the 
case of cosmetic testing helps to define what medical research is through contrast with what 
it is not,  as Gieryn (1983) puts it, ‘the public better learn about "science" through contrasts 
to "non-science"’ (Gieryn, 1983: 791). This can be seen as constituting not only scientific 
boundary work, but also ‘ethical boundary work’ (Wainwright et al., 2006; and for analysis of 
ethical boundary work by laboratory scientists, see Hobson-West, 2012) around what is and 
is not an ethically legitimate research endeavour.  
There are different ways to interpret the mention of cosmetics in discussions of animal 
research. In their investigation of ‘public views on openness’ around animal research, Ipsos 
MORI interpreted references to cosmetic testing by participants as reflective of ‘inaccurate 
and outdated beliefs around why research is carried out on animals’, stating that ‘[e]ven when 
presented with the facts that cosmetics research is no longer legal in the European Union, 
many still kept referring to ‘cosmetic testing’ when discussing animal research later in the 
173 
 
sessions’ (Ipsos MORI, 2013: 17). However, this analysis of writings from the MOP suggests 
that discussion of the use of animals for the development and testing of cosmetics does not 
merely represent a lack of knowledge or belief in a persistent ‘myth’ (Ipsos MORI, 2013: 57) 
about animal research. Rather, as touched on in the first data chapter, in such discussions, 
expressing a clear judgment on the unacceptability of cosmetic-related research may 
represent a way in which people can demonstrate clear ethical limits towards an issue which 
is often perceived as a moral dilemma.  
One way of interpreting the frequent mention of cosmetics across MOP responses is that it 
indicates the relevance of the practice of consumption to discussions of animal research. 
Commenting on the process of governing through consumption, Rose (1999) argues that 
‘[d]isciplinary techniques and moralizing injunctions as to health, hygiene and civility are no 
longer required; the project of responsible citizenship has been fused with individuals’ 
projects for themselves’ (Rose, 1999: 88). In this construction of selfhood as a project to be 
actualised through consumption practices, so called ‘ethical consumption’, which Barnett et 
al. (2005) conceptualise as ‘a form of action-at-a-distance’, is to be recognised as a way of 
constituting moral selfhood or part of a ‘moral selving’ (Allahyari, 2000).   
Given the performativity of consumption practices, the option of choosing ‘cruelty-free’ 
cosmetic products, those with no animal involvement in their development or safety-testing, 
may thus signify a way in which agents can act upon their moral convictions around the use 
of animals in research and development processes and, further, intervene by ‘voting with 
one’s wallet’. Within this consumer context, the ‘cruelty-free’ label can be seen as casting 
animal research practices (and the products they bear) as ‘cruelty-involved’ (indeed, this 
suggestion is also inferred by UAR chief executive Wendy Jarrett (see Devlin, 2014)) and 
insinuating, given that the replacement of animals has been possible in this area, that their 
use is no longer necessary elsewhere. Looking beyond the consumer context, more than 
simply being used to describe consumptions practices or products themselves, ‘cruelty-free’ 
as a label can be applied to modes of living more broadly (Potts and Parry, 2010). Therefore, 
given the importance of consumer contexts for ethical performances, the repeated mention 
of cosmetics and ‘cruelty-free’ products in animal research discussions cannot simply be 
interpreted as reflecting a lack of awareness of current legislation. Rather, cosmetic products 
and ‘cruelty-free’ labelling, in which animal research is present through its absence, should 
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be recognised as a significant way in which people encounter animal research in the everyday 
and, unlike other areas of scientific research, as an issue on which clear-cut ethical positions 
can more easily be demonstrated. 
Moreover, by locating animal research in the everyday contexts which are central to Mass 
Observation, the mention of cosmetics may be understood not as a deficit of regulatory 
knowledge, but, conversely, a manifestation of the banning of this type of animal research at 
both the national and European level (EU Directive, 2010). Such writing about the 
unacceptability of ‘cosmetic testing’ which uses animals may function to reaffirm these 
sanctions on the scientific use of animals. In this way, the discussion of cosmetics in relation 
to animal research can be viewed as occurring in conversation with the ban on using animals 
for cosmetic testing, which, given the role that citizen lobbying played in its accomplishment 
(McIvor, 2019), may loom large in lay imaginations of animal research.   
Additionally, given that commodity chains can often extend beyond national boundaries, 
national legislation cannot always be relied upon to guide ethical consumption practices, as 
the following Mass Observers suggest –  
‘I am glad animal testing for cosmetics is banned in the UK although companies can 
still test abroad and then sell products here.’ (Mass Observer M4780) 
~ 
‘Many years ago, I remember one highly publicized example of rabbits being used for 
eye make-up research which horrified me and many millions of others – it was just so 
very wrong. I am not the type of person to protest but I remember signing a petition 
at the time and I still believe that animal testing for solely cosmetic purposes is totally 
unacceptable. I believe it is now illegal or at least strictly controlled in this country but 
it concerns me that so many products are now being brought in from abroad - China 
in particular and their animal welfare standards are not even close to ours.’ (Mass 
Observer F5890) 
Both of these Mass Observers identify that the use of animals for developing or safety-testing 
cosmetic products is banned in the UK, though still express concern about products imported 
from countries without such legislation in place. Such recognition of the global context in 
175 
 
which commodities circulate therefore renders partial the impact of national or regional (EU) 
law and may be seen by consumers as requiring personal diligence when attempting to 
consume in line with one’s own ethics. In the case of cosmetic products, this means that the 
‘Leaping Bunny’ logo9, the widely recognised symbol of ‘cruelty-free’ products, is more than 
symbolic. This logo tells consumers that a brand does not use animals in the production and 
safety-testing of any of their products and adheres to these standards in all countries, not 
selling in those requiring animal testing by law (i.e. Mainland China). The topic of cosmetics 
may therefore still find relevance in discussions of animal research due to the global context 
of consumption. Considering this, perhaps the repeated mention of cosmetics could reflect a 
citizenly urge to enforce such standards upon the global market or prevent the sale of such 
products within national or European borders. Paying attention to the global marketing of 
cosmetics therefore means that the use of animals for ‘cosmetic testing’ also remains 
pertinent at a procedural level to animal research discussions.  
7.3.2 Cosmetics as medicine 
On the other hand, rather than reinforcing the boundary between cosmetics and medicine, 
some Mass Observers touch on nuances within this distinction and express uncertainty 
around deeming cosmetics as unequivocally unnecessary. As the two Observers below discuss 
-  
‘I think testing for cosmetic purposes has to be made illegal, on the basis that it’s a 
vanity product. But for some people it’s a necessity – for example for those who have 
suffered extensive scarring or disfigurement and need a certain type of makeup for 
their mental and emotional well being.’ (Mass Observer E743) 
~ 
‘I still don’t buy cosmetics or products tested on animals because it’s not necessary to 
do so, and it’s pointless to harm a rabbit with shampoo. 







I think I’d be against a drug tested on animals that was for something of very dubious 
efficacy, say a weight-loss pill that didn’t really work, or an injected substance used 
for cosmetic purposes. That said, I know some drugs are used for cosmetic procedures 
and for medical purposes : as a recipient of botulinum toxin for migraine and chronic 
pain I might sound hypocritical saying I disapprove of animal testing on such 
substances. Morally I object to botox being used for cosmetic reasons, especially if it 
means an animal has suffered in the process. But I don’t think about animals being 
harmed when I get my treatment, only the resulting respite from my symptoms.’ 
(Mass Observer T4715) 
As the first Mass Observer (E743) describes, cosmetics can at times be seen to serve a similar 
purpose to medical treatments, acting as tools to promote positive mental or emotional 
health. Here, external physical conditions i.e. ‘extensive scarring or disfigurement’ are 
understood as having the potential to impact negatively on mental health, and in such cases, 
cosmetic products transcend their common status as ‘vanity products [sic]’ and become akin 
to medical interventions. The second Mass Observer (T4715) acknowledges that some drugs 
are used for both ‘medical’ and ‘cosmetic’ purposes and, as an example of this, considers their 
personal receipt of Botulinum toxin (commonly referred to as ‘Botox’) for pain relief. A 
distinction is made between their usage of Botox, ‘for migraine and chronic pain’, and ‘botox 
being used for cosmetic purposes’. However, this Mass Observer (T4715) also recognises their 
lack of reflection on the suffering inflicted on animals for their own receipt of the treatment, 
thinking about ‘only the resulting respite from my symptoms’. Such admissions reveal how 
the construction of ethical boundaries between cosmetics and medicine may be experienced, 
even by those who erect them, as blurred. 
Indeed, the blurring of both categories has been charted through the emergence of a new 
medical field: ‘aesthetic medicine’, which, Edmonds (2013) claims, ‘aims at nothing less than 
fusing health and beauty’ (Edmonds, 2013: 233). In considering the medical appropriation of 
beauty, categorising biomedical research endeavours as for ‘cosmetic’ or ‘medical’ purposes 
becomes trickier. Furthermore, the example of research into the efficacy of using aesthetic 
treatments such as Botox injections to reduce clinical depression, based on ideas that Botox 
‘may make patients appear more physically attractive and/or express less negative affect 
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during social interactions’ (Coles et al., 2019: 295), illustrates the complex entanglement of 
beauty and biomedicine, together seeking to make health interventions.  
This blurring of cosmetics and medicine has also been prominent in feminist theorising of 
‘beauty’ and the female body (Wolf, 1991; Heyes, 2007), which has even demonstrated 
overlap between medical concepts such as ‘cosmetic’ and ‘reconstructive’ surgery (Naugler, 
2012). Such literature has sought to both politicise the growing prevalence of cosmetic 
procedures and the booming beauty industry and understand the motivations of those, 
mainly women, who utilise such products and procedures. In situating the use of cosmetics 
within patriarchal cultures, feminist approaches enable a reinterpretation of women’s 
investment in their appearance as culturally and politically charged, and, phenomenologically, 
as part of a wider performing of a normative feminine body (Dolezal, 2010; Heggenstaller et 
al., 2018; and for discussion of race in this area see Heyes, 2012; Menon, 2017) which has 
been appropriated through health discourses. Though not unproblematic, and with much 
contention around the agency of those who elect to undergo cosmetic procedures (Morgan, 
1991; Davis, 1995; Heyes and Jones, 2009; Alsop and Lennon, 2018), recognising the location 
of such practices in structures which scrutinise the appearance of women acknowledges the 
role that cosmetic bodily interventions play at personal and political levels, thus granting 
them more meaning than is often assumed.  
Overall, this section has aimed to demonstrate the ways in which constructions of cosmetics 
as unnecessary remain meaningful and relevant in animal research discussions. In paying 
attention to everyday contexts, instead of merely signifying a lack of knowledge about current 
legislation the frequent mention of ‘cosmetic testing’ can be seen as reflecting the key role 
that consumption plays in ordinary encounters with animal research. As argued, within such 
contexts, asserting one’s opposition to the use of animals for developing or safety-testing 
cosmetic products remains salient due to the marketing of ‘cruelty-free’ products and the 
global nature of commodity chains, which generate uncertainty about products without such 
labels and the regulation (or lack of) in countries that export products to the UK. As well as 
this, discussion of the unacceptability of using animals for ‘cosmetic testing’ can be 
understood as a way for Mass Observers to enact clear ethical limits towards the scientific 
use of animals, which, as illustrated in the previous section, can become blurred in regard to 
medical research. As argued earlier in this chapter, by their common associations of 
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biomedicine with altruistic aims of alleviating suffering and aiding the treatment of ‘serious’ 
diseases and illnesses some Mass Observers can be seen as performing ethical boundary 
work. In such framings, the advancement of medicine is treated as an ethical purpose for 
using animals and non-medical usages, such as the prime example considered here of 
‘cosmetic testing’, are met with suspicion and concern. However, as this section has 
demonstrated, some Mass Observers also reflect on the overlap between ‘medical’ and 
‘cosmetic’ categories and identify areas in which cosmetic products and procedures may 
serve ‘medical’ purposes, thus troubling a clear-cut distinction between necessary and 
unnecessary (and ethical and unethical purposes) for using animals in science. 
7.4 Unsettling biomedicine as progress 
Unlike the previous two sections which have analysed the ways in which Mass Observers 
make distinctions between ‘necessary’ and ‘unnecessary’ uses of animals in research, using 
the authority of medicine to navigate such judgements, this section will demonstrate how the 
definition and reach of medicine itself may be challenged and resisted. As will be shown, some 
Mass Observers offer contesting interpretations of ‘medical’ research and express concern 
over medical interventions which are seen to breach the ‘natural’ state of both human and 
non-human animals, leading to a more radical or foundational challenge to the biomedical 
endeavour itself. Given this, the title of this section is deliberate in its double meaning, 
alluding to both the act of unsettling and the experience of being unsettled by biomedicine 
and its entanglement with notions of progress.  
7.4.1 The limits of biomedical research 
The association of medicine and the ‘medical’ with altruism displayed in the previous MOP 
excerpts was not shared by all those who responded to the Directive. Although only a minority 
of correspondents were critical of the status of medicine, such critique is important in the 
way it unsettles the notion that medical advancements represent an unquestionable societal 
good. As the following Mass Observer’s querying of the types of activities subsumed under 
the heading ‘medical research’ suggests, the medical classification is open to multiple 
interpretations –  
‘Of course their are all sort of questions about what is medical animal research? Is it 
animal research to see how many chickens can be stuffed into one crate and still 
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survive to be sold, and as that affects the diets of many people is there a health aspect 
to that?’ (Mass Observer B3010) 
In imagining an experiment with clear welfare implications, ‘how many chickens can be 
stuffed into one crate and still survive to be sold’, and one which relates more closely to 
livestock production yet may affect ‘the diets of many people’, this Mass Observer (B3010) 
can be seen as making a point about the ambiguity inherent to the categories of ‘health’ and 
‘medicine’. However purposely provocative, such questions reveal the multiple 
configurations that health can take. The mundanity of this example contrasts with the classic 
image of the sterile laboratory, which ‘displays itself as a site of action from which 'nature' is 
as much as possible excluded’ (Knorr-Cetina, 1983: 119), as a standardised ‘placeless’ space 
(Birke et al., 2007: 37) which is afforded status as ‘a moral haven, a socio-ethical domain 
within which things are “done properly”’ (ibid, 158). In suggesting a connection between this 
type of ‘experiment’ and human health benefits, the Mass Observer (B3010) gestures to the 
diversity of structures in which human health is implicated and, in turn, can be read as 
decentring the exceptionality of ‘modern’ medicine. The implications of such provocative 
questioning regarding animal research are to challenge the taken-for-granted authority of 
‘medical research’, a category which, as argued earlier in this chapter, is often constructed as 
beyond reproach and of the ultimate necessity.  
The lack of specificity in what counts as ‘medical research’ and the performative role that this 
categorisation plays has been commented on by Blattner (2019). Blattner argues that ‘the 
societal objectives of curing diseases or producing new scientific knowledge typically operate 
as a carte blanche that legitimate every form of animal exploitation and give the 3Rs only 
relative validity. But simply dropping the words cancer research cannot and should not 
automatically justify the use of animals’ (Blattner, 2019: 176). That such critique of the 
vagueness of ‘medical research’ and the legitimising role it plays is apparent in lay 
understandings of animal research is important to recognise, particularly given, as discussed 
in Chapter 6, that some in the bioscience community have made appeals to a moral and 
citizenly duty to care for the health of others (Harris, 2005; Nicoll, 1991). Scepticism towards 
the employment of the broad category of medicine as a reason for using animals in research 
suggests, at least in part, that more detail is needed to provide an accurate insight into both 
how and why animals are being used for medical purposes.  
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Related to this querying of the boundaries of medical research and the category’s justificatory 
power, a different Mass Observer (S496) questions the limits of medical knowledge, asking –  
‘Now that the scientists know so much about human bodies, do these test's ever have 
an end to them? How much more do scientists need to know?’ (Mass Observer S496) 
Charting the progress perceived to have been made in medical science, this Mass Observer 
questions the existence of an end goal of animal research, and perhaps scientific research in 
general. Such querying of the continual quest for scientific knowledge as justification for this 
use of animals challenges the ‘research imperative’ underpinning medical research, a term 
first used by moral theologian Paul Ramsay during a debate in 1976 and which has since 
featured prominently in the work of bioethicist Daniel Callahan. Callahan (2003) describes the 
research imperative as ‘the drive to gain scientific knowledge for its own sake or as a motive 
to achieve a worthy practical end. Research generates not only new knowledge but new leads 
for even more future knowledge […] Research has its own internal imperative, that of learning 
still more, and more’ (Callahan, 2003: 3). Discussing the research imperative’s employment 
as moral imperative, Wayne and Glass (2010) claim that ‘given the scientific soundness of any 
given project (in other words, its legitimacy as research), medical research is always good to 
pursue. Research that is not good is so only because it is not good medical science’ (Wayne 
and Glass, 2010: 375). Critiques of the self-justifying construction of medical research are 
important in considering what ‘healthcare’ means and at which point medical research goals 
will have been fulfilled. As implied by the above Mass Observer (S496), personal visions of 
medical futures are not uniform and do not always involve the realisation of ongoing scientific 
research.  
Relatedly, another Mass Observer considered the value of other factors in progressing 
medicine and management of illness and disease. As the following Observer (K4722) suggests 
by reflecting on their professional insights into cancer care working as a nurse, advancements 
made in this area are not entirely the product of biomedical research and the associated 
development of clinical treatments. Rather, improvements to diagnostic tools and screening 
practices are also important to recognise as contributing to progress in cancer care–  
‘When buying any medication for myself or family, I never think about the scientific 
research on animals that went into producing them. Although, I do at work, as a nurse 
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giving chemotherapy to patients with cancer. I have been aware of the years, that 
animals have been used for scientific research in order to produce the Chemotherapy. 
I am acutely aware that rats have been used to help produce some of the monoclonal 
Antibodies and cytotoxic drugs that we administer. 
I have to confess, that I do feel a bit tied, as I think that animal testing for research is 
cruel, yet if we didn't use this practice, then we would not have seen the medical 
advances that we have seen today. In cancer care, I know that this hasn't been the 
only thing that has produced results, as screening has also got much better. 
But over the last 15 years, whilst giving chemotherapy, the drugs that we give have 
also been able to give researchers the spring board to improve on the drugs that come 
out next, but without using animals in the past, we wouldn't be where we are now. I 
do believe, that animal are not used near as much as they did years ago, as science 
are now able to produce a more synthetic version of drugs, that had previously used 
animals.’ (Mass Observer K4722) 
This Mass Observer (K4722) notes the contributory role that animal studies have played in 
developing cancer treatments, such as chemotherapy, which in their professional capacity 
they administer to patients. Yet, as they go on to ‘confess’, animal research makes them ‘feel 
a bit tied’, due to their understanding that without the previous scientific uses of animals, ‘we 
would not have seen the medical advances that we have seen today’, with the implication of 
this being supposed as an inability to deliver the forms of clinical care that are now available. 
However brief, considerations of the roles that other clinical procedures, in this case 
screening, are important to acknowledge in discussions on animal research due to the 
dominance of the research imperative across the biomedical sciences.  
7.4.2 Medicine without animals: hopes for alternatives 
Another consideration of importance to this topic is how some Mass Observers gestured to 
the future development of non-human animal alternatives, expressing hopes that such 
technological advancements will replace the need to use animals altogether. Even amongst 
Observers who conditionally agreed with the use of animals for (at least certain aspects of) 
medical research, hopes towards the total replacement of animal models were prominent 
alongside this, as the following MOP excerpts illustrate –  
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‘My hope is that science will come up with solutions to make animal testing 
redundant. I think technology is advancing in this direction and I feel fairly confident 
it will happen during my lifetime.’ (Mass Observer C3210) 
~ 
‘In terms of openness and educating the public, I think vivisection is something people 
don’t want to think about. I know I don’t like to. It is a necessary evil - if my husband 
or my baby niece got ill I probably wouldn’t care how many animals had died in the 
name of research - but I hope it will become less necessary as in-vitro and computer 
modelling techniques improve.’ (Mass Observer C5847) 
~ 
‘Scientific advances are producing accurate and less expensive non-animal testing 
methods. We now know how to grow human cells and tissues in a laboratory – without 
harming anyone. The rise of computer modelling techniques is also moving us 
forward. Hopefully we will soon reach a point when animals do not need to be used 
in scientific research.’ (Mass Observer D5698) 
Perhaps such hopes that the scientific use of animals will, at some point, cease to be necessary 
help to mitigate one’s guilt and shame for ‘accepting’ the infliction of such harms on non-
human animals for what are felt as both intimately personal and collective human benefits. 
In this vein, the expression of hope for alternatives and replacement may also reflect another 
way that Mass Observers can demonstrate ‘good morals’, in that although they, in some 
cases, reluctantly accept the current scientific use of animals, it is ultimately hoped that this 
use of animals will eventually be unnecessary. Implied by such expectations that animals will 
sooner or later be replaced by alternative models is that acceptance of their use if ‘necessary’ 
in the present may be undermined if such expectations are not fulfilled and the ‘present’ of 
the future remains one in which animals are still argued to be scientifically necessary. 
Furthermore, given the ways in which some Mass Observers question the pre-eminence of 
human interests represented through animal research and more widely, as demonstrated in 
the previous chapter’s examination of how Mass Observers articulate care obligations beyond 
anthropocentrism, trust in the ‘necessity’ of animal models may diminish if substantial 
advancements in this direction are not granted in the future.  
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Thus, alongside the rhetorical work of such hoping, helping to ease one’s own ethical trouble 
over the condoned suffering of animals, the articulation of such hopes may be intended to 
play a pragmatic role in MOP accounts on animal research, in, as touched on earlier in this 
chapter, attempting to enrol those in the present in one’s vision of the future (Michael, 2017). 
For instance, although A(SP)A 1986 states that project licences are only granted on the 
condition that ‘the specified programme of work does not involve the application of any 
regulated procedure to which there is a scientifically satisfactory alternative method or 
testing strategy not entailing the use of a protected animal’ (Home Office, 2014: 37), there is 
argument of widespread failures in exploring suitable alternatives (Knight, 2011) and also that 
the development of non-human animal alternatives is significantly underfunded (Taylor, 
2014; Taylor, 2019), therefore maintaining reliance on animal models. Given this, to take 
seriously the prominence of hopes for the total replacement of animals in MOP writing on 
animal research would be to acknowledge lay interest in increased funding for developing 
alternative models.  
Therefore, in recognising lay emotional investment in alternatives, the emphasis research 
advocacy groups like UAR place in statements such as ‘[a]nimal research can only be carried 
out in the UK where there is no suitable non-animal alternative’ (UAR 2014b) and a ‘large 
proportion of the UK public accept the use of animals for research as long as there is no 
unnecessary suffering and there is no alternative’ (Williams, 2020b) as signifiers of public 
acceptance is undermined. This is to say that, as any claims of any ‘public’s’ acceptance of 
animal research hinge crucially on the argument that animal models are (currently) necessary, 
with hopes and expectations invested in the future replacement of animals, the claimed 
necessity of animal research cannot itself be seen as an unproblematic guarantor of societal 
support.   
In summary, the data analysis presented in this chapter up to now reveals that, although using 
animals for the purpose of advancing medicine plays a key role in Mass Observers’ 
constructions of the practice as necessary, such advancements are themselves subject to 
conditions. As discussed here, key to many Mass Observer configurations of using animals for 
medical purposes is scepticism towards ‘basic research’ and, in depicting valuable 
applications of medical research, the prioritisation of ‘curing’ major illnesses and developing 
medical interventions which are perceived as ‘life-saving’. Such aspects of Mass Observer 
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expectations, hopes, and anticipations for medical progress arising through animal research 
are often made in reference to a future which stands to threaten the health and survival of 
human lives near and far. However, other visions of the future are also often at play in Mass 
Observer ‘acceptance’ of animal research for medical purposes, that being hopes for the total 
replacement of animal models brought about by the development of non-human animal 
alternatives. If we frame this future imaginary as part of an ‘anticipatory regime’ and thus as 
‘demanding a response’ (Adams et al., 2009: 249), then lay interests in the future replacement 
of animal models can be seen as lending weight to further attention to this area in the present. 
The implications of such hopes for alternatives to animal models will be discussed further in 
the final chapter of this thesis. For now, this subsection stands to emphasise that support for 
the use of animals for medical research is often also tied up with investments in the eventual 
replacement of animal models with non-human animal alternatives.  
7.4.3 Health beyond medicine 
However, not all Mass Observers mobilised a medical model in writing about health. 
Considering the purpose of medical research to improve human health, some Mass Observers 
raised more fundamental concerns towards the scientific use of animals, articulating doubts 
towards the idea that medical interventions, particularly those that extend human life, are 
always societally desirable. Although making different points, the following Observers both 
articulate normative limits to biomedical interventions in human health –  
‘The research is obviously advancing medicine in leaps and bounds and part of me 
thinks that we should get back to nature and just let survival of the fittest and natural 
selection take place. Saying that though if it were my child or family member with a 
disease that would benefit from these advances then I’m presuming I would probably 
feel a lot differently.’ (Mass Observer H5845) 
~ 
‘Valid research on medicines to reduce pain, kill viruses and bacteria are required to 
improve the survival rate of people around the world; although I would weight this for 
‘real’ medicine and not just that to keep people hanging on to live into their 100’s’ 
(Mass Observer F4873) 
185 
 
Both Mass Observers suggest that there should be socio-ethical limits to medical 
interventions, the former Observer (H5845) conveying this, perhaps flippantly, as returning 
‘back to nature’ and letting ‘survival of the fittest and natural selection take place’, with the 
suggested assumption being that medicine’s prolonging of human life is in some way 
detrimental. However, this thought is then self-reflexively answered by the Observer’s 
admission: ‘though if it were my child or family member with a disease that would benefit 
from these advances then I’m presuming I would probably feel a lot differently’ (H5845). As 
touched on in the previous chapter on care, such care obligations are crucial to thinking about 
animal research and complicate the enacting of broad ethical propositions such as the 
perhaps glibly suggested return to a brutally competitive ‘nature’. Nevertheless, such musings 
on the limits of medical advancement reveal anxieties around the future that such research 
may work to create and illustrate the importance of deliberation over what kinds of 
healthscapes are to be brought into being. 
In this vein, perhaps the observation that research is ‘advancing medicine in leaps and bounds’ 
(H5845) reflects that the pace of biomedical research might be felt as moving beyond socio-
ethical parameters, leaving behind societal concerns, and hailing a future that some do not 
feel ready for. Such reflections on the role of momentum and time in understandings of 
biomedical progress, may relate to Knowles’ (2014) concept of ‘slow disasters’. Knowles 
describes the slow disaster as stretching ‘both back in time and forward across generations 
to indeterminate points, punctuated by moments we have traditionally conceptualized as 
"disaster," but in fact claiming much more life and wealth across time than is generally 
calculated’ (Knowles, 2014: 777). In contrast to the ‘slowness’ of the disasters that Knowles 
describes, concerns around the speed and scope of biomedical research may amplify anxieties 
in that we may not realise the full extent of its ethical ramifications until ‘too late’. In the case 
of animal research, the ’disaster’ envisioned through such worries is both fast and slow, the 
ramifications of biomedicine are felt as fast-paced and sweeping, yet are also gradual, with 
roots that reach ‘both back in time and forward across generations’. Given this, concerns 
towards biomedical research and its impact on human health may coalesce around the 
precedent being set in harming animals to support or extend human life.  
With a similar, though differently articulated focus on the longevity of human life, the second 
Mass Observer (F4873) quoted above distinguishes ‘Valid research’ as that which produces 
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‘’real’ medicine and not just that to keep people hanging on to live into their 100’s’. Objections 
to biomedical research concerning the extension of human lifespans emphasise that such 
areas of medical research do not always fit unproblematically within conceptions of 
healthcare. Indeed, the moral acceptability of research into human longevity has been subject 
to much philosophical debate (Harris, 2004; Pijnenburg and Leget, 2007; Caplan, 2005), and 
some scholars have sought to involve the views of publics within such discussions (Partridge 
et al., 2009). Locating the struggle against mortality as central to the research imperative of 
modern medicine, Callahan (2000) claims that contemporary medicine ‘has an almost sacred 
duty to combat all the known causes of death. Underlying this view is the assumption, usually 
tacit, that death is the principal evil of human life’ (Callahan, 2000: 654). However, as implied 
in such excerpts from the MOP, the prolongation of human life does not always qualify as a 
necessary medical endeavour and is made further ethically dubious when implicated in a 
process of killing other animals.  
Overall, this section has examined instances where biomedical frameworks of health are 
resisted or reframed, touching on concerns towards the ambiguities within ‘medical’ 
classifications, scepticism towards the existence of an end goal to medical research, hopes 
and expectations for the replacement of animals in science with alternatives, and worries 
about the futures that biomedical research might bring forth. In considering these challenges 
towards the foundations of biomedicine, ruptures are identified in assumptions of unanimous 
acceptance of animal research for medical purposes (Ipsos MORI, 2018), with medicine and 
health being open to multiple interpretations, some of which work to unsettle the widespread 
prioritisation of human life at the expense of other animals.  
7.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter has illustrated that although the notion of ‘medical research’ and 
the advancement of medicine as an overarching aim was key to many Mass Observers’ 
construction of some forms of animal research as necessary, within this construction are 
particular conditions and nuances. For instance, the first section demonstrated that 
classifications of scientific uses of animals as ‘medical’ are subject to particular stipulations, 
such as the application of scientific knowledge to generate tangible, worthy, and timely 
medical outputs. Yet, this data analysis has also shown how instilling value in animal research 
applications may be done retrospectively, with some Mass Observers reassessing past 
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biomedical endeavours with current understandings of their implications in the present. The 
value of such applications is also considered through a lens of risk, with concerns expressed 
towards biomedical ventures which breach notions of naturalness. Alongside expectations of 
the application of scientific knowledge, many Mass Observers discussed the importance of 
medical research for focusing on areas which can prevent the most suffering or prolong 
human life, with some correspondents making distinctions of deservingness between health 
conditions in which some illnesses are characterised as self-inflicted and belonging more to 
the realm of lifestyle than medicine.  
In exploring medicine and medical research as representative of necessity, the second section 
analysed the common distinction made in the MOP responses between the ‘medical’ and the 
‘cosmetic’, using the latter to validate the former by way of contrast. As was argued, such a 
division centres on constructions of medicine as inherently altruistic, being crucial for the 
promotion of health, and cosmetics as frivolous vanity products.  Rather than representing a 
knowledge deficit or a persistent belief in ‘myths’ (Ipsos MORI, 2013), this analysis argued 
that cosmetics remain relevant to animal research discussions due to the importance of 
consumption practices in the everyday. With the consumption of ‘cruelty-free’ cosmetic 
products providing a way to enact clear ethical boundaries towards the use of animals in 
research and remaining pragmatically relevant in the global context of consumption practices 
with legislative differences across states. Yet, this section also illustrated that the demarcation 
between the ‘cosmetic’ and the ‘medical’ may become blurred, with some Mass Observers 
reflecting on instances where the cosmetic and the medical overlap. As discussed, such 
understandings relate to frameworks of aesthetic medicine which seek to establish a link 
between cosmetic interventions and health. This analysis thus troubles the boundary work 
between medical research and so-called ‘cosmetic testing’ by reflecting on instances where 
medical boundaries become permeable.   
Finally, the third section of this chapter explored how the writings of some Mass Observers 
suggest a more fundamental challenge of the biomedical field itself, with some individuals 
expressing concern over its reach and articulating different visions of health in which medical 
interventions are not always desirable. Suggested through such anxieties towards the span of 
biomedicine is that ‘saving’ human lives does not always justify the harms that such research 
inflicts on other animals. Rather, other modes of health which may centre on an embracing 
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of the vulnerability that all living beings share, that of mortality, were hinted at, perhaps 
reflecting shifting care relations in a cultural moment where the negative impact of human 
activity is being witnessed across the planet. Such ambivalences towards biomedical 
frameworks of health and the conditionalities of necessary medical research identified in the 
first section reflect that assumptions of general acceptance of animal research for medical 
purposes are overly simplistic. As this data analysis shows, visions of medical futures are not 
homogenous and there are particular expectations of medical research for it to qualify as a 
necessary use of animals. In this way, the necessity of animal use in medical research is not a 
given but is dependent on the material realisation of particular forms of healthcare and, for 
some, is situated amongst multispecies care relations that may unsettle anthropocentric 















8. Implications and conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
In investigating the research questions that have informed this study, the three empirical 
chapters of this thesis have explored the meta-themes of knowledge, care, and medicine. 
Attending to these themes, the data analysis chapters have sought to illuminate how relating 
to animal research in the everyday involves affectual as well as rational processes and how 
interactions with the topic are experienced and actively managed. Given the ethical problem 
that animal research continues to pose, understandings of the issue go beyond knowledge of 
regulation or the scientific merit of animal models and therefore this thesis has examined 
questions which are foundational to human-animal relations and interspecies ethics in the 
everyday. This is exemplified when considering what kinds of feelings are suggested in writing 
about animal research, how the topic of animal research is negotiated in everyday contexts, 
how the animals of animal research are constructed and what role species distinctions play, 
whose harms and benefits are implicated in the practice, and whether some kinds of research 
are deemed more acceptable, worthy, or necessary. 
Bringing together the insights offered in these data chapters, this final chapter aims to draw 
out the wider implications for the Mass Observation Project, the public dialogue around 
animal research, and the concept of necessity in animal research practice. In opening up the 
analytical claims offered in this thesis to the above areas, I hope to illustrate their value for 
particular audiences. These audiences include those interested in using the MOP to research 
sensitive topics, those invested in cultivating public dialogue on animal research and making 
claims about societal views towards it, and those involved in shaping the ethical review of 
projects involving animal research. As such, this chapter is organised into three sections. 
These speak to (i) those interested in using the Mass Observation Project as a qualitative 
research method, (ii) stakeholders invested in the public dialogue around animal research, 
and (iii) those whose work concerns the policy and practice of scientific animal use – 
particularly the implementation of the harm-benefit analysis. Although organised into these 
three sections and audiences, implications offered within each are also implicitly and explicitly 
directed at researchers interested in studying views and understandings of animal research, 
with suggestions being made throughout to enhance future studies in this area.  
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8.2 The MOP and methodological implications 
Having presented empirical insights garnered from my analysis of responses to the 2016 
‘Using animals in research’ Directive, I will now step back in order to comment on the 
particular context of this research, what it has covered and what it has not, and identify 
methodological lessons for future researchers interested in using the Mass Observation 
Project.  
8.2.1 The important partiality of this research 
What is offered in this thesis is an exploration of how some Mass Observers discussed the 
topic of animal research in 2016, with a focus on the particular areas of knowledge, care, and 
medical necessity. As with all research, my account of what, how, and why the Mass 
Observers mentioned in this thesis wrote about animal research is partial, with many avenues 
within the dataset left unattended to. For instance, one of these unexplored avenues was the 
figure of the ‘animal rights extremist’ which recurred across MOP responses, particularly in 
response to the section of the Directive which prompted discussion of media stories featuring 
animal research (see Appendix A). Although the historical prevalence of ‘anti-animal research’ 
activism (Illman, 2005; Franco, 2013) suggests that analysis of this theme would have been an 
important contribution to the area, I chose not to pursue this as it would have required me 
to situate within and orient towards social movements literature. Given my interests in how 
Mass Observers themselves relate to the topic of animal research, this would have diverted 
from my overall focus and therefore, although making preliminary notes on this theme, I did 
not pursue it for analysis in its own right. However, so-called ‘animal rights extremism’ and 
the figure of the extremist is still present at times in this thesis, being touched on in the first 
data chapter as an element of the public identity and in the second data chapter as one of the 
risks of working in animal research, the threat of which was for some a source of sympathy 
for animal research staff. To mention this here is to draw attention to the fact that my 
analyses of course do not tell the ‘whole story’ of the data and, indeed, are themselves 
constructions shaped by my particular relation to the MOP and the topic of animal research. 
Therefore, it is my hope that this work might inspire other future analyses (by myself or 
others) of unexplored aspects of the responses to the ‘Using animals in research’ Directive, 
highlighting different elements and offering different interpretations of Mass Observer 
writing on animal research.  
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Though MOP writing reaches into the past and the future and societal discourse around 
animal research involves recurrent themes and narratives (such as the importance of 
concepts of naturalness (Macnaghten, 2004) or analogies with eating meat (Michael and 
Brown, 2004)), the responses to this Directive are products of the temporospatial contexts in 
which they were produced and so too are my analyses of them. This means that issues of 
relevance to Mass Observers in 2016 may be diminished in later moments and the 
perceptions of animal research captured in these writings may shift. In the ways in which their 
thoughts and feelings about animal research are imbedded in everyday experiences, the 
writings of Mass Observers illustrate the fluidity and particularity of views or attitudes 
towards the practice, with my analysis directing attention towards the processes and framings 
through which individuals relate to animal research rather than fixed ethical standpoints.   
In emphasising the importance of the contexts through which the MOP responses at the heart 
of this thesis emerge, I hope to encourage further work which grapples with how animal 
research is related to within the everyday worlds which imbue it with meaning. By reflecting 
on this point as I finish writing this thesis amidst the global coronavirus pandemic, it is 
impossible not to consider how the writings of Mass Observers and the design of the ‘Using 
animals in research’ Directive might differ if produced now. How might the Directive’s 
questions about media coverage of animal research, conversations had on the topic, or 
reflection on the production of medicine be responded to in a time when the development 
of a COVID-19 vaccine is touted as the only real way out of the current crisis (Smyth, 2020)? 
To reflect on this is to recognise that each engagement with publics on animal research, 
whether soliciting their views towards the issue, facilitating discussion, or otherwise, happens 
within a particular temporospatial moment. As the references to Brexit in MOP writing on 
animal research illustrate, at certain points there may be overarching historical events which 
come to bear on scientific and ethical issues, influencing how obligations between institutions 
and citizens are politically configured.  
In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, other political currents may come to bear on 
perspectives towards animal research and the role of the individual and the figure of the 
wider public in relating to it.  For instance, media reporting of vaccine hesitancy (Siddique and 
Elgot, 2021; BBC, 2021b) or the UK government’s response to the pandemic and relationship 
with its scientific advisory group SAGE (Sample, 2020; BBC, 2021a; McMullan et al., 2021) 
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might reshape trust relationships between publics and institutions and between publics 
themselves in particular ways which bear on feelings towards the practice of animal research. 
Given the positionality of Mass Observers’ writings within the historical project of the archive, 
as a method for social scientific research the MOP promotes an attunement to the situation 
of knowledge-making in time and space. For future studies of how animal research is 
discussed or research into views or feelings towards it, it is imperative to embrace the 
locatedness of knowledge, with a need for qualitative research which allows participants to 
imbed their contributions in their everyday worlds of meaning and steers away from 
analytical generalisations. 
The importance of situating understandings of animal research within the contexts they 
emerge has led me to consider how I might have handled and analysed the MOP responses 
differently if I were to begin the project again. Having included the entire dataset in my 
analysis (see subsection 4.3 for justification of this decision), I was inevitably restricted in the 
attention I could give to each individual Observer and my exploration of the identities they 
brought to bear in their responses was limited. Therefore, if I were to start over, perhaps I 
might follow Courage’s (2018) example of using ‘vignettes’, which in their case entailed 
looking at how specific Mass Observers had responded to multiple Directives and constructing 
a narrative identity that expands beyond a singular Directive response. Such an approach 
could offer greater insight into the people behind the MO identification numbers, enabling 
this thesis to tell more of their own personal stories in which relations with animal research 
are caught up. In doing so, I could have analysed responses to other Directives with relevant 
topics, such as those with an explicit focus on animals, science, or health. As well as allowing 
for more detail in the analysis of Mass Observer identities, the use of vignettes may also better 
illustrate the complexity of understandings of animal research, with views potentially shifting 
throughout different contexts. However, although prompts exploring ‘the past’ and memories 
were present in the ‘Using animals in research’ Directive (see Appendix A), such a narrative-
focused analysis might correlate better with a Directive involving more explicit focus on life 
stages, enabling a tracking of biographical narratives in which animal research features.  
As well as being situated in the moment of solicitation, it is also important to recognise that 
the writings of Mass Observers are part of a larger project, with the longitudinal nature of the 
MOP opening their views up to rearticulation in future acts of correspondence, and also that 
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Mass Observers are often reflexive about how their views might change. For instance, the 
self-questioning that featured in each data chapter, with some Mass Observers putting down 
their opinions on animal research then immediately deliberating on their validity, illustrates 
the capacity of the MOP as a method to move away from presenting views on the issue as 
stagnant and definitive. That the MOP enables correspondents to articulate the fluidity of 
their thoughts, feelings, and opinions is a methodological benefit with significance not only 
to the animal research debate but to societal debates around contentious issues more 
generally, providing better insight into the process of understanding such topics and the 
relationality which shapes this.  
8.2.2 Ethical obligations towards Mass Observers 
As a research method, the MOP offered an innovative way of moving beyond the restrictive 
response formats of opinion polls and surveys which, as shown in the literature review, 
dominate studies of views towards animal research. Although the solicitation of writing on 
sensitive topics may raise ethical concerns (Hobson-West et al., 2019), that the MOP captured 
responses expressing resistance towards engaging with this topic is methodologically 
valuable. In allowing correspondents to articulate their resistance or ambivalence towards 
animal research beyond selecting ‘unsure’ or ‘other’ tick boxes, the MOP aids an analysis 
which grapples with the complexity of feeling towards the practice beyond the binary of 
support or opposition.  
In responding to the Directive, the majority of Mass Observers broadly followed the 
structured prompts to guide their writing. Across responses, there were varying levels of 
detail given to each prompt and a range of full response lengths. As previously discussed in 
Chapter Four, some Mass Observers wrote several pages, some a small paragraph, and a few 
Mass Observers only a line or so, expressing an inability to write about the topic or refusing 
to it engage with it, and, in doing so, communicating back to the MOP about their 
expectations for Directives. As covered in the first data chapter, rather than representing a 
failure to appropriately engage Mass Observers on the topic of animal research, the capacity 
to record disconnections with the issue and hear, even briefly, something from those who 
feel unable or unwilling to discuss it, is recognised in this thesis as of significant 
methodological value.  
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However, the prevalence of discomfort detected in my analysis of the MOP responses raises 
ethical questions for how communications, engagement events, and even research studies 
design their interactions with others on animal research and other potentially sensitive and 
distressing topics. Reflecting on my methods, I think it is important to consider whether using 
methods such as the MOP to solicit writing on animal research might represent an invasion 
of the personal domestic space with unsettling moral quandaries, leaving participants ‘alone’ 
at home with emotionally and morally troubling thoughts and feelings (Hobson-West et al., 
2019: 4). This sense of insensitivity in asking Mass Observers to write about topics which can 
be upsetting is reflected on in Bailey’s thesis on funeral attendance, with one of their 
foremost regrets in using the MOP to explore the topic being ‘the pain that was caused to 
some correspondents’ (Bailey, 2012: 159).   
Of course, there are two sides to this concern, with the time and space to think and articulate 
oneself away from the archivist or researcher that the MOP affords its correspondents being 
an important methodological benefit for research into complex and sensitive socio-ethical 
issues. As well as this, the MOP allows correspondents to skip past certain sections of the 
Directive or to not respond altogether. With the anonymity of the panel, passing on particular 
topics can be done without anxieties around judgement from the commissioner of the 
Directive. As well as this, Mass Observers often discuss their Directive topics with others, 
sometimes mentioning conversations or the thoughts of others in their responses and 
sometimes even asking someone they feel has a particularly valuable perspective to write 
part of the response (Sheridan, 1993), with the writing process thus being a shared rather 
than solitary one. And, indeed, notions of the home as the manifestation of the public/private 
divide or a space of respite are themselves far from unproblematic (Oakley, 1974; Boyd, 
1997).  
However, more than the discomfort towards knowing about animal research, it is both the 
sense of guilt and shame surrounding the desire not to know and the need for empowering 
knowledge on the topic which suggests that group-oriented methods that enable participants 
to share the burden of such thinking together may be useful for future research in this area. 
Rather than pushing for increased public knowledge of certain aspects of animal research 
practice (UAR 2014a), with such openness strategies focusing on one-way transmissions  of 
information, group-based discussions may alleviate the sense of personal moral failure that 
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some feel of their inability to engage with the topic. In this way, perhaps collective 
acknowledgment of the difficulty of knowing about animal research and the need that some 
feel to avoid the topic may lift the blame surrounding individualised ways of knowing and 
engagements with the problem of animal research might become easier.  
Indeed, collective acknowledgment of the difficulty in discussing animal research does not 
necessarily require group methods. As Jenkins and Harkins’ (2021) public engagement survey 
on multi-species dementia demonstrates, there are ways of building care for the wellbeing of 
participants into the method. In their case, the survey’s first page acknowledges that ‘[s]ome 
people can find answering questions about dementia or the use of animals upsetting’ (Jenkins 
and Harkins, 2021) and advises those who are likely to find these topics upsetting against 
participating. As well as this, the survey includes ‘temperature checks’ – pop-up questions 
which ask the participant if they ‘are experiencing any distress as a result of taking part in the 
survey’ (ibid) – with an affirmative response resulting in the survey being immediately 
terminated and the disposal of recorded information. Such an approach displays recognition 
of the affectual strain that engagement with such topics can take, taking some of the pressure 
off participants who may feel negatively, as some Mass Observers expressed in responding to 
the ‘Using animals in research’ Directive, if they are unable to cope with discussing sensitive 
topics. However, we could also argue, as I have done in this thesis, that discomfort is 
methodologically valuable and thus instead of circumventing discomfort from arising and 
being considered, perhaps it would be better to cultivate methods which make 
uncomfortable discussions manageable.  
In the first instance, this line of thinking suggests that all solicitations on the topic should 
acknowledge that animal research is, for many, a moral problem and as such may be troubling 
for those asked to participate in activities based upon its discussion. To do so, is to reshape 
expectations of what kinds of contributions can be made to such activities, moving from the 
‘capturing of views’, as if these can be neatly distilled, to hosting conversations in which 
narratives and themes can be observed and unpacked. The problem of animal research should 
not be side-stepped in such engagements but opened up for participants to articulate in their 
own ways, with an embrace of ambivalence and uncertainty rather than ‘for’ and ‘against’ 
binaries. Indeed, this data analysis has intended to promote a revaluing of ambivalence in 
discussions around animal research. As the three data chapters have shown, questions of 
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whether there should be more openness on animal research, whose care should come first 
when thinking about our ethical obligations to those implicated in the practice, and if the 
scientific use of animals is necessary remain open to multiple judgements. This cannot be 
explained as merely a symptom of ignorance or misunderstanding about the ‘facts’ of animal 
research (UAR 2009; FRAME, 2020a) but is rather a reflection of the socio-ethical problem 
posed by animal research in which there are no facts to be uncovered and learned. 
Acknowledgment of the moral and emotional conflict a sensitive topic such as animal 
research might generate and the ambivalence that some might feel when discussing it are not 
only important methodologically in encouraging rich and reflexive responses but also ethically 
important for empathising with the toll that such topics can take.  
8.3 Public dialogue on animal research 
Having analysed ways in which the Mass Observers who responded to the ‘Using animals in 
research’ relate to the issue, this section will now open up these analyses to suggest their 
implications for the wider public dialogue around animal research.  
8.3.1 The relationship between Mass Observers and ‘the public’ 
A prominent consideration throughout this thesis has been the question of who ‘the public’ 
are. Although this research has aimed to be specific in presenting an analysis of the writing of 
Mass Observers who are not intended to represent the wider public by proxy, Mass Observers 
occupy a unique position in relation to their role as ‘Observers’. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
Mass Observers are encouraged to record the views and behaviours of others around them, 
acting as both the ’Observer’ and the ‘Observed’ (Kramer, 2014). This role as ‘the people's 
representatives’ (Shaw, 1998) was demonstrated in the first data chapter ‘Knowing and not-
knowing about animal research’ and was particularly clear in Mass Observer responses to the 
final prompt in the Directive which asked: ‘Some people claim that the general public needs 
to know more about animal research, and that more ‘openness’ from scientists and the 
government is therefore needed. What do you think of this suggestion?’ (see Appendix A). 
Given that this prompt raised the suggestion of more openness around animal research in 
relation to the ‘general public’, the analysis presented in this chapter illustrated how the 
‘public’ were imagined, often being constructed as uneducated, ignorant, or irrational, with 
different consequences for their capacity for openness. In their constructions of the public, 
this chapter argued that some Mass Observers performed a responsible technopolitical 
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citizenship in their writing, presenting themselves as scientifically educated or respectful of 
the authority of experts in the animal research domain. In such performances, Mass 
Observers thus present themselves as responsible knowing subjects who, unlike the risk-
imbued entity of the general public who might weaponise such openness, can be trusted with 
more information from the bioscience sector.   
This example of the relationality of Mass Observers, who, at times, discuss the ‘general public’ 
as a collective they stand outside of, raises an important point about how identities are 
performed in writing about socio-political aspects of technoscience. This performativity, how 
views on what might be good or bad for ‘the public’ are articulated through performances of 
citizenship, has methodological implications not only for uses of the MOP but for studies of 
views towards animal research more widely. Given that many previous studies on societal 
views in this area break down views into demographic categories which constitute identity as 
static and fixed (see section 2.2 in the literature review), the role of the method in eliciting 
performances of identity is overlooked.  
As this data analysis has shown, in writing about animal research, Mass Observers often take 
particular standpoints, i.e. responding as a patient or a dog-owner or, more implicitly, a ‘good 
citizen’, each of which are identities that become relevant when locating animal research in 
particular social worlds. For instance, as discussed in the first data chapter, this performance 
of the ‘good citizen’ who can be trusted with further openness on animal research was 
expressed by some Observers in contrast to the particular figure of the irresponsible general 
public in light of the 2016 Brexit vote. Such examples illustrate that performances of 
citizenship draw on distinctions made within specific socio-temporal contexts and thus in 
seeking ‘public’ views towards an issue, researchers must first acknowledge that ‘member of 
the public’ is not a neutral position. Rather, in using methods such as the MOP which allow 
individuals to situate their responses to the topic of animal research in lived experience and 
relevant contexts, neutral framings of ‘the public’ are challenged by the emergence of specific 
positionalities through which feelings and opinions are articulated. This reaffirms both 
Sheridan’s (1996) and Pollen’s (2014) assessments that how Mass Observers write and who 
they write as are heavily influenced by the Directive.  
As well as this, the analysis presented within this thesis shows that when asking individuals 
for their views on issues in relation to the ‘general public’, they may respond by taking a 
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position within that public (Davies et al. 2020) or outside of it, marking a distinction between 
themselves and the broader public body. This raises an important methodological 
consideration not only for those seeking to capture the views of ‘the public’, but also for 
researchers using the MOP. The role of Mass Observers to document everyday life, standing 
both inside and outside of their everyday worlds in order to do so, necessitates this ‘dual 
vision’ (Kramer, 2014) oriented both inwards and outwards.  Therefore, uses of MOP writing 
should also acknowledge the role of the materials as not only historical observations but as 
performative texts through which individuals constitute their role as Mass Observer, with the 
MOP itself promoting particular ideals such as ordinariness which influence how Directives 
are responded to (see subsection 3.4.1). This means that, though admittedly tricky, analysis 
of MOP writing should be careful not to separate the identities of Mass Observers from their 
performance of doing Mass Observation and the particular ways of relating that the process 
cultivates.   
8.3.2 Communicating with care on the topic of animal research 
Throughout the data chapters, the discomfort of some Mass Observers in responding to the 
‘Using animals in research’ Directive has been a prominent theme, raising both 
methodological and ethical implications for how communications around animal research are 
performed. As the first and second data chapters illustrated, animal research can be an 
acutely uncomfortable topic for some because of the ways it unsettles existing care relations 
between humans and other animals, revealing tensions between whose care comes first. In 
mitigating the impact that encountering the topic of animal research can have, the first data 
chapter explored Mass Observer descriptions of deliberate practices of not-knowing, 
demonstrating that knowing about animal research is an active process based in emotional 
as well as rational understandings (if such a dualism can even be imposed).  
One way of understanding the need to turn away from engagements with animal research 
presented in the first data chapter is the inability to act on what one comes to know, with a 
lack of routes for laypeople to intervene in the practice (Hobson-West, 2010; Pound and 
Blaug, 2016). This sense of disempowerment in affecting change upon biomedical uses of 
animals in the everyday was often implicitly contrasted with ‘cosmetic uses’ of animals, which 
many Mass Observers discussed in ways that allowed enactment of ethical boundaries. For 
instance, buying ‘cruelty-free’ products was mentioned across many MOP responses, 
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reflecting the relevance of ethical consumption practices in everyday engagements with 
animal research. In the third data chapter, the sense of agency associated with cosmetic 
products was explained as also related to judgments of cosmetics as nonessential, particularly 
in comparison to medicine. With the necessity of biomedical advancements often being 
culturally constructed as beyond question, this chapter suggested how the case of cosmetics 
might enable Mass Observers to discuss their discomfort with animal research in a way that 
becomes clouded by taboo or ethical ambiguity when discussing medical research (an issue I 
also blogged about, see McGlacken, 2020). Such a finding suggests that in order to aid 
individuals in expressing their discomforts around animal research, dialogues around the 
issue should include discussion points which enable agentic ways of relating to the topic. In 
doing so, participants may be able to better manage the ‘heavy’ (Tessman, 2009) or 
‘uncomfortable’ (Rayner, 2012) knowledge of animal research, with the moral problem it 
poses not being diminished but recognised as caught up with real-world constraints on 
individual moral action and intervention. To acknowledge this is to reaffirm that examples 
such as the importance of choosing ‘cruelty-free’ products throughout the MOP responses 
are valid forms of moral expression, enabling individuals to demonstrate their ethical limits 
within the dilemma of animal research.  
As the introduction to this thesis described, the current openness agenda around animal 
research in the UK places its emphasis on making data about how animals are used in 
bioscience institutions available and promoting awareness of the regulatory framework which 
underpins the scientific use of animals. As argued, this approach is not limited to the 
bioscience community but is also taken by organisations campaigning against animal 
research, with the assumption that once the bioscience sector is truly ‘transparent’, publics 
will be outraged and support their efforts to abolish the practice. However, the analysis 
presented in this research reveals how, without consideration of how audiences perceive and 
manage information on animal research, this push for openness throughout the sector may 
further isolate individuals who care about those implicated in the practice yet feel unable to 
cope with such information.  
Therefore, instead of pushing one-way transmissions of information on animal research with 
the assumption that these will win the favour of public audiences, stakeholders in science-
society dialogues around the practice should acknowledge that, for some, the topic of animal 
200 
 
research is associated with discomfort and disempowerment. In accounting for this, 
communications on animal research should be conducted with care for their audience, being 
mindful of the ways in which some might feel compelled to turn away from the issue because 
they care about those implicated in it. Indeed, it is because practices of knowing and caring 
are entangled that the need to withdraw from animal research is experienced by some. As 
well as challenging the effectiveness of current openness strategies to foster productive 
science-society dialogue, this raises broader questions around the obligations that institutions 
have to care for laypeople and their capacity to manage knowledge which may be distressing.  
In beginning from a responsibility to care for publics when communicating about animal 
research, stakeholder organisations such as UAR, FRAME, CFI, RSPCA, etc. and media involved 
in promoting public dialogue around the issue should acknowledge the current burden of 
knowing associated with it, such as simply stating a recognition of the issue as an ethical 
concern that may be challenging to consider. Again, this is not to suggest that the moral 
problem of animal research should be sidestepped, but rather, to account for the impotence 
that some Mass Observers associate with animal research, routes for publics to enact their 
ethics in relation to animal research must also be present. This means that processes of 
knowing about animal research should also enable acting, and, more specifically, ways for 
publics to care for experimental animals. In promoting science-society dialogues around 
animal research with care, Engdahl and Lidskog’s (2012) discussion of the emotional basis of 
trust is relevant. They write that ‘trust cannot be achieved by being a spectator, by passively 
being fed knowledge, or by standing alone outside of social life. Instead, trust is created when 
citizens are emotionally involved, take part, have a say, and in some sense are able to 
recognize themselves in the recipient of their trust’ (Engdahl and Lidskog, 2012: 714). In 
recognising the emotional nature of engagements with issues such as animal research, 
communication must be built upon care for how publics can make meaningful use of 
opportunities to know. 
Methodologically, the finding that some Mass Observers were hesitant to know more about 
or discuss the topic of animal research highlights that studies of views towards the practice 
should not focus only on the contributions of ‘issue’ (Converse, 1964 [2006]) or ‘attentive’ 
(Devine, 1970; Adler, 1984) publics, whose positions on animal research are publicly 
vocalised, but also consider how to include those who tend to withdraw from interactions 
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with the topic due to discomfort. In both studies of views towards animal research and 
engagement activities around the issue, efforts should be sought to facilitate the involvement 
of those who feel immobilised by the issue because of their care towards those caught up in 
it. Again, for me, central to facilitating comfortable ways of expressing discomfort is for 
dialogical and participatory processes around animal research to be built on an 
acknowledgement of the moral problem of scientific animal use and the emotional difficulty 
that many individuals experience in interacting with it.  
Drawing back to the earlier point on the importance of enabling individuals to express their 
ethical limits in relation to animal research, Macnaghten’s (2003) work on environmental 
concerns and everyday practices is resonant here, signalling a ‘clear need to engage with 
people in their own terms, as responsible and capable individuals, resonating with different 
lifeworlds through lived particulars’ (Macnaghten, 2003: 82). In recognising the messiness of 
ethics in everyday life and the multiple (and, at times, conflicting) pulls on our care 
obligations, perhaps feelings of sadness, powerlessness, shame, or guilt in relation to animal 
research can become valued parts of the societal dialogue. In so doing, such feelings can thus 
be understood not as individual failings to rationally accept the ‘facts’ or live a morally 
consistent life, but as part of the shared experience of negotiating the scientific use of 
animals.  
In considering the role of care in relations with animal research this data analysis ultimately 
emphasises the entanglement of practices of knowing and caring and, in bringing insights 
from Care Ethics into the area of Public Understanding of Science, offers an expansion of both 
literatures. As discussed in subsection 2.3.4 of Chapter 2, there has been much recent 
attention given to caring practices within animal research laboratories, yet how wider publics 
might understand animal research through the lens of care has been overlooked. However, 
as the data analysis presented here has shown, care relations and obligations play an 
important role in interactions with the issue, being present not only in the dedicated data 
chapter on care (Chapter 6) but recurring throughout each data chapter.  Thus, the cultures 
of care associated with animal research facilities could be seen as expanding beyond these 
physical spaces to include wider publics who may conceptualise animal research as a way of 
caring for others and care about those involved in the practice. In doing so, as dwelled on 
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here, the responsibilities that the animal research community has to also care for publics are 
brought to the fore.  
8.3.3 Attuning to the present and the future of animal research 
As the third data chapter explored, hopes and expectations around alternatives to using 
animals were prominent in many of the MOP accounts. The prevalence of hopes for non-
human animal alternatives and the future replacement of animals in research across the MOP 
responses was understood as a way of coping with acceptance of scientific animal use in the 
present. As this chapter discussed, even amongst Mass Observers who conditionally agreed 
with the use of animals for (at least certain aspects of) medical research, hopes for the 
replacement of animal models often accompanied such acceptance. Such insights reveal how 
acceptance of the present use of animals as ‘necessary’ may be contingent on a future in 
which their use will no longer be needed.  
References to this imaginary of the future in which animal models are no longer necessary 
may also be understood as a way of demonstrating that there are ethical limits to current 
acceptance of animal research. This future can therefore be understood as an area which 
provides individuals a sense of agency in animal research discussions, enabling a move beyond 
the present claim that the scientific use of animals is necessary and thus unavoidable to a 
point when this is no longer so. That, for some Mass Observers, present acceptance of animal 
research is bound up with its future replacement implies that such articulations are not 
merely ‘wishful thinking’ but are responses to stakeholder dialogues around the practice 
which, whether asserting or challenging the current necessity of animal models, hail a future 
in which animals are no longer used. Therefore, acknowledging investments that individuals 
have in the replacement of animal models, science-society dialogues on animal research 
should strive to involve participants in specific discussions around alternatives and visions of 
the future. Linking back to the responsibilities I have suggested stakeholders have to approach 
their public interactions with care for the emotional capacity of audiences, that some may 
find it easier to discuss the area of alternatives to animal models offers an opportunity to 
foster public dialogue around animal research which is accessible and mutually productive.  
As well as acknowledging the role of future imaginaries of animal research, this analysis 
emphasises that stakeholders invested in fostering science-society dialogue around the issue 
must allow for participants to embed their views within the temporospatial contexts they 
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emerge. As the data chapters have illustrated, the broad issue of animal research is 
understood in the everyday contexts which imbue it with relevance. These may be consumer 
contexts which give salience to the prominence of discussions around ‘cruelty-free’ products, 
the relationships shared with companion species, or the political landscape which shapes 
current understandings of democracy and citizenship. In regard to the latter, given the timing 
of the ‘Using animals in research’ Directive, being administered in the summer of 2016, it may 
be unsurprising that references to ‘Brexit’ appeared in some of the responses. As discussed 
in the first data chapter, the UK’s EU referendum was relevant to some Mass Observers’ 
discussions of openness on animal research because of its impact on views towards 
democracy and trust in the capacity of the ‘general public’ to act as one’s version of a 
responsible citizen. Stepping back, references to political happenings such as Brexit reflect 
how significantly current political contexts can shape feelings towards the responsibilities of 
scientific institutions and how values such as openness and transparency come to be viewed 
as risky. In seeking to foster productive science-society dialogue on animal research, then, it 
is important to allow publics to situate their feelings towards animal research in the personal 
and political contexts which shape how the practice and science-society relations more widely 
are perceived.  
In the current climate of the global coronavirus pandemic, the hinging of an effective vaccine 
on scientific animal use has been assumed by some stakeholders as, perhaps temporarily, 
allaying previous ethical concerns towards animal research. An example of this can be seen 
in a survey investigating public opinion towards animal research during the UK’s first national 
lockdown in Spring 2020 which was commissioned by research advocacy group 
Understanding Animal Research (UAR) and conducted by Ipsos MORI (and which was also 
referred to in the literature review, see page 35). Reporting on this survey in an online 
communication titled ‘High public acceptance of animal research to find treatments for 
COVID-19’, Williams, UAR’s head of engagement, states that – 
‘[w]e know from ongoing tracking polling of public opinion that people in Great Britain 
are generally very accepting of the use of animals in research. […] However, the public 
is usually less certain about how animals are used in research, and less accepting of 
the need to use larger animals such as dogs and monkeys.  This survey shows that, 
faced with a health crisis like COVID-19, people are prepared to accept that animal 
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research is going to be necessary if treatments and vaccines are to be developed’ 
(Williams, 2020a).  
The implication is made here that in times of collective health crisis, the necessity of animal 
research is more readily accepted. However, given the restrictive nature of such surveys, the 
lack of capacity they offer for respondents to situate their feelings in the wider moment of 
the coronavirus pandemic, they do not allow for discussion of why feelings might have shifted 
and how the current context has come to bear on them. Thus, in striving to measure levels of 
‘acceptance’, ambiguities towards animal research are dismissed. For example, in the survey’s 
report, the finding that ‘62% of the UK public think the UK has strict rules governing the use 
of animals in research, but 28% gave a neutral response’ is explained away as ‘most likely 
because they are unsure about the rules and welfare standards’ (Williams, 2020b: 10). Rather 
than opening up these ‘neutral’ response options to allow respondents to explain, answers 
which do not fit into the binary positions of agree or disagree are dismissed by way of deficit-
model assumptions about respondents’ lack of knowledge or comprehension.  Given that the 
survey also found that only 51% of respondents agreed that they trust the UK government to 
find a solution to the outbreak (ibid, 12), such dismissal of these responses disregards 
apparent uncertainty towards governance at a moment of national and global crisis.  
This example illustrates the importance of allowing respondents to contextualise their 
responses in wider contexts. As references to Brexit and the untrustworthy figure of the 
general public made in some of the MOP responses demonstrate, current cultural and 
political happenings imbue concepts such as openness with meanings that are salient in that 
moment of solicitation. Yet, in doing so, interactions with publics on the topic of animal 
research should also move beyond simplistic understandings of ‘acceptance’ which ignore 
ambiguities and also the constraints that can, in a sense, coerce publics into expressing 
acceptance of animal research. Rather, acceptance is better understood here as a continual 
process which is always contingent on particular requirements and, as the third data chapter 
explored, may be entwined with particular expectations of the future. This thesis therefore 
supports further qualitative studies which allow participants to locate their understandings 
of animal research in lived contexts and resist closure of such narratives, instead, identifying 
the socio-temporal contingencies upon which acceptable scientific uses of animals hinge and 
attending to the socio-ethical practices through which the problem of animal research is 
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continually negotiated. Without such an approach, studies of how individuals relate to animal 
research risk further straining science-society relations around the issue, lending to 
interpretations which could further alienate publics who care about the practice and sow 
more distrust amongst those critical of it. In other words, instead of helping to understand 
and address societal views and concerns towards animal research, such studies may in fact 
work to exacerbate unease around it.  
8.4 Accepting and resisting the current necessity of animal models in biomedicine 
In identifying the implications of Mass Observer constructions and deconstructions of 
necessity in animal research, this section sets out the importance of understandings of the 
purpose of biomedical research and the role of future imaginaries for animal research policy 
and practice.  
8.4.1 Accounting for societal understandings of necessity in the harm-benefit analysis 
In exploring how Mass Observers understand the necessity of animal research, the analysis 
presented in the third data chapter challenges the authority of science to decide what forms 
of research are not only scientifically but socio-ethically acceptable or not. This chapter 
examined how animal research is judged to be necessary and key to this was the purpose of 
advancing medicine, chief components of which were tangible healthcare applications, 
prioritising medical applications which can prevent human suffering or save lives, and the 
future replacement of animal models with alternatives.   
In looking at what constitutes medical research in Mass Observer responses, numerous 
references were made to cosmetic uses of animals. As discussed earlier in this chapter, this 
worked as a contrast with medical research which enabled Mass Observers to clearly 
demarcate ethical boundaries in the scientific use of animals. Yet, some Mass Observers also 
reflected on the overlap between ‘cosmetic’ and ‘medical’ categories, describing instances 
where cosmetic products and procedures may serve ‘medical’ purposes and unsettling the 
power of the medical signifier to characterise necessity. As well as this, some Mass Observers 
put forward a broader questioning of the role of the definition and authority of medicine 
itself, with some expressing anxieties over the assumed inherent desirability of medical 
interventions, particularly those that seek to extend the human lifespan at the expense of 
shortening those of other animals.  
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The implication of this blurriness between the categories of the medical and the cosmetic is 
not to contend that using animals for cosmetics-related testing should be accepted but to 
challenge the exceptional status afforded to the field of medicine. In illustrating the 
permeability of the medical and the cosmetic, it is my intention to add to a critical 
understanding of the ‘medical’ in the animal research domain and unsettle the ease with 
which the ban on cosmetic research across the EU (EU Directive, 2010) is gestured to as a 
signifier of moral boundaries in biomedicine (McGlacken, 2020). Indeed, despite having 
different and often conflicting positions on the necessity of the scientific use of animals, 
campaigning organisations in the animal research domain largely assume a homogenous 
societal vision for medical progress, with the divergences between them centring on the 
adequate means to achieve this. However, as this analysis suggests, some individuals may 
approach the question of a need to use animals in biomedicine from a more foundational 
questioning of the medical endeavour itself.  
This third data chapter also reflected on the role of the futures promised in medical 
experiments and how, for some Mass Observers, assessments of the necessity and value of 
experiments using animals emerge with expectations of a timeline of when everyday 
healthcare benefits will be witnessed. Such expectations mean that the outcomes of such 
research must not belong to a future too distant as to have only a vague suggestion of how 
they will be realised. These insights reflect the situation of judgments of the necessity of 
animal research in temporal care relations which demand that the harms inflicted upon 
animals provide substantial, worthy, and timely clinical benefits, thus contesting the 
production of knowledge for ‘its own sake’. However, in considering the high-profile cases of 
Dolly the sheep and the Vacanti mouse, experiments which they perceived as pointless at the 
time, other Mass Observers discussed how some clinical benefits may only be properly 
understood at a later date. Yet also at work here are assessments of risks posed by animal 
research, meaning that usage of a harm-benefit framework should involve mitigating not only 
the harms posed to research animals, but to humans through the cultivation of certain 
medical futures. Such concerns around the reach of medicine and the possibility that, rather 
than alleviating health issues currently faced, some medical research areas may be generating 
problematic healthscapes are important to acknowledge in decision-making processes which 
consider not only the ethics of specific research proposals, but their societal necessity. 
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In their consideration of how to clarify what is meant by valid or worthwhile benefits, Eggel 
and Grimm (2018) propose an alternative model of project evaluation. They advocate for the 
replacement of the HBA with ‘a “harm-knowledge-analysis” (HKA) for prospective project 
evaluation and an analysis of the societal benefits in a retrospective evaluation in the form of 
systematic reviews’ (Eggel and Grimm, 2018: 11). In this model, ‘the inflicted harm on animals 
would be weighed against and justified by the expected knowledge gain’, the importance of 
which, they suggest, ‘would be qualified by its impact on a given research field or research 
objective (i.e., important human interests)’ (ibid). In following this reworking of the HBA, 
criteria for what would constitute valid societal benefits would need to be identified on the 
political level and there would also need to be retrospective evaluation of whether research 
endeavours have met such criteria (ibid, 12). Also concerned with a lack of specification over 
the validity of benefits is animal law scholar Blattner (2019), who argues that in scientific 
terms, ‘to offer benefits, a research project must produce recognizable results of scientific 
value’, crucially however, from a societal perspective, ‘only socially desirable objectives can 
be pursued in an experiment’ (ibid). 
Given the social and ethical importance of defining what benefits are necessary to pursue for 
society, the role of publics and the ways in which they can contribute to decision-making 
processes in the animal research domain deserves greater attention. This raises the question 
of whether lay members of animal welfare ethical review bodies (AWERBS) who are involved 
in the process of reviewing research proposals involving animal use at their institution and 
deciding whether or not to grant a research license, should be involved in assessing not only 
the ethical harms posed by animal experiments but also their societal necessity. Indeed, on 
this point, McLeod and Hartley (2018) observe that ‘[s]ome animal welfare organizations have 
called for greater public scrutiny of project license applications before they are approved, but 
these calls have been unheeded on the basis that the public is not qualified to scrutinize 
animal research proposals’ (McLeod and Hartley, 2018: 731). Given the reliance on the 3Rs to 
demonstrate responsible governance in the animal research domain, they contend that ‘[t]oo 
often, a 3Rs approach to responsibility closes down opportunities to challenge the political 
dimensions of animal research, particularly its purpose’ (ibid, 735).  
Although produced close to two decades ago, still resonant with this analysis is the Animal 
Procedures Committee’s (now Animals in Science Committee) 2003 review of what was then 
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termed the ‘cost-benefit assessment’ in animal research. The APC advise that past benefits 
provided from animal research and the projection of potential future benefits should not 
determine ‘that the benefits of proposed experiments should go unquestioned’ (APC 2003: 
24). Rather, they contend that ‘in assessing scientific validity, critical evaluation of the need 
to use animals is always required, along with exhaustive, on-going efforts to avoid using 
animals wherever possible’ (ibid, 23). This suggests that publics have much to offer the harm-
benefit review of animal experiments, in helping to assess what the 2003 APC report describes 
as ‘possibly the most difficult and contentious part’ (ibid, 24) of the process, evaluating the 
likeliness that they will produce valuable benefits. As the APC state, ‘[p]eople's perceptions 
of what counts as a 'worthwhile' benefit vary’ and there is ‘disagreement about who has the 
expertise to make such judgements, who can be trusted to do so, and whether there is 
sufficient transparency in the process at present’ (ibid).  
Despite shifts towards openness throughout the bioscience sector (UAR 2014a), similar 
concerns around the transparency of the harm-benefit analysis are articulated in the ASC’s 
2017 review of the harm-benefit analysis (ASC 2017: 58). Highlighting the lack of any formal 
capacity to identify and understand societal concerns, the report contends that ‘[a]t present, 
societal concerns relevant to harms and benefits (along with important ethical concerns and 
novel or contentious issues) are not well defined. In addition, there is no clear mechanism for 
ensuring that the diversity of relevant issues is identified and given due scrutiny within the 
project evaluation and HBA processes’ (ASC 2017: 62). Concurrent with the ASC report, the 
analysis presented in the third data chapter of the thesis underscores the need for more 
attention to societal views on the proposed benefits of scientific animal use as well as the 
potential harms. 
Speaking to this, the data analysis presented in this thesis supports the call for ethical review 
processes which are more attentive to societal judgments of necessity and benefit, which may 
at times conflict with dominant ideas of bioscientific and medical progress. As the second data 
chapter argued, the desirability of benefits of animal research can be seen as drawing on 
frameworks of care, in which the use of animals acts as a way of caring for the health of others 
near and far, now and in the future. This suggests that mechanisms of assessing the societal 
necessity of benefits should employ a lens of care in order to identify whether proposed 
research chimes with existing care relations, which, as the third data chapter showed, are not 
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always based in human exceptionalism and species boundaries. Rather, sense-making around 
which kinds of experimental animal use are necessary are also informed by care obligations 
to ourselves, other humans, and to the non-human animals caught up in our healthcare 
systems. In recognising the role of care relations rather than abstract ethical principles in 
judging whether biomedical uses of animals are necessary or not, decisions around necessity 
become much more nuanced.  
As discussed in the third data chapter, care obligations to others complicate simple and 
absolute ideas of necessity, with tensions between care relations generating 
characterisations of animal research as a ‘necessary evil’ (Blakemore, 2008; Masterton et al., 
2014; Franco and Olsson, 2016), as a practice which conflicts with one’s ethics of care towards 
certain members of their moral community but is at times felt to be necessary for the sake of 
others. Therefore, this suggests that in seeking to monitor areas of particular societal concern 
as the ASC report alludes to, the ethical review of animal research should consider the issue 
through a lens of care, identifying how procedures using animals for medical research might 
enhance or conflict with existing care relations in the community. This could be enacted at 
both national and local levels, with considerations of how care relations shape 
understandings of animal research helping the ASC to identify areas of societal concern which 
can then aid harm-benefit analyses at the local AWERB level.  
8.4.2 The importance of replacement to accepting the current usage of animals as necessary  
Also tied up with constructions of the necessity of animal research, as discussed earlier in this 
final chapter, are hopes for and expectations of its eventual replacement with non-human 
animal alternative models. In recognising hopes for this particular future of biomedical 
research as crucial to acceptance of the practice in the here-and-now, the investment of 
resources into developing alternatives can be more explicitly framed as an issue of public 
interest. Following this, the ways in which research projects might build into or divert away 
from imagined biomedical futures can be reframed as potential benefits or harms which 
should be accounted for in the ethical review process.  
Such an argument again reaffirms suggestions made in the APC’s review of the cost-benefit 
analysis. For instance, opening the review is a letter to the Minister from then chair of the 
APC Michael Banner, which insists that the bioscience sector must not rest on acceptance of 
the use of animals as a ‘regrettable necessity’ –  
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‘For many people the use of animals is thought of as a regrettable necessity; in that 
context, there can be no satisfaction with the status quo, but only a determination to 
consider what steps can be taken, compatible with legitimate scientific progress, to 
avoid or reduce animal suffering’ (APC 2003: 1). 
In emphasising the need for continual critical reflection on how to progress bioscientific 
research in ways which avoid or reduce animal suffering, Banner hits on a point made in the 
data analysis presented in the third data chapter of this thesis, that the animal research 
community should not rest on the repeated claim that publics accept animal research as 
necessary when no alternatives are available and no ‘unnecessary’ suffering is involved (for 
examples of this, see Clemence and Leaman, 2016; Ipsos MORI, 2018; Williams, 2020b). To 
view such claims as evidence of trust in the rigour of the ethical review process or to interpret 
them as signalling a broad ‘public acceptability’ of the practice is to ignore the constraints 
which border such ‘acceptability’. Indeed, another way of reading this claim would be to point 
attention to the investment of publics in developing alternative models and preventing animal 
suffering in science altogether. 
In dwelling on the current reliance on animal models as necessary and trying to measure 
levels of acceptance in relation to conditions which are perhaps more ethically palatable but 
arguably misleading, attention is shifted away from the ethical urgency of and emotional 
investment individuals have in replacement. For instance, public acceptance of the necessity 
of animal research is framed as hinging on two conditions which are themselves problematic, 
such as the idea of only inflicting ‘necessary suffering’ or presenting the lack of alternatives in 
an apolitical way, ignoring critiques that claim research into replacement is globally 
underfunded (Herrmann, 2019). To read such constrained acceptance as signifying support 
for the practice is to ignore how this is infused with turmoil and regret, enabling efforts spent 
on replacement as a bonus to rather than a prerequisite of ‘acceptance’ in the here-and-now. 
By overlooking the conditions through which acceptance of animal research emerges and the 
discomfort that still surrounds it, societal concerns towards the practice are left unidentified 
and unaddressed in science-society dialogues, risking undermining recent emphases on 
fostering better communication and engagement with publics and, further, corroding the 
social contract seen as legitimising the scientific use of animals.   
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Schuppli and Weary (2010) summarise that the ‘[s]ocial acceptance of use of animals in 
scientific research hinges upon the perceived benefits of the research and concern for the 
suffering of the animals’ (Schuppli and Weary, 2010: 695). As the data analysis presented in 
this thesis has shown, necessary scientific uses of animals can differ and, for many, the future 
replacement of animal models is crucial to accepting their use in the present. Going forward, 
in order to develop better understandings of valid societal purposes for using animals in 
biomedicine, there is a need for further qualitative social scientific research which critically 
explores understandings of healthcare and the role that biomedicine plays within this. In 
exploring the relation between frameworks of human health, in which medical progress has 
become predominant, and multispecies ethics of care which ask how we can better coexist 
with other animals, criteria upon which the necessity of animals in scientific research rests 
can be identified and unpacked, perhaps revealing ruptures in the notion that medical uses 
of animals are perceived as inherently necessary. This is a continual project that, in line with 
the conditionalities of current acceptance of animal research, must be ongoing until societal 
expectations are met and animal models are replaced with non-human animal alternatives.  
 8.5 Conclusion 
In seeking to answer questions that have emerged through this research, the data analysis 
presented in this thesis has focused on the ways in which the issue of animal research is 
interacted with and managed in everyday life, what kinds of concepts and emotions that 
thinking about and discussing animal research can generate, and whose interests are 
considered (and how) when thinking about animal research. Attending to the relational 
processes through which individuals relate to the topic of animal research in the everyday, 
this data analysis has sought to validate the importance of the entanglement of emotion and 
rationality in understandings of the issue, considering the role of care relations, both intimate 
and distant, which are affectual and material rather than calculative.  
I have argued that the use of animals in scientific research has come to represent a way to 
channel care towards the self and others, an investment in healthy futures for humans near 
and far and, further, part of an obligation that we share as parents and caregivers, friends and 
relatives, and members of society to prevent and alleviate human suffering. However, at the 
same time, biomedical research efforts are often clouded by regret when the involvement of 
animals is placed centre-stage. This regret and the way in which some Mass Observers 
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discussed strategies of not-knowing to avoid the emotional impact of encountering the topic 
highlights what has often been overlooked in previous studies concerned with ‘views towards’ 
animal research; that is the ubiquity of ambivalence, rather than simplistic polarised positions 
in support of or opposition to the practice. In this way, animal research remains a deeply 
uncomfortable topic for some individuals, with the ethical dilemmas it poses being currently 
irreconcilable.  
In considering the problems that animal research continues to pose, this thesis has argued 
that the development of non-human animal alternatives and the full replacement of animal 
models is a source of hope to many and, indeed, expectations that this future is beckoning 
are central to accepting some forms of scientific animal use in the present. To acknowledge 
this is to accept that animal research remains societally problematic, conflicting with 
commonly held values around the treatment of non-human animals and human-animal 
relations, the importance of which mean that utilitarian methods of weighing harms against 
benefits cannot entirely resolve discomfort with the practice. Therefore, instead of striving to 
explain away concerns through appeals to the current necessity of animal models to medical 
advancement and the strength of regulation, it is my contention that science-society relations 
around animal research would fare better with honest acceptance of the moral trouble and 
discomfort at the centre of the issue. To do so is not to denigrate the commitment to 
responsible scientific practice and animal welfare of those working with animals in research; 
it is not to reinforce black and white notions of good and evil. Rather, acknowledgment of 
concerns and ambivalence around animal research, which do not necessarily translate into 
clear opposition to the practice and indeed may accompany its acceptance, allows for 
conversations around what ‘we’ as a society feel about the practice to move beyond 
professional reputation management and collectively grapple with the complexity of 
understandings of the issue. In being careful to refrain from treating concerns around animal 
research as an inherent attack on those who are professionally invested in it, such expressions 
can be opened up and engaged with in ways which would better alert the bioscientific 
community to the socio-ethical parameters that shape good practice and help to identify 
societal priorities around the scientific use of animals going forward.  
Concern towards the use of animals in science consistently motivates better policy and 
practice and such concern comes from both within the bioscientific community and outside 
213 
 
of it. Indeed, reporting on a 2011 Nature poll examining bioscientists’ views on animal rights 
extremism, Cressey (2011) writes that ‘[i]t can be challenging to explain the type of nuanced 
positions on animal research that the poll revealed: 33% of respondents had “ethical 
concerns” about the role of animals in their current work’ (Cressey, 2011: 453). That scientists 
who work with animal models might have ethical concerns may seem challenging to 
understand at first glance, however, this is only so if we continue with the idea that the moral 
question of animal research is settled and that discussion of the issue should now tackle only 
the science. Such a framework constructs ethical concern around animal research as 
belonging only to those outside of the bioscientific community, as a hostile force which is 
borne from misunderstanding or ignorance. It reinforces the polarisation between scientists 
using animals and those whose concerns are most vocal or visible, such as campaigning 
organisations and activists. However, I believe that recognition of the ethical problem at the 
core of the scientific use of animals is key to good practice. Discussing what American bio-
mathematician Carol M. Newton termed the ‘3 Ss: Good Science, Good Sense and Good 
Sensibilities’, Smith and Hawkins (2016) emphasise empathy as crucial to good sensibility in 
the scientific use of animals, with empathy for research animals being ‘a prerequisite for the 
reduction of suffering and a “life worth living” for the animals’ (Smith and Hawkins, 2016: 3).  
In my view, this empathy for research animals should be based in a recognition that the 
current situation is ethically problematic, that the material situation they exist within is not 
in their interests and, although positive animal welfare can be worked towards in the confines 
of research facilities, the very use of animals as means for primarily human ends remains 
fraught with ethical concerns.  
Given that we are all implicated in the scientific use of animals, as funders through taxation, 
as beneficiaries of the knowledge and applications it generates, and as citizens who give 
legitimacy to the social contract upon which animals can be justifiably used, concerns towards 
the practice are the concerns of those whose name animals are used in. In this sense, an open 
embracing of such concerns is a democratic obligation, and, as one Mass Observer (T1843) 
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Appendix A: Summer 2016 Directive: Part 1: ‘Using animals in research’ and Part 2: ‘Being 
‘thrifty’’ 
 
The Mass Observation Project  
      Summer 2016 Directive  
Part 1: Using animals for 
research  
Experiments on animals are widely used to understand 
disease and to develop and test new medicines. However, 
using animals for this kind of research remains 
controversial. Is animal research necessary to understand 
and improve human health, or are there other ethical 
issues to consider?  
  
Before you read on, please note down the immediate phrases or images that come to mind 
when you hear the term ‘laboratory animal research’.  
  
Thinking back  
  
Over the years, there have been many highly publicised examples of animal experiments, 
and coverage of protests against animal research. Are there any examples that you 
specifically remember?   
  
Have any media stories you may have seen prompted you to have conversations with 
friends or family about this topic? Have your own views on the subject changed over time?    
  
Everyday life   
  
Do you have any personal experience of working in an environment where research using 
animals was/is carried out?   
  
Please start each part of your Directive 
reply on a new sheet of paper with your 
MO number, sex, age, marital status, the 
town or village where you live and your 
occupation or former occupation.  
  
Remember not to identify yourself or 
other people inadvertently within your 
reply. It is best to use initials instead of 
real names.  
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Were animals used in science classes at your school or college? How did you feel about this 
at the time, and do you have any reflections now looking back?   
  
When taking medicines or buying them for you and your family members, to what extent do 
you think about the scientific research on animals that went into producing them?   
Policy and practice  
  
What are your impressions of the people who work in laboratories that use animals for 
research?   
  
Are there some species of animal that shouldn’t be used for research, and other species that 
are more acceptable? Please give details.   
  
Some people claim that the general public needs to know more about animal research, and 
that more ‘openness’ from scientists and the government is therefore needed.  What do you 
think of this suggestion?  
 
Part 2:  Being ‘thrifty’   
 
This Directive is about how you manage resources around the 
house. Do you ‘make do and mend’, or do you prefer to buy 
new when something is broken? Those who have been writing 
for MO for a while may remember that we issued a similar 
Directive in the 1980s.  This Directive revisits the subject to see 
if, and how, things have changed.   
  
Being thrifty   
  
What do you think of when you think of thrift or being thrifty?  
  
Is being thrifty generational?  Can you remember your parents or grandparents doing 
anything specifically to save resources?   
  
Do you have any objects, handed down to you, which you still use today (kitchen utensils; 
furniture, gardening equipment or tools)? Why do you keep these? Are they better than the 
ones you can buy today?   
  




What things do you do to be economical with your resources? Maybe you collect rainwater, 
or darn socks?  Are you committed to knitting, mechanics, baking or DIY?  Maybe you never 
Please start each part of your 
Directive reply on a new sheet of 
paper with your MO number, sex, 
age, marital status, the town or 
village where you live and your 
occupation or former occupation.  
  
Remember not to identify yourself 
or other people inadvertently within 
your reply. It is best to use initials 
instead of real names.  
243 
 
waste food, preferring to freeze it or give it away?  Please share any tips, no matter how 
trivial you might think they are!  
  
Do you do any of these activities for pleasure (as a hobby)? Or, do you do them out of 
necessity to save money?  
  
Thrift and time  
  
Have these tasks become part of your everyday routine?  Do you do things at set times 
every day or week or perhaps every month/season/year? Does being thrifty take time and 
planning?    
  
Thrift and waste  
  
How does being thrifty relate to being environmentally responsible?  Is this a new thing?  
Are we all consuming too much?  What about the push to reduce food waste?  
  
What do the terms ‘upcycling, recycling and reuse’ mean to you? Do you do any/ all of these 
things? How do you do them?    
  
Your neighbourhood   
  
Thinking now about your neighbours, do you share things with them such as food or tools?  
How much do you rely on them to help you out with lending, borrowing and sharing, or 
helping with tasks around the home?  If not your neighbours, what other networks or 
groups do you rely upon to get by?  
  
Local events   
  
The 1987 Directive talked specifically about Jumble Sales. These seem to be a thing of the 
past, but what other events are popular in your community?    
  
Please let us know if you have seen any thrifty events advertised in your local area. This could 
be a food bank, or a ‘Bring and Buy’ sale, Jacobs Joins, Pot Lucks or a clothes swapping party. 
Who attends these events? Have you attended anything like this?  
  
Are there more or less of these events then there were 10 years ago? In what ways have they 
changed and in what ways have they stayed the same?  Do people get more out of such events 
than just being thrifty, such as meeting new people and making friends?  Please share any 
thoughts.    
 _____________________________________   
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Please post your response to: Freepost: RTGU-AYJE-YSSC, The Mass Observation Archive, The Keep, 
























Appendix B: Summer 2009 Directive: Part 1: ‘Animals and humans’ and Part 2: ‘Heaven and 
hell’ and Part 3: ‘Swine flu or H1N1’ 
 
The Mass Observation Project  
 Summer 2009 Directive  
  
Part 1: Animals and humans  
 
This directive is about the part played by animals in your life, 
from your childhood until the present day. You may live and 
work with animals or rarely encounter them – whatever your 
circumstances we are interested in your experiences with 
animals and any stories you can tell us which throw light on 




What do animals mean to you?  
Before you answer the more specific questions below, please could you jot down ten 
separate words or phrases which describe what animals mean to you.  
 
Childhood and animals  
What part did animals play during your childhood? Did you read stories about animals? 
See films about animals? Visit zoos or circuses? Ride horses? Have pets? If you had a 
pet please can you describe your relationship with them. Were you responsible for looking 
after a pet? Did you experience the death of a pet? How did this make you feel?    
 
What part do animals now play in your life?  
Are animals part of your daily life? If so, please can you describe your involvement with 
them and your relationship to them.   
  
Has the type of animal you’re involved with changed over time? Are animals relevant to 
you in any other way? Do you see this as being typical of your community or social group?   
  
Living with animals  
Do you share your home with any animals or have you done so in the past? How would 
you describe your relationship with them? Is it similar to or different from your 
relationship/s with the people who you share your home with or are close to?   
As usual, please start each 
part of your directive reply 
on a new sheet of paper with 
your MO number (NOT 
name), sex, age, marital 
status, the town or village 
where you live and your 
occupation or former 
occupation.  
  
Remember not to identify 
yourself or other people 





Please describe your daily routine with an animal that you feel or have felt particularly 
close to. How would you describe your relationship with this animal?   
  
If you have never shared your home with an animal please could you tell us if there is any 
reason for this.   
  
PLEASE TURN OVER  
 
Working with animals  
Do you work with animals? How would you describe your relationship with the animals that 
you work with?   
  
Please can you provide an account of your working day and your interactions with the 
animals you work with. Do you get attached to any of them?   
 
Animals and well-being  
Do animals contribute to your well-being in any way?   
Do they enable you to meet people? How?  
Have you experienced the death of a companion animal? How did this make you feel? 
What made you feel better?  
 
Animals as food  
Do you eat animals/wear clothing made from animal products?   
If you do, how does this relate to the way you feel about animals?   
If you are a vegetarian please can you tell us how you became one and the reasons for 
this, particularly if they relate to your feelings about animals.   
 
Animal welfare  
Are you concerned about the welfare of the animals that provide us with food and/or 
clothing?  Do you support any animal welfare organisations? Might you consider leaving a 
bequest to an animal charity? What do you feel about people who donate to animal 
welfare in this way?  
 
Sport  
Are you involved in any sport with animals? (This could be racing, hunting, shooting, 
fishing). Please can you describe your relationship to the animals involved.   
Do you oppose any sports involving animals? Please can you describe the form this 
opposition takes. 
 
Television and films  
Do you watch television programmes or films about animals? What sort of 
programmes/films are they and what is it about them that you enjoy?  
 
Wild animals  
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Do you have any relationship with wild animals? Do you feed birds or other animals in 
your garden? Do you consider any animals to be vermin?   
Have you been ‘on safari’ or to a wildlife reserve?   
Are you involved in any conservation projects or environmental organisations? Why?   
 
And now we’d like you to think about these more general questions  
What is it that distinguishes a pet from other animals?  
It is often said that a dog is a person’s best friend. Do you think there is any truth in this? 
People sometimes say that their animals are part of their family – has this been your 
experience?  
Have you encountered any cultural or national differences in the way we relate to 
animals?  
 







This Directive is about ‘heaven’ and ‘hell’.  What do these words actually mean to 
us nowadays?  
  
• What do ‘heaven’ and ‘hell’ mean to you? What sorts of feelings, 
images or relationships come to you when you use or hear these words? 
(Please expand, or even illustrate)  
  
• What do you think about the idea of an afterlife? Do you spend time 
thinking about this? What do you think determines what happens to us in 
the afterlife?  
  
• Where did your first ideas about heaven and hell come from? How 
have your ideas of heaven and hell changed over time? Have your 
experiences of life changed your ideas about heaven and hell?  
  
• How do you think science has changed how we think about the 
afterlife? Do you think our understandings of heaven have been, or will be, 
affected by the ongoing scientific exploration of the universe?  
  
• Why do you think people have ideas about heaven and hell?  
 
Part 3: Swine flu or H1N1  
Please start both Part 2 and Part 3 of your 
directive reply on a new sheet of paper with 
your MO number and a brief biography (see 
page 1).  
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What do you think about the swine flu pandemic so far?  
  
Views please on the whole issue, publicity and media coverage, health advice, 
fears for the future.   
  
Please include, as always, your own direct experience either of the illness or of any 
preparations to cope you have witnessed or done yourself.   
  
How concerned are you for yourself and those near to you?  
  
Have you been involved in any outbreaks? If so how has it affected you?   
  
Have you changed your own behaviour in any way? More careful hand-washing?   




Please post your response to:    
The Mass Observation Archive, FREEPOST BR 2112, The Library, University of 
Sussex, Brighton BN1 1ZX      Or by email to: moa@sussex.ac.uk  
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